Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANTODOMINGO2838
2006-09-01 15:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Santo Domingo
Cable title:
WATCHLISTS AT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S POINTS OF ENTRY
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S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 002838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD; DEPT FOR WHA/CAR, DS, INR, CA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PINR PINS PTER CIVS KFRD DR
SUBJECT: WATCHLISTS AT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S POINTS OF ENTRY
REF: A. STATE 114021
B. SANTO DOMINGO 2568
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Roland W. Bullen for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)
S E C R E T SANTO DOMINGO 002838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD; DEPT FOR WHA/CAR, DS, INR, CA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PINR PINS PTER CIVS KFRD DR
SUBJECT: WATCHLISTS AT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S POINTS OF ENTRY
REF: A. STATE 114021
B. SANTO DOMINGO 2568
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Roland W. Bullen for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary. With reftels Embassy reported on the
Dominican Republic's immigration database system located at
seaports, airports, and border crossing points. New
information reveals that at points of entry only the
Dominican intelligence agency has access to watchlists
provided by Interpol and other Dominican government agencies.
End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REFTEL B - WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (S) With reftel A Washington analysts requested
information about the Dominican Republic's immigration
system, specifically regarding the tracking of entries and
exits, limitations of the immigration database, biometrics,
and watchlists. We received this information from the
Dominican National Immigration office and reported it in
reftel B. Although the immigration office provided the
Embassy with accurate information, it was not complete
because Dominican immigration officials do not have access to
other database systems that include additional watchlists.
According to the security manager of Santo Domingo's Las
Americas international airport (a well-connected former
Dominican military general),Dominican immigration officials
cannot be trusted. He added that the daily salary for many
of the immigration officials at the points of entry (POE) can
not even cover the cost of gasoline needed to and from work.
The security manager noted that immigration and customs
officials regularly accept bribes, (on a recent personal
trip, econoff saw a Dominican customs official at the
Santiago airport receive money from a Dominican passenger as
she attempted to clear her luggage).
3. (SBU) Due to the lack of trust and high levels of
corruption, the Immigration database contains only the
information from a system called Impediments to Exit and
Entry (Impedimento de Salida y Entrada). This system is a
local watchlist that informs the immigration official of any
individual who has a judicial problem within the country. It
is managed by the Attorney General's office. All government
agencies can submit information to the Attorney General's
office for review; and if approved, the Attorney General's
office will add that individual to their watchlist.
- - - - - - - - - - -
ADDITIONAL WATCHLISTS
- - - - - - - - - - -
4. (S) After receiving the information from the Dominican
immigration office, Embassy sent reftel B in accordance with
the suspense date. However, after the London scare in
mid-August, emboff drove out to Las Americas international
airport to get a first hand look at the Dominican immigration
database as well as a tour of the security checkpoints and
personal meetings with immigration officials, airport
security, interpol, airport management, and members of the
National Department of Investigations (DNI-Intelligence).
5. (S) Emboff found that the Dominicans do have watchlists
that are more robust than the watchlist used in the
immigration database. The following is a revision of
Embassy's answers:
A. (SBU) IS THERE A NAME-BASED WATCHLIST SYSTEM USED TO
SCREEN TRAVELERS AT POES?
(C) Yes. The Immigration database has a watchlist that is a
name-based system and is called Impediments to Exit and
Entry. It is found at all entry and exit points at POEs.
The Department of Investigations also has a name-based
watchlist, but this system is located only at entry points at
Dominican POEs.
B. (SBU) WHAT DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INFORMATION POPULATE THE
NAME-BASED WATCHLIST, I.E., NAMES OF DEPORTED PERSONS,
TERRORIST LOOKOUTS, CRIMINAL WANTS/WARRANTS?
(C) The watchlist within the Immigration database is managed
by the Attorney General's office and consists of individuals
who have legal and criminal problems in the Dominican
Republic. All Dominican law enforcement agencies can submit
information to the Attorney General's office for review and
if approved for submission to the watchlist. An entirely
separate Intelligence Agency (DNI) watchlist consists of
information gathered from DNI sources, the national
directorate for drug control (DNCD),the national police, and
the J2 (Intelligence) of the Armed Forces. Emboff confirmed
that they have terrorist lookouts in their watchlist.
C. (SBU) WHAT INTERNATIONAL WATCHLISTS DO HOST COUNTRIES
USE FOR SCREENING INDIVIDUALS? SUCH AS INTERPOL OR TSA NO FLY
LISTS, UN, ETC.
(C) DNI officials use terrorist watchlists from a variety of
sources and the Interpol watchlist.
D. (SBU) HOW ARE WATCHLIST SYSTEMS NETWORKED BETWEEN PORTS
OF ENTRY (AIR, LAND, SEA)?
(C) According to Dominican officials, all airports and
seaports are networked via hardline. The remote border posts
receive updates via a diskette on a weekly basis.
E. (SBU) ARE WATCHLIST SYSTEMS LINKED TO A STANDALONE OR
INTEGRATED IMMIGRATION DATABASE BETWEEN THE IMMIGRATION, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES?
(C) Officials claim that the Impediments to Exit and Entry
watchlist is integrated with local law enforcement and
intelligence services. The DNI watchlist is not integrated
among other government agencies.
F. (SBU) WHO CAN ACCESS THE WATCHLIST INFORMATION?
(C) Dominican officials state that the immigration office,
DNI, DNCD, and the national police can all access information
from the Impediments to Exit and Entry watchlist. Only DNI
officials have access to the watchlists on the DNI database.
G. (SBU) WHAT ARE THE POLICIES/PROCEDURES WHEN A
WATCHLISTED INDIVIDUAL IS ENCOUNTERED?
(C) Immigration and DNI officials state that when an
individual is found to be on one of their watchlists, he or
she is escorted to secondary and from there to the
appropriate law enforcement agency.
6. (S) The separation between DNI and immigration officials
is not easily noticeable at the POEs. Upon entering the
country, passengers are greeted by two immigration officers.
However, the first "immigration" officer is an undercover DNI
official who checks the passport's name against their
watchlists. If no record appears, the officer hands the
passport to the real immigration official, who collects the
immigration form and runs the passenger's name against their
watchlist (Impediments to Exit and Entry). If no record
appears, the passenger is allowed to exit the airport.
7. (S) Comment. The systems that are in place are effective
only if the officer follows normal procedures. Due to high
levels of corruption, low salaries, and a lack of close
supervision, it is apparent that individuals can slip by if
they have the connections and the money. There are no checks
and balances and if the officer at the immigration desk
wanted to assist a criminal, the officer would simply an
incorrect name into the watchlist, so that no record would
appear. End Comment.
8. (U) Drafted by Chris Davy.
9. (U) This report and extensive other material can be
consulted on our SIPIRNET site,
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ .
BULLEN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD; DEPT FOR WHA/CAR, DS, INR, CA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PINR PINS PTER CIVS KFRD DR
SUBJECT: WATCHLISTS AT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S POINTS OF ENTRY
REF: A. STATE 114021
B. SANTO DOMINGO 2568
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Roland W. Bullen for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary. With reftels Embassy reported on the
Dominican Republic's immigration database system located at
seaports, airports, and border crossing points. New
information reveals that at points of entry only the
Dominican intelligence agency has access to watchlists
provided by Interpol and other Dominican government agencies.
End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REFTEL B - WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (S) With reftel A Washington analysts requested
information about the Dominican Republic's immigration
system, specifically regarding the tracking of entries and
exits, limitations of the immigration database, biometrics,
and watchlists. We received this information from the
Dominican National Immigration office and reported it in
reftel B. Although the immigration office provided the
Embassy with accurate information, it was not complete
because Dominican immigration officials do not have access to
other database systems that include additional watchlists.
According to the security manager of Santo Domingo's Las
Americas international airport (a well-connected former
Dominican military general),Dominican immigration officials
cannot be trusted. He added that the daily salary for many
of the immigration officials at the points of entry (POE) can
not even cover the cost of gasoline needed to and from work.
The security manager noted that immigration and customs
officials regularly accept bribes, (on a recent personal
trip, econoff saw a Dominican customs official at the
Santiago airport receive money from a Dominican passenger as
she attempted to clear her luggage).
3. (SBU) Due to the lack of trust and high levels of
corruption, the Immigration database contains only the
information from a system called Impediments to Exit and
Entry (Impedimento de Salida y Entrada). This system is a
local watchlist that informs the immigration official of any
individual who has a judicial problem within the country. It
is managed by the Attorney General's office. All government
agencies can submit information to the Attorney General's
office for review; and if approved, the Attorney General's
office will add that individual to their watchlist.
- - - - - - - - - - -
ADDITIONAL WATCHLISTS
- - - - - - - - - - -
4. (S) After receiving the information from the Dominican
immigration office, Embassy sent reftel B in accordance with
the suspense date. However, after the London scare in
mid-August, emboff drove out to Las Americas international
airport to get a first hand look at the Dominican immigration
database as well as a tour of the security checkpoints and
personal meetings with immigration officials, airport
security, interpol, airport management, and members of the
National Department of Investigations (DNI-Intelligence).
5. (S) Emboff found that the Dominicans do have watchlists
that are more robust than the watchlist used in the
immigration database. The following is a revision of
Embassy's answers:
A. (SBU) IS THERE A NAME-BASED WATCHLIST SYSTEM USED TO
SCREEN TRAVELERS AT POES?
(C) Yes. The Immigration database has a watchlist that is a
name-based system and is called Impediments to Exit and
Entry. It is found at all entry and exit points at POEs.
The Department of Investigations also has a name-based
watchlist, but this system is located only at entry points at
Dominican POEs.
B. (SBU) WHAT DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INFORMATION POPULATE THE
NAME-BASED WATCHLIST, I.E., NAMES OF DEPORTED PERSONS,
TERRORIST LOOKOUTS, CRIMINAL WANTS/WARRANTS?
(C) The watchlist within the Immigration database is managed
by the Attorney General's office and consists of individuals
who have legal and criminal problems in the Dominican
Republic. All Dominican law enforcement agencies can submit
information to the Attorney General's office for review and
if approved for submission to the watchlist. An entirely
separate Intelligence Agency (DNI) watchlist consists of
information gathered from DNI sources, the national
directorate for drug control (DNCD),the national police, and
the J2 (Intelligence) of the Armed Forces. Emboff confirmed
that they have terrorist lookouts in their watchlist.
C. (SBU) WHAT INTERNATIONAL WATCHLISTS DO HOST COUNTRIES
USE FOR SCREENING INDIVIDUALS? SUCH AS INTERPOL OR TSA NO FLY
LISTS, UN, ETC.
(C) DNI officials use terrorist watchlists from a variety of
sources and the Interpol watchlist.
D. (SBU) HOW ARE WATCHLIST SYSTEMS NETWORKED BETWEEN PORTS
OF ENTRY (AIR, LAND, SEA)?
(C) According to Dominican officials, all airports and
seaports are networked via hardline. The remote border posts
receive updates via a diskette on a weekly basis.
E. (SBU) ARE WATCHLIST SYSTEMS LINKED TO A STANDALONE OR
INTEGRATED IMMIGRATION DATABASE BETWEEN THE IMMIGRATION, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES?
(C) Officials claim that the Impediments to Exit and Entry
watchlist is integrated with local law enforcement and
intelligence services. The DNI watchlist is not integrated
among other government agencies.
F. (SBU) WHO CAN ACCESS THE WATCHLIST INFORMATION?
(C) Dominican officials state that the immigration office,
DNI, DNCD, and the national police can all access information
from the Impediments to Exit and Entry watchlist. Only DNI
officials have access to the watchlists on the DNI database.
G. (SBU) WHAT ARE THE POLICIES/PROCEDURES WHEN A
WATCHLISTED INDIVIDUAL IS ENCOUNTERED?
(C) Immigration and DNI officials state that when an
individual is found to be on one of their watchlists, he or
she is escorted to secondary and from there to the
appropriate law enforcement agency.
6. (S) The separation between DNI and immigration officials
is not easily noticeable at the POEs. Upon entering the
country, passengers are greeted by two immigration officers.
However, the first "immigration" officer is an undercover DNI
official who checks the passport's name against their
watchlists. If no record appears, the officer hands the
passport to the real immigration official, who collects the
immigration form and runs the passenger's name against their
watchlist (Impediments to Exit and Entry). If no record
appears, the passenger is allowed to exit the airport.
7. (S) Comment. The systems that are in place are effective
only if the officer follows normal procedures. Due to high
levels of corruption, low salaries, and a lack of close
supervision, it is apparent that individuals can slip by if
they have the connections and the money. There are no checks
and balances and if the officer at the immigration desk
wanted to assist a criminal, the officer would simply an
incorrect name into the watchlist, so that no record would
appear. End Comment.
8. (U) Drafted by Chris Davy.
9. (U) This report and extensive other material can be
consulted on our SIPIRNET site,
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ .
BULLEN