Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SAOPAULO1143
2006-10-24 19:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Sao Paulo
Cable title:  

BG VIEWS BOLIVIAN GAS CONTRACT AS UNACCEPTABLE

Tags:  EPET ENRG EINV ECON BR BL 
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VZCZCXRO8825
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #1143/01 2971939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241939Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5984
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2828
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7043
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2517
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3095
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2196
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1903
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3203
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7553
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 001143 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR FEARS
STATE PASS USTR MSULLIVAN/SCRONIN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK AND OPIC
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS
USAID/W FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2011
TAGS: EPET ENRG EINV ECON BR BL
SUBJECT: BG VIEWS BOLIVIAN GAS CONTRACT AS UNACCEPTABLE

REF: A. BRASILIA 1972


B. LA PAZ 2817

Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer David C. Wolfe for reason 1.4(d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 001143

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR FEARS
STATE PASS USTR MSULLIVAN/SCRONIN
STATE PASS EXIMBANK AND OPIC
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS
USAID/W FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2011
TAGS: EPET ENRG EINV ECON BR BL
SUBJECT: BG VIEWS BOLIVIAN GAS CONTRACT AS UNACCEPTABLE

REF: A. BRASILIA 1972


B. LA PAZ 2817

Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer David C. Wolfe for reason 1.4(d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sao Paulo-based British Gas (BG) Executive
Vice President for South America Rick Waddell called DPO on
Oct. 20 to discuss ongoing gas contract negotiations with the
Bolivian Government. Due to a series of unrealistic demands,
Waddell deemed the Bolivian model contract completely
unacceptable and stated that BG would not sign the contract
by the Bolivians' October 28 deadline. Nonetheless, he
judged the risk low that Bolivia would expropriate foreign
hydrocarbons assets for failure to sign or expel the
companies, as threatened by Bolivia's vice president, because
the Bolivians realize they do not have the money to keep up
operations at current levels for long. Waddell termed the
relations between Petrobras and Bolivia as tense, and opined
that the big new deal to supply Bolivian gas to Argentina is
unrealistic because no one will fund it. END SUMMARY.

Bolivia's Contract Offer Unacceptable
--------------


2. (C) The Bolivian Government's May First hydrocarbons
decree mandated that all companies currently operating in
Bolivia, including BG, "migrate" their existing contracts to
the new system by October 28. According to Waddell, contract
negotiations normally take many months, and the Bolivians,
who only sent model contracts to the companies on September
22, are trying to finish this complicated process in only
five weeks. He said the initial model contract sent over,
though still inadequate, was not all that bad. The draft the
Bolivians sent over on October 13, however, was much worse,
and there was no way BG could sign it. Waddell said the most
charitable interpretation of this worse second draft is that

the inexperienced current group of Bolivian officials have no
understanding of how contracts in the real world are actually
negotiated and what demands are realistic. He listed six
main problems with the model contract:

-- Bonus Payment: The Bolivians demand that an unspecified
bonus payment be paid upon signing of the contract. Waddell
noted that bonus payments, which could be many millions of
dollars, are common when signing contracts for exploration
block bids but are not done for renegotiated contracts. The
unspecified amount is also worrisome, since the Bolivians
could demand anything from a token amount to something really
big.

-- Parent Guarantee: As with the bonus payment, the
Bolivians demand an unspecified guarantee. Waddell explained
that in bid contracts, parent guarantees, with specific
amounts and percentages, are signed that commit the parent
corporation to spend a certain amount on well work programs
or pay fines. With the current renegotiation, there is
nothing new to guarantee. The added uncertainty of whether
the Bolivian Congress would approve the contract while still
committing the company means no parent corporate board would
approve the signing of such a contract.

-- Waived Arbitration Rights: The Bolivians want the
companies to agree in the contract to give up their rights to
international arbitration. The Government could effectively
seize and transfer assets to third parties under any number
of pretexts, with the companies helplessly standing by.

-- Dictated Prices: The contract would allow the Bolivian
Government, as the sole buyer and seller of gas, to set the
price for both natural gas and liquids at artificially low
prices, again with no recourse.


SAO PAULO 00001143 002 OF 003


-- Questionable Capital Recovery: The international
standard is for a contract to "front load" a company's
recovery of capital expended to develop a well, so that even
if the company never makes a profit, it can at least get back
the investment through guaranteed set asides from the revenue
stream. The Bolivian model contract does not guarantee
capital recovery, nor pay interest should capital recovery be
shifted to subsequent years. With the high tax rates being
charged, a company could very well reach the end of a well's
life without every recovering the capital and simply be out
of luck.

-- No Stabilization Clause: The Bolivians offer no
guarantee (stabilization clause) that the contract will not
be changed in the future.

Expropriation Risk Low
--------------


3. (C) Based on the objections listed above, Waddell stated
that BG could not possibly sign such a contract and doubted
any of the other companies would either. One tactic might be
to go ahead and sign the contract as an "intermediate" step,
with the hope of improving the contract later, though he
dismissed this option as too risky. He noted that President
Morales repeatedly stated at the UN, before the European
Parliament, and elsewhere that the Bolivian Government had
not and would not expropriate any assets or expel companies.
Back in Bolivia, however, Vice President Garcia Linera was
saying that any company that did not sign the new contract
would have to leave the country and there would be no
extensions. Waddell commented that new Hydrocarbons Minister
Villegas was much more reasonable than former Minister Soliz,
and that new Bolivian state hydrocarbons company (YPFB)
President Ortiz was much more rational than his predecessor.
Nonetheless, the Bolivians have painted themselves into a
corner for political reasons from which it will be very
difficult to extricate themselves.


4. (C) Waddell then stated that BG rates the risk of
expropriation or expulsion by the Bolivians for failure to
sign the contract as low, mainly because the Bolivians do not
have the cash to keep things running for long. BG has 74
employees in Bolivia, only three of whom are foreigners. In
the event of an expropriation or expulsion, the likely
scenario would be for the foreign employees to be expelled
and the Bolivian employees to be declared part of whatever
entity takes over and ordered to keep up operations. While
the Bolivian employees are quite capable of running the
current operation, Waddell assessed that the Bolivian
Government is unlikely to kick foreign companies like BG out
at this juncture because they realize they don't have the
capital to maintain operations at their current level for
long, much less invest to expand operations. In the event of
an expropriation, BG will cooperate with Bolivian authorities
for an orderly transition while pursuing its rights in the
international system.

Petrobras Piqued
--------------


5. (C) When asked about Petrobras' situation, Waddell replied
that the Brazilian giant, which has the most invested in
Bolivia, is in no mood to be coerced. For Petrobras, as with
all the foreign companies, a crucial issue is the booking of
hydrocarbons reserves as required by New York and other stock
exchanges. If reserves in Bolivia become unreliable and thus
have to be removed from the books, share prices for the
Petrobras and other companies could take a hit. Petrobras
has been especially hard hit, with taxes upped to a whopping
82 percent on its big gas fields. In addition to Petrobras'
contract renegotiation, Waddell recounted the convoluted
story of Petrobras' refineries in Bolivia and how a series of

SAO PAULO 00001143 003 OF 003


pre-Evo Bolivian Government decrees intended to keep fuel
prices low in Bolivia had skewed the liquid fuel market.
Producers ended up having to deliver liquids at a loss to
Petrobras refineries, and Petrobras made a profit by
exporting excess liquids at higher world prices. Producers
like BG kept quiet about this arrangement to avoid
destabilizing the various weak Bolivian governments. Because
of the scarcity of diesel in Bolivia due to low prices and
smuggling of fuel to neighboring countries, Petrobras agreed
to import Brazilian diesel as long as the Bolivian Government
made up the price differential. Chronic late payments by the
Bolivians led Petrobras to end this arrangement in July.
Notwithstanding public accounts circulating at the time (Ref
A),Waddell continued that the latest impasse in September
between Bolivia and Petrobras on the refineries was due to
Bolivian retaliation to end Petrobras' special authorization
to export excess liquids, a decision that the Bolivians
suspended due to the sharp Brazilian reaction and that led to
Minister Soliz' downfall.

Argentina Deal -- Pipe Dream?
--------------


6. (C) Waddell also commented on the recently announced deal
for Bolivia to supply an extra 20 million cubic meters of gas
per day to Argentina by 2010 (Ref B). He noted that Bolivia
has trouble meeting the current commitment of 7.7 million
cubic meters per day to Argentina. The deal would require
several billion dollars to build new pipelines and develop
existing and new fields. Such money, he opined, could only
come from the multinational gas companies, which are in no
mood under existing uncertainties to even consider further
investments in Bolivia. Enarsa, Argentina's state energy
company, has the same relatively low investment rating as
Argentina itself and could not itself raise the money needed,
Waddell concluded. Finally, he observed that, even under the
right circumstances, such deals take a long time: the
Bolivia-Brazil gas deal signed in 1992, but gas did not start
flowing until 1999, seven years later.


7. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Brasilia and
La Paz.
MCMULLEN