Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SAOPAULO532
2006-05-16 18:58:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

SAO PAULO STREET WAR OVER, BUT WHO WON?

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KCRM SOCI SNAR ASEC BR 
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VZCZCXRO6775
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0532/01 1361858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161858Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5064
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6202
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2923
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7105
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2574
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2237
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1980
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2798
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1711
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000532 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR CRONIN
DEA FOR OEL/DESANTIS AND NIRL/LEHRER
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/PDA, DRL/PHD, INL, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA
BRASILIA FOR RSO AND LEGAT; RIO DE JANEIRO FOR RSO
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCRM SOCI SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: SAO PAULO STREET WAR OVER, BUT WHO WON?

REF: (A) Sao Paulo 526; (B) Sao Paulo 319; (C) Sao Paulo 42; (D) 05
Sao Paulo 975

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000532

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC, WHA/BSC
NSC FOR CRONIN
DEA FOR OEL/DESANTIS AND NIRL/LEHRER
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/PDA, DRL/PHD, INL, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA
BRASILIA FOR RSO AND LEGAT; RIO DE JANEIRO FOR RSO
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCRM SOCI SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: SAO PAULO STREET WAR OVER, BUT WHO WON?

REF: (A) Sao Paulo 526; (B) Sao Paulo 319; (C) Sao Paulo 42; (D) 05
Sao Paulo 975

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.


1. (U) SUMMARY: The three-night assault on Sao Paulo police forces
by the organized crime gang PCC seemed to have ended Monday evening
(May 15) as suddenly as it started. The daily newspaper Folha de
Sao Paulo reported on Tuesday, May 16, that the PCC leadership
called a truce after reaching an agreement with state government
officials regarding the status of imprisoned gang leaders. State
officials deny making any deals with the gang. Regardless, life all
but returned to normal overnight in Sao Paulo. Almost all of the
state's penitentiaries were under control by midnight on Monday,
and, after an evening rush "hour" declared to be the worst gridlock
ever experienced in Sao Paulo, streets were largely quiet through
the night. By Tuesday morning police barricades were being
dismantled, and government officials declared that at least 50
percent of the cities buses would be running, after several
terminals had been closed and bus services canceled on Monday out of
fear of violent attacks. Some schools remained closed, but in
general, May 16 looked like any given Tuesday in Sao Paulo. State
government officials criticized media outlets and Internet surfers
for spreading baseless rumors on Monday of erroneous government
advisories and PCC threats. These rumors, officials charge, fueled
a low-level panic across the city that led to the early closure of
businesses and schools, and ultimately resulted in the ensuing
gridlock that tied up the city for hours. END SUMMARY.

--------------
THE DAY SAO PAULO STOPPED
--------------


2. (U) Normalcy returned to Sao Paulo on Tuesday, May 16, as the
war between the organized crime gang First Capital Command (PCC) and
the Sao Paulo police (ref A) seemed to have come to an end by Monday

evening. Traffic on Monday remained snarled throughout much of the
city until 9:00 p.m., and cellular telephone traffic periodically
overloaded circuits as rumors spread throughout the afternoon that
the government had advised residents to stay indoors or even decreed
a curfew, and that the PCC had issued a threat that it would carry
out random attacks on the general populace beginning at 8:00 p.m.
Both rumors proved to have been false, leading government officials
to decry the media and Internet surfers for spreading panic.
Nonetheless, several buses were burned throughout the day and the
police did engage suspects in several gun battles, resulting in some
20 deaths, including three police officers. (NOTE: We erroneously
reported that Congonhas Airport had suspended operations during the
course of a bomb scare. Apparently flights were not halted during
the sweep, but rather, people were rushed through security
checkpoints into boarding areas, and stores and other public access
areas were cleared until it was determined that no bomb existed. A
few incoming flights may have been cancelled by airlines. END
NOTE.)


3. (U) The rumors, coupled with images of burning buses carried
live on television, led many store owners, mall operators and other
businesses to close early Monday afternoon, resulting in a mass
exodus around 4:00 p.m. onto Sao Paulo's roadways, which can become
overburdened with routine traffic on any given day. Further, with
five bus companies refusing to operate and several key bus terminals
closed, an estimated three million people who rely on public
transportation found themselves scrambling for rides or walking long
distances in search of the few bus lines still running. Within an
hour the city became gridlocked in a manner worse than most
Paulistanos (as the city's residents are called) can remember; for
example, many Consulate staff simply returned to the compound to
wait out the gridlock after having moved only a few blocks in 30
minutes. But as the traffic eased and nightfall descended, Sao
Paulo remained relatively quiet, and it seemed that the bloody
attacks of the previous three nights would not reappear for a
fourth.

SAO PAULO 00000532 002 OF 004



--------------
TRUCE OR CONSEQUENCES
--------------


4. (U) The major daily newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo reported on
Tuesday, May 16, that a truce was called by the PCC after its
leaders negotiated acceptable terms for their confinement in the Sao
Paulo prison system. State government officials deny that it made
any deals with the PCC, stating emphatically, "We do not negotiate
with bandits." Nonetheless, peace did come rather quickly to Sao
Paulo streets. Particularly noticeable was the sudden cessation of
prison riots; on Monday morning, 46 of 144 prison facilities
reported ongoing riots with hostage situations (after a peak of 71
such riots on Sunday, May 14),and television stations showed
footage of these throughout the day. But by 8:00 p.m. the number of
riots had dropped to six, and by midnight all but two prisons were
under the control of state authorities. Folha reported that PCC
leaders gave an order of truce via cell phone that was to have taken
effect at 4:00 p.m., and that the word quickly spread through the
prison population, largely controlled by the PCC (ref B).


5. (SBU) State police also appeared to have regrouped during the
day on Monday, May 15. The Commandant General held a mid-afternoon
press conference to appeal for calm and assert that he would have
sufficient forces out at night to combat the unprecedented violence
in what he described as a "state of war." In that vein, Poloff
witnessed a group of four to six police officers detain two suspects
in a tactical maneuver that took place in the street alongside a
public bus and near a police station. The officers, dressed in
plain-clothes and armed with both handguns and shotguns, appeared
suddenly in the vehicle lanes among the commuters stuck in traffic
on a six-lane boulevard. While several officers surrounded the
suspects with weapons drawn and aimed, others forced the two men to
the ground and then brought them to their feet with their hands
behind their heads. It was unclear whether the men had been walking
between the cars in traffic or were pulled from a vehicle near the
bus, but the police officers acted swiftly and decisively, and the
entire incident lasted less than two minutes during a period when
traffic was at a complete standstill. (NOTE: RSO suggests this may
have been the work of one of Sao Paulo's tactical anti-organized
crime units, which may have been dispersed throughout the city in
unmarked vehicles for the purpose of disrupting criminal attacks
before or as they happen. END NOTE.) Television news footage and
print photographs show that police presence had been beefed up at
government facilities and on overpasses with sightlines to potential
hotspots, and masked police with assault weapons and shotguns had
been dispersed at the airports, although Consulate staff reported
seeing no noticeable increase in security at Guarulhos International
Airport on Monday evening.

--------------
NORMALCY RETURNS
--------------


6. (U) On Tuesday morning, May 16, state officials declared that at
least 50 percent of the city's buses would be running, and police
barricades around police stations had been removed in some areas.
Public schools were mostly open, but many private schools and
universities that announced on Monday afternoon that they would be
closed on Tuesday remained so, mostly as parents and administrators
assessed the security and transportation situation throughout the
city. Businesses seemed to open as usual, if a bit slowly. While
the Sao Paulo State Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) had terminated its
after-hours trading session early on Monday, there is no indication
that financial markets and banks would alter normal operations on
Tuesday. In short, life in Sao Paulo appears to have returned to
normal.

--------------
SO, WHO WON THE WAR?
--------------

SAO PAULO 00000532 003 OF 004




7. (U) The question remains, what was this incredible wave of
violence really about, and what was the result? Best estimates now
put the total number of attacks against police and public security
targets, public buses, banks and other properties at 274 over four
days (Friday, May 12 through the end of Monday, May 15). Almost 100
deaths associated with the attacks and related prison rebellions
were reported, 40 or more involving law enforcement officers and
just under 40 involving suspects. Four innocent civilians were
killed, and a dozen or more inmates died in prison riots, either by
police attempting to quell the violence or at the hands of other
inmates. Several other states experienced spill-over violence,
primarily from prison uprisings coordinated with those in Sao Paulo
or in solidarity with them. One gruesome photo in Tuesday's Folha
shows an inmate in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul holding up the
severed head of a fellow inmate. It is not clear why he was
killed.


8. (SBU) For the PCC, it may be that gang leaders simply wanted to
demonstrate their power in the over-burdened, under-staffed state
prison system, and throughout the favelas and working-poor districts
that dot greater Sao Paulo. Once unleashed by their leaders behind
bars, PCC followers on the streets may have taken revenge on the
police they knew, thus hitting targets primarily in the periphery of
Sao Paulo proper, and often killing officers while off-duty and
unarmed. It seems there is a tacit understanding that a level of
criminality behind bars will be tolerated, in no small part because
the police and prison system are largely incapable of stopping it.
The PCC may have demonstrated just how independently it believes it
has a right to operate; in other words, the prison authority's
decision to transfer 750 PCC leaders to isolated facilities and to
lock up its titular head in maximum security (ref A) would not be
tolerated without a flexing of muscle. (NOTE: A case study of the
precariousness of the prison system in Sao Paulo is the release of
10,000 inmates last Friday on furlough for Mother's Day (ref A).
RSO was told by one police source that the street battles would
likely end by Tuesday, May 16, because those inmates, thought to be
focal points in the weekend attacks, were due to return to their
prisons by 2:00 p.m. Monday. The re-incarceration of these inmates
would be voluntary, but was fully expected by State officials. We
have no information regarding the rate of compliance. END NOTE.)


9. (SBU) From a public safety standpoint, the result of the
violence is a battered police force that managed to persevere during
what had to have been one of the most trying and debilitating
weekends faced by almost any police force. In a city where the
public largely distrusts its police as being overwhelmed and
underpaid at best, and inept and corrupt at worst, public confidence
in law enforcement fell even further as it became obvious that just
being near police posed a danger, since they were the targets of
murderous attacks. Comparisons to Baghdad were frequently made by
Paulistanos of all stripes over the weekend, and experienced
city-dwellers warned newcomers to avoid stopping next to squad cars
or in front of police stations while in traffic, lest you get caught
in the crossfire.


10. (SBU) However, this wave of brutality at the hands of highly
organized criminal enterprises may give added impetus to efforts to
revamp the criminal justice system and provide more resources.
Government leaders from other states called upon the federal
government to better coordinate efforts to combat organized crime
and drug trafficking. And there is renewed discussion of exploring
methods to block cellular signals within prison facilities, in order
to cut the key lines of communication of the PCC and other organized
criminal operating from prison. Such a technology option is
necessary because prison administrators clearly cannot prevent
corrupt guards from helping inmates acquire cell phones illicitly
(ref B). The State Secretary of Justice had convinced several
cellular operators to shut down transmission towers near some
prisons during the uprisings last weekend. This may have disrupted
some gang communications, but it also disrupted the communications
of nearby residents. The president of the Bar Association of Brazil

SAO PAULO 00000532 004 OF 004


criticized a proposal by Sao Paulo Governor Claudio Lembo to have
police monitor the telephone conversations between prison inmates
and their lawyers. The Governor suggests that lawyers have been
complicit in criminal activities conducted on inmates' behalf. The
Bar Association suggested that the government should instead present
a list of lawyers known to be abetting crime so they can be
disciplined and expelled from the Bar.

--------------
COMMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
--------------


11. (SBU) In the immediate term, life is returning to normal in Sao
Paulo, albeit with some trepidation. Paulistanos are now keenly
aware just how powerful the organized crime gangs are in Sao Paulo
State, and how fragile is their security. The city is taking a hard
look inward, as local media outlets review with a certain obsession
the worldwide media coverage of the weekend's gang attacks - which
were of a brutality previously more commonly associated with Rio de
Janeiro than Sao Paulo -- and as commentators blame residents for
spreading fear and panic, causing the city to come to a standstill.
Comparisons abound: one commentator noted bitterly that London did
not stop in the wake of bombings last year, and another pointed to
New York City as an example of how zero tolerance can transform a
crime-ridden city to a welcoming business and tourist destination.
And there is talk of better investments in the lives of children, as
President Lula noted over the weekend, in order to reduce the need
for costly prisons. But ultimately in a city of 18 million people
and a state of about 40 million, large police forces and prison
systems are necessary, costly, and hard to manage. Changes will
likely be made in the margins - which can be effective, as
demonstrated by the downward trend over the last two years in Sao
Paulo's murder and violent crime rates - and may begin with a busy
signal for Sao Paulo's prisoners when they switch on their cell
phones. END COMMENT.


12. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.

WOLFE