Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANTIAGO614
2006-03-23 22:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Santiago
Cable title:
BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000614
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CI VZ
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER
VENEZUELA SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE
REF: A. SANTIAGO 0577
B. SANTIAGO 0561
C. SANTIAGO 0516
D. SANTIAGO 0514
E. SANTIAGO 0488
F. SANTIAGO 0447
G. SANTIAGO 0429
H. SANTIAGO 0384
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Emi L. Yamauchi for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000614
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CI VZ
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER
VENEZUELA SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE
REF: A. SANTIAGO 0577
B. SANTIAGO 0561
C. SANTIAGO 0516
D. SANTIAGO 0514
E. SANTIAGO 0488
F. SANTIAGO 0447
G. SANTIAGO 0429
H. SANTIAGO 0384
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Emi L. Yamauchi for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).
1. (C) A British Embassy colleague told EPOL Counselor on
March 22 that a British contact at the Chilean Foreign
Ministry (who we suspect is a senior official in the
Multilateral Affairs Directorate) appeared increasingly
worried about negative U.S. reaction if Chile were to support
Venezuela for the GRULAC Security Council seat. The British
Embassy officer did not/not have instructions from London to
talk to the Chileans about the Venezuela candidacy, but had
raised the matter on his own account, to sound out the
Chilean position. His Chilean contact delivered the expected
explanations -- namely gratitude for Venezuela's support for
Jose Insulza's OAS SecGen candidacy and Venezuela's ability
to cause problems with Chile's neighbors. The Chilean
official reportedly added, "Do you know what you get for
voting with the Americans? Just a 'thank you'." The British
officer noted that his most telling point with the Chileans
seemed to be, "Do you think electing Chavez will actually buy
you more stability in the region?"
No instructions from EU on GRULAC seat
--------------
2. (C) The British diplomat said he did not expect the EU to
arrive at a consensus position on the GRULAC seat, in large
part because the Spanish were too involved with "selling
things" to Chavez. To his knowledge, none of his European
colleagues had received instructions from their capitals to
talk to the Chileans, to CARICOM, or to African nations where
had influence. He did not believe a British demarche alone
would be very effective, because "we (the British) are viewed
as U.S. lapdogs in any event." He suggested the Dutch would
be easy to enlist, given their concern over the Netherlands
Antilles. He was not aware of any French inclination to get
involved, one way or the other.
3. (C) Comment: Our British colleague said it appeared to him
that the Chileans were concerned by the strength of U.S.
opposition, and were thinking more seriously about the
potential consequences of a vote for Venezuela. We will
continue to push on this issue at all levels with the new
Chilean government (reftels).
YAMAUCHI
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CI VZ
SUBJECT: BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS CHILEAN CONCERNS OVER
VENEZUELA SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE
REF: A. SANTIAGO 0577
B. SANTIAGO 0561
C. SANTIAGO 0516
D. SANTIAGO 0514
E. SANTIAGO 0488
F. SANTIAGO 0447
G. SANTIAGO 0429
H. SANTIAGO 0384
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Emi L. Yamauchi for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).
1. (C) A British Embassy colleague told EPOL Counselor on
March 22 that a British contact at the Chilean Foreign
Ministry (who we suspect is a senior official in the
Multilateral Affairs Directorate) appeared increasingly
worried about negative U.S. reaction if Chile were to support
Venezuela for the GRULAC Security Council seat. The British
Embassy officer did not/not have instructions from London to
talk to the Chileans about the Venezuela candidacy, but had
raised the matter on his own account, to sound out the
Chilean position. His Chilean contact delivered the expected
explanations -- namely gratitude for Venezuela's support for
Jose Insulza's OAS SecGen candidacy and Venezuela's ability
to cause problems with Chile's neighbors. The Chilean
official reportedly added, "Do you know what you get for
voting with the Americans? Just a 'thank you'." The British
officer noted that his most telling point with the Chileans
seemed to be, "Do you think electing Chavez will actually buy
you more stability in the region?"
No instructions from EU on GRULAC seat
--------------
2. (C) The British diplomat said he did not expect the EU to
arrive at a consensus position on the GRULAC seat, in large
part because the Spanish were too involved with "selling
things" to Chavez. To his knowledge, none of his European
colleagues had received instructions from their capitals to
talk to the Chileans, to CARICOM, or to African nations where
had influence. He did not believe a British demarche alone
would be very effective, because "we (the British) are viewed
as U.S. lapdogs in any event." He suggested the Dutch would
be easy to enlist, given their concern over the Netherlands
Antilles. He was not aware of any French inclination to get
involved, one way or the other.
3. (C) Comment: Our British colleague said it appeared to him
that the Chileans were concerned by the strength of U.S.
opposition, and were thinking more seriously about the
potential consequences of a vote for Venezuela. We will
continue to push on this issue at all levels with the new
Chilean government (reftels).
YAMAUCHI