COSTA RICA DEFENDS EMBASSY MOVE TO TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 001841

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS XK CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA DEFENDS EMBASSY MOVE TO TEL AVIV

REF: A. A) FRISBIE-SHAPIRO TELCON 8/15/06

B. B) SAN SALVADOR 2017

C. C) WHA-SAN JOSE EMAIL 8/16/06

Classified By: CDA Russell L. Frisbie for reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a public ceremony marking his
administration,s 100 days in office, President Oscar Arias
explained that his government,s decision to move its embassy
from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv was not a slap to Israel, but was
consistent with Costa Rica,s "respect" for UN resolutions
and international law. The GOCR expects the decision will
improve relations with moderate Arab states. The sudden
timing took many by surprise. FM Stagno informed a stunned
Israeli charge of the move the evening of August 15,
stressing that Arias himself had made the decision, but the
entire GOCR concurred. Stagno also asked the Israelis to
inform the USG; the newly-arrived Israeli Amb-designate
briefed Ambassador Langdale. Stagno subsequently insisted to
the Ambassador on August 17 that the GOCR really was waiting
for the right moment, had consulted closely with President
Saca in El Salvador, and had refrained from acting until the
violence in Lebanon was over. We suspect that the decision
to move the Embassy was timed more to Arias,s 100-day marker
than to anything else, and it provided another opportunity
for Don Oscar to burnish his involvement in global issues.
Arias could employ his stature more effectively in this
hemisphere, particularly in Cuba. We will continue to nudge
him in that direction. END SUMMARY.

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THE PUBLIC EXPLANATION
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2. (U) Costa Rican President Oscar Arias used a special
August 16 public cabinet session marking his
administration,s first 100 days in office to defend and
explain his government,s short-notice decision to move its
embassy in Israel from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. Arias couched
the decision as consistent with Costa Rica,s "respect" for
UN resolutions and international law, and as "rectifying" an
"historical error" (the move of the GOCR embassy to Jerusalem
in 1982) which had "damaged" Costa Rica internationally and
"deprived" Costa Rica of wider "friendship with the Arab
world." The President stressed that the decision was not
intended to insult Israel, a "brave and admirable nation,"
but rather to confirm to international law and expand Costa
Rican relations with as many nations as possible. After the
ceremonial cabinet session, Arias reiterated to the media, ".
. . as a small country which bases its foreign policy on
international law and human rights, Costa Rica must comply
with UNSC resolutions." He blamed himself for not moving the
embassy during his first administration, but explained that
he did not want to "open another front" during the Central
American peace process.


3. (U) The MFA,s 13-page legal brief defending the decision
on the basis of UNGA and UNSC resolutions dating back to
1947, echoed Arias,s comments. The brief (transmitted to
Costa Rican diplomats around the world) concluded (informal
translation):

"This decision was necessary in light of Costa Rica,s
historic attachment to international law, and in particular
in light of:

-- the legality of UNSC resolutions;
-- the inadmissibility of seizing territory by force;
-- the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
other basic principles protecting human rights;
-- the illegality of administrative measures taken to modify
the legal status of Jerusalem contrary to UNSC resolutions;
-- the need to preserve the special status of Jerusalem; and
-- the need to wait for the final determination of the status
of Jerusalem."

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THE PRIVATE ACTION
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4. (C) Although the GOCR had been preparing for this
decision for some time (as evidenced by how swiftly the MFA
issued its detailed legal brief),the suddenness of the
decision took many, including us, by surprise. MFA contacts
told Pol/C and Poloffs on August 16 that "Don Oscar" himself
had made the decision, with little advance coordination.


5. (C) How the Israelis themselves were informed by the GOCR
is illustrative. Amb.-designate Ehud Eitam called on
Ambassador Langdale the evening of August 15 to explain (Ref
A). Eitam said his Charge had been summoned by FonMin Bruno
Stagno a few hours earlier, without explanation. Stagno told
the Charge that Arias himself had made the decision, although
the "entire" GOCR agreed. Costa Rica had "paid dearly" with
the Arab world for having its embassy in Jerusalem, Stagno
continued, adding that Arias would make the announcement on
August 16. Eitam said that his Charge, taken aback, noted
the "very bad" timing of the decision, coming less than 48
hours after a fragile calm had begun in south Lebanon. Costa
Rica seemed to be punishing Israel just as it was pursuing
peace. Stagno countered that the GOCR had planned to move
the Embassy for some time; this was in fact part of Arias,s
election platform. Costa Rica in fact had waited until the
Hezballah-Israeli violence was over, and was now giving the
GOI advance notice. According to Eitam, Stagno also asked
the Israelis to inform the U.S.


6. (C) Eitam called the GOCR decision "very grave."
Hezbollah would claim the Embassy move as a victory, making
it appear to be a "prize for terrorism." He said the Israeli
Embassy had expected the GOCR decision at some point in the
future, but they were caught completely off guard by the
timing. The GOI had just expressed support for Costa Rica,s
seat on the UNSC in 2008, and Costa Rica,s small Jewish
community had backed Arias,s election. Even a call from
Shimon Peres proved fruitless. Arias reportedly told Peres
he "could not back out" of his campaign pledge, according to
Eitam. The GOI now feared that El Salvador, with the last
remaining embassy in Jerusalem, would be
under enormous pressure to follow suite and move to Tel Aviv
(Ref B).


7. (C) FM Stagno maintained to the Ambassador on August 17
that there had been no meaningful international blowback from
the GOCR,s decision. There was no good time to make the
decision, so Arias wanted to act early in his administration.
Stagno insisted the GOCR really was waiting for the right
moment, had consulted closely with President Saca in El
Salvador, and had refrained from acting until the violence in
Lebanon was over. The government had briefed the legislative
assembly, he added, so that the entire GOCR concurred, and to
avoid a potential constitutional challenge from the
legislature,s three Jewish members. (Arias summoned all the
faction leaders the evening of August 15 to advise them of
his decision.) The Ambassador stressed USG concern with how
the GOCR handled the decision and especially with the lack of
prior consultation, especially given the Secretary,s deep
involvement in brokering the cessation of hostilities and
UNSCR 1701. He urged Stagno and the GOCR to work more
closely with the USG on issues of strong mutual interest.

COMMENT
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8. (C) We suspect that the decision to move the Embassy was
timed more to Arias,s 100-day marker than to anything else.
This was an "easy" executive branch decision he could add to
his (short) list of achievements thus far, and it provided
another opportunity for Don Oscar to remain involved in
global issues. Arias,s stature, advocacy for human rights
and defense of international law would be employed more
effectively in this hemisphere, however, particularly in
Cuba. We will continue to nudge him in that direction.
FRISBIE