Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO1275
2006-06-05 11:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S.

Tags:  OPDC PREL BK NATO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3666
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001275 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, FRIED, VOLKER),D (SMITH),P (BAME),
EUR/SCE (ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR
WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016
TAGS: OPDC PREL BK NATO
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S.
TROOP REDUCTION

REF: STATE 84064

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney for Reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

This is an Action Request, please see para. 5.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001275

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, FRIED, VOLKER),D (SMITH),P (BAME),
EUR/SCE (ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS),NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR
WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016
TAGS: OPDC PREL BK NATO
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S.
TROOP REDUCTION

REF: STATE 84064

Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney for Reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

This is an Action Request, please see para. 5.


1. (C) Summary: Bosnian leaders, particularly those from
Bosniak Muslim parties, were unhappy and apprehensive about
the news, delivered per reftel, that the U.S. troop presence
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) would be diminished in the
coming months and the U.S. presence at Eagle Base, Tuzla,
ended. They were particularly anxious about the potential
impact of the downsizing during the current election
campaign. The Ambassador reassured the BiH leadership that
the U.S. would continue its involvement in Bosnia, including
through bilateral military engagement. The Bosniak reaction
is expected; we can help alleviate the apprehension through a
careful media strategy (worked out in tandem with NATO HQ),a
remaining visible U.S. presence at least through October
elections, and a range of possible bilateral initiatives that
will ease the sting of withdrawal. End Summary

Visceral Bosniak Reaction


2. (C) In a series of four meetings, the Ambassador
delivered reftel news of U.S. troop reduction and withdrawal
from Eagle Base, Tuzla, to the members of the Tri-Presidency
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),Prime Minister Terzic, and
Defense Minister Radovanovic. Bosniak Presidency Member
Tihic, deeply unhappy, privately told the Ambassador that he
viewed the departure of the U.S. forces as a signal that the
U.S. is "no longer interested" in BiH, though he fortunately
toned down his rhetoric in the Ambassador's subsequent
meeting with the entire Tri-Presidency. During that
discussion, Croat member of the Tri-Presidency Jovic
underscored the need to properly engage the Bosnian public
through well-publicized bilateral events, both within and
outside the military sphere, aimed at demonstrating an
ongoing U.S. presence in BiH. Prime Minister Terzic, too,
had a visceral initial reaction, proclaiming dramatically

that the closure of Eagle Base will be "a huge issue" for the
Bosniaks during the upcoming pre-election campaign.

Defense Minister Pragmatic, Focused on Future


2. (C) As ever pragmatic, Defense Minister Radovanovic
acknowledged the importance of the transition as a reflection
of Bosnia's future. Radovanovic told the Ambassador that he
will a create commission composed of BiH Ministry of Defense
(MOD),NATO HQ, and local officials to develop a long-term
strategy for utilizing Eagle Base once the remaining U.S.
troops depart. The commission will discuss the possibility
of retaining part of the complex to meet future NATO
requirements for accessible military facilities as well as
possible U.S. bilateral needs. (Note: We are highly
skeptical that the Bosnians will have either the resources or
the institutional ability to retain Eagle Base for any
practical use. More likely, it will be shut down following
the U.S. departure and the subsequent EUFOR drawdown.)
Radovanovic emphasized the growing political importance of
timely BiH membership in Partnership for Peace, commenting
that failure to gain entry by the November NATO Summit in
Riga would adversely affect the momentum of defense reform.
The Ambassador concurred about the importance of PfP for
Bosnia, underscoring the need for movement on political
criteria regarding the ICTY as the single remaining
precondition.

Questions Regarding Disposition of Tuzla Base


3. (C) During the Radovanovic meeting, a number of questions
arose related to ownership of Eagle Base. During the
transition from SFOR to EUFOR, the U.S. retained control of
the airfield and EUFOR assumed jurisdiction over the base.
U.S. ownership of other facilities within Eagle Base is
unclear, however. Prior to the arrival of the stabilization
forces in 1994, Eagle Base served as a Yugoslav National Army
(JNA) site. Under the 2004 Defense Law, the facility should
theoretically resort to ownership by the BiH MOD. As the
U.S. withdraws, BiH officials will look to the U.S. to ensure
property claims are clarified appropriately and in line with
BiH law and U.S.-BiH historical agreements.


SARAJEVO 00001275 002 OF 002


Comment and Action Request


4. (C) Equating the troop reduction with overall U.S.
"abandonment", as both Tihic and Terzic rather
melodramatically put it, will be a common theme among Bosnian
Muslims once the word spreads of the impending drawdown. For
Bosniaks, the troop reduction validates long standing fears
that the U.S. will forsake BiH, leaving the Bosnian Muslims
to the same Europeans who failed to react adequately in the
1992-95 timeframe. The impact of the U.S. drawdown optic
will have even greater resonance in Bosnia's pre-election
atmosphere, already heated by Serb references to separatist
referenda. To counter the accusations of abandonment, the
Embassy is engaging NATO HQ Sarajevo to develop a
comprehensive public affairs strategy; continued visible U.S.
engagement will be critical to a successful transition. We
would also recommend that a U.S. presence at Eagle Base be
maintained at least through October elections (also the
timeframe for Kosovo status discussions) as reassurance.


5. (C) Action Request: Other bilateral initiatives, some
with military benefit in their own right, could also help to
ease the sting of the U.S. withdrawal. Among those deserving
of strong consideration are:

-- EUCOM can develop a strong Theater Security Cooperation
(TSC) plan which emphasizes, in addition to our ongoing
military assistance, a continual bilateral training and
exercise relationship with the AFBiH. The U.S. could gain
valuable public diplomacy traction if such a plan were
announced before the actual troop reduction occurs. A
visible demonstration within the next few months of our
over-the-horizon capability via military exercise would also
help reduce Bosniak anxiety over the U.S. restructuring.
Another ship visit in early Fall would help in this regard,
as well.

-- Meetings with local defense attaches here in Sarajevo have
highlighted the stalled progress of the NATO Trust Fund,
established to help with the demobilization of soldiers made
redundant by defense reform. A relatively small but widely
heralded U.S. donation to the Trust Fund could encourage
others to contribute and again give us a much needed bump in
our public relations effort.

-- The postponed Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDC) could
be held this summer, another venue in which our bilateral
relationship and TSC plan are reviewed, formalized and made
ready for an early Fall announcement.

-- Finally, increased FMF and IMET funding is important to
send a strong message of bilateral support and assistance.
Bosnia has already contributed troops to the coalition effort
in Iraq and would take the necessary steps to field a
presence in Afghanistan, if the funds were available.
Increased FMF, however, will be necessary to accomplish this
until such time as Bosnia is eligible for PfP coalition
funds.
MCELHANEY