Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANSALVADOR418
2006-02-17 17:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy San Salvador
Cable title:  

VIOLENCE SPIRALS IN EL SALVADOR/GOVERNMENT GRASPS

Tags:  PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER SNAR KCRM ES GANGS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 000418 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER SNAR KCRM ES GANGS
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE SPIRALS IN EL SALVADOR/GOVERNMENT GRASPS
FOR SOLUTIONS


Classified By: DCM Michael Butler for reasons 1.4 b & d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 000418

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER SNAR KCRM ES GANGS
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE SPIRALS IN EL SALVADOR/GOVERNMENT GRASPS
FOR SOLUTIONS


Classified By: DCM Michael Butler for reasons 1.4 b & d


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In 2005, El Salvador eclipsed
Colombia as the country with the highest homicide rate per
capita in the Western Hemisphere. The GOES has responded to
the epidemic of gang violence with a variety of initiatives
that have thus far failed to stem the tide of violence. The
latest initiative, announced February 13, is the creation of
a special operations unit within the police to identify and
capture extortionists, mostly "mara" members, who are killing
large numbers of public transportation workers. Separately,
according to GOES law enforcement, the deportation of
criminal gang members from the United States to El Salvador
continues to add to the burgeoning violent crime problem.
Although the police is earnestly (and desperately) trying to
respond to a public safety crisis, the Salvadoran government
lacks the additional resources necessary to adequately
address the problem. A further impediment is an underfunded
and less-than-effective Attorney General's office and
judicial officials who are often unwilling to keep violent
criminals behind bars. End Summary and Comment.

--------------
EL SALVADOR'S "CRIMINAL EPIDEMIC"
--------------


2. (U) On February 13, the Salvadoran National Chief Medical
Examiner presented his annual report, and characterized El
Salvador as plagued by a "criminal epidemic" that has created
the highest rate of homicides per capita in the Western
Hemisphere. In 2005, 55.5 of every 100,000 inhabitants in El
Salvador lost their lives to violence (3,812 total). This
rate of violence eclipsed that of Colombia, which reported
40.4 murders per 100,000 inhabitants over the same period.
The Pan American Health Organization PAHO) considers any
figure above 10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants to be of
epidemic proportions. The high level of murders in El
Salvador is largely attributable to criminal gang activity,

and has its roots in control of territory for drug
trafficking and sales, and extortion of common citizens,
public transport workers, and small businessmen. The Medical
Examiner further provided annual violent crime statistics
which show that El Salvador's murder rate has spiraled
year-by-year, starting in 2002 with 2,346, then 2,933 in
2004, and culminating with the 2005 figures. For the first
time in 2005, even the upper class "Escalon" neighborhood in
San Salvador appeared among the high murder areas, with 13
homicides. (Note: "Escalon" is one of the bedroom areas for
the diplomatic community. End Note.)

--------------
THE GOES IS TRYING, BUT FAILING
--------------


3. (C) The GOES has responded to the epidemic of gang
violence with a variety of initiatives that have thus far
failed to stem the tide of violence. Over the past several
years, the police have created a number of targeted units,
including specialized anti-gang and homicide units. On
February 13, the Minister of Governance announced the
formation of a special operations unit in the police to
identify and target extortionists, largely "mara" members,
who have been responsible for numerous assassinations of
public transportation employees unwilling to pay "mara"
"tolls." Unfortunately, the formation of these units does not
place additional police officers on the street, but rather
rearranges officers already assigned to different tasks. To
provide additional manpower and security, ESAF soldiers now
augment some police foot patrols. This arrangement, however,
is only a temporary fix in a country wary of granting police
powers to the military.


4. (C) The most significant and promising action taken by the
GOES to address gang violence is the January, 2006
appointment of Rodrigo Avila as Police Director. Avila is an
ARENA party stalwart with broad political and business
contacts, and has been a close Embassy contact for many
years. He previously served as Police Director in the 1990s,
and most recently held the post of Vice Minister of Public
Security. By naming Avila Police Director, President Saca
sent a clear message that he is willing to employ his best
and brightest to address the gang violence issue. Avila's
first actions included the removal and prosecution of a large
number of community police officers who had been receiving
protection money from "mara" members and other petty drug
dealers to allow the retail drug trade in several notorious
San Salvador neighborhoods. Last week, Avila also
transferred a large number of traffic officers who were
suspected of asking for bribes in exchange for forgiving
traffic tickets. However, despite his abilities and
commitment to cleaning up the streets, Avila's chance for
success will be significantly hampered without additional
police resources.


5. (C) Much of the gang violence in El Salvador occurs in
areas without a strong police presence. El Salvador has
16,000 police officers to provide public security and
criminal investigations for seven million inhabitants. This
police-to-civilian ratio of 1 to 437 is less than half that
of major U.S. metropolitan cities with comparable
populations. Further compounding the lack of police officers
is the fact that gangs are not concentrated in one area of
the country. They operate in all major cities and in the
rural areas of each department. The police will not be able
to adequately provide public security in gang infested areas
without a substantial augmentation of its forces.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Although it is focused on the issue, the GOES is
presently unable to adequately address gang related violence.
The expedited deportation of criminal gang members from the
United States to El Salvador under the Secure Borders
Initiative (SBI) is only exacerbating the problem. Costs
associated with gang violence -- including unemployment --
are already estimated at eleven percent of El Salvador's
gross domestic product. In the absence of any mechanism to
absorb and monitor these deported criminals, we should expect
gang violence and unemployment to escalate. Both factors
contribute to increased illegal immigration to the United
States.


7. (C) President Saca and all his key players on this issue
fully understand that, next to promoting economic growth and
investment, this is El Salvador's critical issue.
Nonetheless, Saca can only devote a very limited amount of
resources to the criminal justice system within the context
of other demands such as the need to maintain fiscal
responsibility and to expand social programs such as public
health and education. Having said that, the GOES has taken
great advantage of USG programs targeted to law enforcement,
such as INL-funded counternarcotics programs. GOES law
enforcement is also excited about ILEA and how those programs
will improve the effectiveness of their criminal justice
professionals. Post experience has been that U.S. funding of
criminal justice programs here is money well-spent and can
have a positive impact on U.S. national security, especially
in regards to the "mara" issue in the states.
Barclay