EMBASSY MILITARY AFFAIRS GROUP EXPLORING CHILEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 002108

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NOFORN
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STATE FOR WHA/BSC, PM/WRA, ISN/CATR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL CI
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MILITARY AFFAIRS GROUP EXPLORING CHILEAN
DEMINING ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Kelly for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request, see paragraph eight.


2. (C) Summary: On July 5 the Ambassador floated the idea
with Foreign Ministry Director General for Foreign Affairs
Carlos Portales of Chilean demining assistance to
Afghanistan. Portales seemed receptive to the idea, and
promised to discuss it with Under-secretary for War Gonzalo
Garcia. Since that time, the Mission has continued to pursue
the idea in an informal way with mid-level military and
ministry contacts. Officials in the Army's engineering
brigade and in the Ministry of Defense's National Demining
Secretariat believe Chile would be open to deploying up to a

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dozen experienced demining experts to conduct training or
cooperative exchanges for humanitarian demining in
Afghanistan. Post understands from conversations with the
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan that a
Chilean deployment could play a valuable role in the CSTC-A's
demining program. A Chilean deployment would likely depend
on financial support from the U.S. or the allied effort in
Afghanistan. End Summary.


3. (C) On September 13-14, Emboffs in Calama for the
graduation of a demining course conducted by Seventh Group
discussed Chilean participation in humanitarian demining in
Afghanistan with a mid-level Chilean Army (CIAR) engineering
command officer and the Deputy Director of the National
Demining Commission (CNAD). The CIAR engineering command and
CNAD are in charge of demining operations in northern Chile;
the Navy and CNAD conduct demining operations in southern
Chile. Both officials agreed that Chile had the expertise to
conduct demining training and/or operations in Afghanistan.
Chilean deminers would welcome the opportunity to get broader
exposure and work with a multi-national force. (Post Note:
In early-mid 2004, 2-3 Chilean Army engineers were present in
Afghanistan observing coalition reconstruction efforts. End
Note)


4. (C) The CIAR and CNAD officials said that any decision
to participate in a program in Afghanistan would depend on a
"political decision" from the Ministry of Defense. Chile had
limited demining resources, they noted, and was not likely to
make its Ottawa Treaty deadlines for demining within Chile.
All demining in Chile was being conducted by the military,
indeed the branch that placed the mines (army or marines) was
responsible for removing them. Chile placed a high priority
on conducting simultaneous demining efforts on all three
frontiers - Argentina, Peru and Bolivia. Thus, any Chilean
demining deployment would be limited in size, not to exceed 8
- 12 individuals. The CIAR officer speculated that the Navy
might deploy a demining team, as its efforts in the southern
fiords were currently limited by lack of aerial medevac
capacity.


5. (C) On October 3, Emboff contacted the CSTC-A point of
contact for humanitarian demining to discuss the feasibility
and desireability of a Chilean demining training mission to
Afghanistan. CSTC-A would be able to integrate demining
training into its programming and would welcome a Chilean
force. However, CSTC-A POC noted potential operational
difficulties, including translation, transportation, and
difficulty in scheduling activities with Afghani military
units still actively engaged in military operations.


6. (C) Comment: The Chilean military, particularly units
that are directly involved in demining, seem receptive to the
idea of a small (8-12 person) deployment Afghanistan.
Training of Afghan deminers, or humanitarian demining as part
of an international operation, are both possibilities.
Political leadership might be open to cooperation as a way of
demonstrating Chile's ongoing engagement with international
PKOs. However, Chile is not likely to deploy unless it
receives external funding - i.e. a support package that would
allow it to deploy without impacting its already very limited
domestic demining budget. Indeed, CNAD actively solicits
donations to support its national demining program. The GOC
would likely want to keep a deployment to Afghanistan
low-profile.


7. (C) Action Request: Post requests Department's guidance
on a prospective Chilean demining mission to Afghanistan.
Specifically, should Post or the Department engage the GOC
and Chilean MOD on organizing a demining deployment to
Afghanistan? What would be potential funding or offset
mechanisms we could offer the Chileans to encourage such a
deployment?
KELLY