Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANTIAGO1172
2006-05-30 12:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Santiago
Cable title:  

MEDIA REACTION - VENEZUELA'S UNSC CANDIDACY

Tags:  OPRC KMDR KPAO CI MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #1172/01 1501208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301208Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9305
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1036
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0957
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 001172

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IIP/G/WHA, INR/R/MR, WHA/BSC, WHA/PDA, INR/IAA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO CI MX
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION - VENEZUELA'S UNSC CANDIDACY


On May 28, La Tercera (conservative, independent, circ. 102,000)
printed an article by political analyst Ascanio Cavallo entitled,
"The List with which the White House Awaits the President."

"For her visit to the U.S. President Michelle Bachelet has been
invited to stay at Blair House, adjacent to the White House and will
have a working lunch with President George Bush followed by a
high-level reunion in the Oval Office. Both are courtesies reserved
for those the U.S. government considers illustrious guests and are
thus considered signs of friendship. But it is possible they will
be the only ones, and depending on the evolution of the bilateral
dialogue, may become the final ones...

The State Department looked askance at Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez' affectionate gestures and jokes with President Bachelet
(which they evaluated as an effort at public "patronization," a
vitriolic observation for a government so dedicated to restoring the
dignity of women). And the State Department likes even less the
policy of neutrality and silence that Bachelet announced concerning
Chile's South American neighbors.

The U.S. believes that Chile's success in terms of political and
economic stability and openness to the world means Chile has a "soft
power" it should actively employ as a stabilizing factor in the
region. The fact that Santiago has expressly refused to do so
signifies for Washington that "irresponsible" governments lack a
counterbalance and that its own containment efforts become
increasingly difficult.

The Chilean Foreign Ministry apparently believed the explanation
that Chile needed to be very prudent because it is situated between
sensitive and unstable neighbors who are sometimes jealous of
Chile's "success" would be easy to install in Washington, and that
the U.S. was over dramatizing the Venezuelan theme.

If that were the case, Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley would have
received the first surprise during his three April meetings with
high-ranking officials, when he found that Venezuela has become the
central theme on the U.S.-Chile bilateral agenda.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dedicated an overwhelming

SIPDIS
majority of her meeting with Foxley to only one point: Venezuela's

candidacy for the United Nations Security Council. She
differentiated the case from any other regional or multilateral
decision to the point that she said that its singularity "pointed at
the heart of U.S. interests."

According to versions from the Foreign Ministry, Foxley attempted to
explain that Chile had to consider its neighbors' opinions and that,
in any case, Chile had as yet not made a decision (as Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay--which will vote for Venezuela--seem to have
done, with the apparent objective of retaining the energy supply
that Chavez provides).

But the secretary of State was categorical: the U.S. "simply will
not understand" a Chilean vote favoring Venezuela for the Security
Council. She added that if that were to occur, Chile could end up
in a group of losers, against the sentiments of the U.S., Mexico,
part of Central America and almost all of Europe.

Rice referred to the decisions that the Security Council may have to
take with respect to Iran and underscored the "provocative"
friendship that Chavez has developed with Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad...

The secretary of State did not even pay much attention to other
topics on Foxley's list, such as Chile's favorable position toward
the International Criminal Court, which for other countries has
signified a restriction in U.S. military cooperation, and an area in
which the U.S. could make an exception if Chile were declared a
"non-NATO ally"... She also gave short shrift to (talk of) deepening
the bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).

The message was that the entire bilateral agenda would be easy if
Chile did not vote for Venezuela and very difficult if it did.

The meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was much
worse. Zoellick openly displayed his skepticism with the prudence
policy and with what he called--in a mildly ironic tone--the "naive
idea" of South American solidarity.

According to the senior official, Chile's silence (which some might
interpret as a kind of "shame over its own success," he added) would
ultimately distance Chile from the global actors with which it
interacts, such as Asia and Europe while paying few dividends among
neighbors that are more involved with their internal situations than
with international diplomacy.

Zoellick noted that, when he was the U.S. trade representative, he
personally urged U.S. President George Bush to move forward on the
FTA with Chile despite the fact that Chilean President Ricardo Lagos
had recently announced Chile's negative vote on the invasion of
Iraq. Bush, with the support of some "hawks" in his administration,
had decided to freeze the FTA and Zoellick intervened to illustrate
that the damage to the hemisphere would be greater than the
punishment to the Chilean government. "This time (the Venezuela
case) I would not do the same thing," Zoellick said to Foxley.

The harshest portion of Zoellick's speech came when
Foxley told him that the U.S. had to understand that
Chile needed to evaluate its Security Council vote by
looking at its immediate surroundings. The deputy secretary of
State replied that if that reflection led to a vote for Venezuela
that the bilateral relationship would be "decisively damaged," that
bestowing "non-NATO ally" status would be unviable and that the
costs to Chile in terms of security and commercial exchange would be
exceedingly high.

Thus, the "broad bilateral agenda" the Chilean government has
described to justify President Bachelet's trip could be
circumscribed to one point: the ambiguity La Moneda wants to confer
upon its relationship with Chavez, to preserve both its autonomy and
its regional ties. As tends to occur, the polarization the two
principal interested parties--Washington and Caracas--are making
that ambiguity increasingly tense.

In the private lunch at the White House, Ministers Foxley and Andres
Velasco will accompany President Bachelet. Bush will be surrounded
by Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, Assistant Secretary
for the Western Hemisphere Tom Shannon (who was in the
Zoellick-Foxley meeting) and the National Security Council's
Presidential Advisor Stephen Hadley, who also hosted Foxley in
April.

If those in attendance apply even half the pressure Foxley received
during his preparatory visit it is a good bet that it will not be a
peaceful lunch."

In its May 29 edition, La Tercera published an article entitled,
"Government Says it will Not Allow the U.S. to
Pressure It on the UN Vote"

In the days before the first meeting between Presidents Michelle
Bachelet and George Bush...Chilean government Spokesman Ricardo
Lagos Weber said that La Moneda would not be pressured by the United
States to distance itself from Venezuela, saying "Chile is an
honorable country that will not allow itself to be pressured and a
country that pursues diplomacy... We are not about pressure. We
are about building consensus..."

A month ago during his trip to Washington, Foreign Minister
Alejandro Foxley received a direct message from Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick...who said
that if Santiago were to support Caracas in the vote for a spot on
the United Nations Security Council the costs to the relationship

with the U.S. would be "exceedingly high." For her part, Rice was
unequivocal in signaling to Foxley that the U.S. government "simply
would not understand" a Chilean vote in favor of Hugo Chavez'
government.

Chile's support in that vote, which will take place in October, is
still undefined. Nevertheless, Minister Lagos Weber signaled
yesterday that the government "would always seek a consensus
position within Latin America." That could favor Venezuela,
considering that various countries in the southern cone have the
apparent objective of maintaining the energy supply that Chavez
promises.

Foreign Ministry sources admitted the Bush administration was
concerned with Chavez' recent signs of closeness with Bachelet at
the EU-Latin America Summit in Vienna...

Legislators on the foreign relations committees of both houses
shared the posture taken by La Moneda. While Christian Democrat
(DC) Senator Jorge Pizarro said that, "U.S. pressure should be of
little importance to us," his National Renovation (RN) colleague
Sergio Romero added that, "in international relations that type of
threat is not used so it surprises me that a foreign minister would
say such a thing."

On the other hand, Party for Democracy (PPD) Deputy Jorge Tarud
said, "It is natural that countries talk and seek support, thus if
Rice asked for support for a candidate, that's fine, she has a right
to do so; and Chile is within its rights not to respond."

At the same time, the legislator added that in order to avoid future
consequences for the U.S.-Chile relationship "a consensus candidate
should be sought." Tarud also defended the secret nature of the vote
since it is he noted, "to protect smaller nations from the pressure
larger ones apply."

Senator Romero did not share that opinion, saying, "Chile needs to
clarify its position, because transparency is necessary in this
area, as (the vote) should have been public at the time of the vote
in the Commission of Human Rights" of the U.N.

In any case, the RN parliamentarian maintained, "I find it hard to
believe Chile would declare itself for Venezuela. I think the more
clear line of support is for Brazil, with whom we have a strong ties
and a renewed alliance, as Foreign Minister Foxley has noted."
KELLY