Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SARAJEVO1020
2006-05-09 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA: RELIGION AND POLITICS APPEALING MIX FOR

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI BK 
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VZCZCXRO8287
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1020/01 1291313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091313Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3457
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001020 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(ENGLISH, FOOKS, MITCHELL, SAINZ),NSC FOR BRAUN, OSD FOR
FLORY, USNIC FOR WEBER AND GREGORIAN, VATICAN CITY FOR
SANDROLINI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: RELIGION AND POLITICS APPEALING MIX FOR
CATHOLIC LEADERS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 994

B. SARAJEVO 966

C. SARAJEVO 954 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge Tina Kaidanow for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001020

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D (SMITH),P (BAME),EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE
(ENGLISH, FOOKS, MITCHELL, SAINZ),NSC FOR BRAUN, OSD FOR
FLORY, USNIC FOR WEBER AND GREGORIAN, VATICAN CITY FOR
SANDROLINI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SOCI BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: RELIGION AND POLITICS APPEALING MIX FOR
CATHOLIC LEADERS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 994

B. SARAJEVO 966

C. SARAJEVO 954 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge Tina Kaidanow for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) has long been politically involved in issues
surrounding Croat returns, specifically the question of who
is primarily to blame for the low numbers of Bosnian Croat
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who returned
to Bosnia after the 1992-1995 conflict. In recent months,
Church officials have also focused on the proposed
constitutional reforms that were rejected by the state
Parliament's House of Representatives on April 26 (see refs A
and B). Church opposition to constitutional reform has put it
squarely in the middle of Bosnian Croat electoral politics,
as it involved itself in the internal split within the Croat
nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party. The
Church's unhappiness with former Presidency member and HDZ
President Dragan Covic as a political leader and its
dissatisfaction with the international community's alleged
lack of concern for the plight of Bosnian Croats fueled
Church officials' public support for the new, splinter party
"HDZ 1990." The Church has also been openly hostile to USG
efforts to promote constitutional reform. As the Church is
currently the only institution that can speak to Bosnian
Croats with a unified voice, its influence cannot be
underestimated, and its political stance contributed directly
to the defeat of the proposed constitutional amendments.
These amendments were universally applauded by U.S. and
European leaders as a major step forward in giving BiH a more
functional state. The last time the Church waded so overtly
into political controversy was during the failed "Third
Entity" secession movement in 2000-2002. End summary.

RELIGIOUS LEADERS FOCUSED ON POLITICAL AIMS



2. (C) Church officials have long been vocal in accusing the
international community, and the U.S. and UK in particular,
of obstructing efforts to promote the return of Bosnian Croat
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their
prewar homes in BiH. However, in recent months, and as
campaign season heats up in advance of the October 1 national
elections, the Church's message has become increasingly
strident and counterproductive. Recently, Church officials
also focused on the debate over U.S. and EU-backed
constitutional reforms supported by the majority of BiH's
political parties. Although the proposed amendments were
supported by the Bosnian Croat Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ),by far the largest Croat party, internal leadership
rivalries within the party intensified as the amendments came
to a vote--eventually splitting the party. Rather than
remaining neutral, Catholic Church leaders have increasingly
and openly aligned themselves with the new Croat nationalist
"HDZ 1990" party, which opposes constitutional reform, and
whose members advocate founding a Croat "third entity" in
Bosnia--a backward step from the Dayton structures, and one
which Under Secretary Burns explicitly ruled out during his
October 2005 visit to BiH.

FOURTH REGION, NOT THIRD ENTITY


3. (C) In early November 2005, the Catholic Bishops'
Conference in BiH (consisting of the four Bishops of
Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla and Banja Luka),with Cardinal Vinko
Puljic's signature and endorsement, publicly put forward
their proposed alternative constitutional framework for BiH.
(Note: Cardinal Puljic is the head of the Catholic Church in
BiH.) The Bishops' proposal suggested a Bosnia divided into
four "regions," centered around Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka
and Mostar. These regions "would follow the current criteria
of economic...historical, geographic and (above all) national
divisions." While avoiding the politically-charged phrase
"Third Entity," this proposal nevertheless resurrects the
postwar nationalist aspirations of Bosnian Croats to carve
out their own Croat-majority territory in BiH.


4. (C) The Bishops' proposal also ignores the fact that some
Bosnian Croats do not live in Croat-majority areas, and thus
would not benefit from a Croat-dominated "fourth region." The
same Croat minority returnees to the Republika Srpska and
central Bosnia, who are the focus of the Church's complaints
that the international community and the Bosnian government

SARAJEVO 00001020 002 OF 003


want to force Croats out of Bosnia, would be excluded under
this political framework--unless they resettled in the
Croat-majority region, thus further consolidating the results
of ethnic cleansing against which the Church claims to be
fighting.

PULJIC: U.S. SEEKS TO WIPE OUT BOSNIAN CATHOLICS


5. (C) During his recent visit to Washington, Cardinal Puljic
intensified the ugly rhetoric he had employed during the
constitutional reform talks, particularly in the weeks
leading up to the vote in Parliament. In Washington, Puljic
said that the U.S. "cannot ignore the disappearance of
Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina" and that he would
continue to advocate for constitutional changes that would
"safeguard the equality of Croats." (Note: Despite his stance
as the protector of his peoples' interests, Puljic was the
only leader of one of Bosnia's traditional religious
communities to refuse to represent his community at an
inter-faith dialogue on the margins of the November 2005
Dayton commemoration events in Washington hosted by Secretary
Rice.) Puljic also implied that Bosnian Croats were the
victims of a negative campaign by the U.S. government, which
resulted in members of Congress and other interlocutors
having "information that was negatively colored towards
Catholics in BiH." In an earlier interview on Good Friday,
Puljic explicitly accused the U.S. and UK of chasing Bosnian
Croats out of BiH, a policy which, Puljic argued, is
enthusiastically supported by the perpetrators of ethnic
cleansing who want to consolidate the "gains" they made
during the war.

CROAT RETURNS: MYTH AND REALITY


6. (C) Puljic and the Catholic Bishops in BiH frequently cite
lack of support by the international community and
obstruction by local government authorities as the main
factors causing the low number of Croat returns to BiH. In
fact, according to sources in the UN High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other NGOs working in the field, the
most critical influence on Croat returns was the deliberate
policy of the Croatian government from 1995-2000 (and,
secondarily, of politicians in Croat-majority areas of
Herzegovina) to encourage Bosnian Croats to permanently
resettle either in Croatia or in Croat-majority areas in BiH.
Refugees and IDPs who chose to remain in or move to Croatia
were offered substantial incentives to do so, including
housing, land, employment, education and social benefits, and
Croatian citizenship. Inducements to settle in Herzegovina
were more limited, but also included housing and land
allocations.


7. (C) The U.S. was one of the biggest international donors
for reconstruction of housing and infrastructure in Bosnia.
While assistance was not segregated by ethnicity as a matter
of policy, we estimate that at least $69 million in USG
funding was spent on projects in primarily Croat return areas
between 1996 and 2005. Claims--whether from Bosnian Croat
politicians or Catholic Church officials--that the U.S. did
not support Croat returns, either as a question of funding or
policy, are factually incorrect and politically mischievous.
Obstruction by local government officials was and remains a
real issue affecting returnees to areas where they are in the
minority. However, this obstruction affects not only Croats,
but all ethnic groups in minority return communities
throughout BiH.

AN AGREEMENT WITH THE HOLY SEE


8. (C) In April 2006, the goverment of BiH signed a "basic
agreement" with the Holy See governing the legal status of
the Catholic Church in BiH. The conclusion of such an
agreement (while not granting the status to the Church that
would be accorded via a Concordat of the type usually used in
majority Catholic countries) represents a major success for
the Church and is the result of years of persistent lobbying
by Church officials in BiH. Unfortunately, the agreement has
done little to quell complaints of state discrimination
against the Church and its believers.


9. (C) Comment: In an era where the U.S. government, the
international community and the more progressive of Bosnia's
political leaders are pursuing constitutional change to place
a strong and unified Bosnia firmly on the path toward

SARAJEVO 00001020 003 OF 003


Euro-Atlantic integration, the Church's vision of an
ethnically-divided Bosnia is a tragic and dangerous step
backwards. When the "Third Entity" movement was strong in the
late 1990s, the international community had a robust
international military presence and there was direct
oversight by the Office of the High Representative, which
firmly rejected any further division of Bosnia along ethnic
lines. The retrograde political forces pushing for Croat
separatism came to a head in 2000-2002, a period which saw
orchestrated mob attacks on UN peacekeepers by Croat mobs and
removal from high office by the High Representative of Croat
officials who were fanning the irridentist flames. The
Church's stance will continue to benefit "HDZ 1990" as it
makes its "victory" against constitutional reform the
foundation of a negative, obstructionist and separatist
election campaign. End comment.
MCELHANEY