Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA415
2006-02-20 13:39:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING

Tags:  AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000415 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, DS/ICI/RFJ,
DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX, D, P, DS,
CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: A. 05 STATE 35169

B. 05 SANAA 557

C. SANAA 266

D. SANAA 306

E. SANAA 349

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/19/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees.
EAC also discussed residential local guards and the Rewards
for Justice (RFJ) program. Members in attendance were DCM,
RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000415

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, DS/ICI/RFJ,
DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA/EX, D, P, DS,
CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: A. 05 STATE 35169

B. 05 SANAA 557

C. SANAA 266

D. SANAA 306

E. SANAA 349

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/19/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees.
EAC also discussed residential local guards and the Rewards
for Justice (RFJ) program. Members in attendance were DCM,
RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.


1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and
sections on the situation, 17 days after the reported escape
of the Al-Qaida prisoners. Members were advised that none of
the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts
were still unknown. NOTE: (Post has subsequently been
advised that two of the escapees have turned themselves in).
Relevant office and section heads advised that the ROYG has
been cooperative in sharing what information there is, but
that there was nothing new to report at this time.


2. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel
restrictions put in place in RefTel's were still warranted in
light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts
of the escapees. Personal security and travel restrictions
agreed to by the EAC are as follows:


A. Embassy personnel are strongly urged to maintain a low
profile in Sana'a until the capture of the escapees or
information of their whereabouts are learned. Unnecessary
travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods, shopping and
social venues and areas on the outskirts of Sana'a should be
curtailed. Post personnel are reminded to avoid numerous
trips to grocery stores and other venues frequented by
Westerners. All personnel were reminded to vary their routes
and times to and from work.


B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen.

Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Travel to Yemen by official Americans
will also be considered on a case-by-case basis. The RSO and
section heads will review all travel and TDY requests and
make recommendations to the DCM.


C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and
access to armored shuttles.


D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential
security forces will be alerted and will maintain a
heightened security posture.


E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance
at the three approved hotels used by official American
personnel.


F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain
vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems
suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1.


G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately
reflected the situation and no change was necessary at
present.


3. (S/NF) EAC members discussed timelines and potential
tripwires and all agreed that the one month mark would be the
point at which discussion on future security restrictions and
an enhanced embassy response might be warranted. All EAC
members agreed that, absent significant numbers of the
escapees captured or information concerning their
whereabouts, post would have to make changes in the operation
of the mission and the security of it's personnel. EAC
members felt that the longer the terrorists were at large,
the more likely they were to start planning operations
against the embassy and its personnel.


4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and
to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation.
Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received
that increased the threat to the embassy or it's personnel.
Post will immediately report developments as they occur.


5. (SBU) RSO advised that the issue of reduced residential
local guard coverage discussed in 2005, RefTel's A and B, is
again under review by DS/IP/OPO/FPD. The issue of 24/7
residential local guard coverage first broached by
DSS/IP/OPO/FPD in 2005 concerned post's residential guard
staffing being over standards for our threat ratings. Post
has maintained the position that our unique situation, even
before the recent escape of 23 Al-Qaida prisoners, requires
an exception to the guidelines and post must keep 24/7
residential guards. The EAC unanimously agreed that guard
coverage should not be reduced and voiced strong objections
to the matter even being considered during these turbulent
times. RSO advised he was in the process of writing a post
response on the issue, EAC demanded RSO include their strong
feelings on the subject.


6. (S/NF) RSO advised EAC that DS/ICI/RFJ, Rewards for
Justice program, made contact with the RSO office and advised
that rewards for two of the escapees, Al-Banna and Al-Badawi,
were still available. EAC agreed that advertising in the
local newspapers, press releases, advertising campaign and
posters may be effective in attaining information on the two
subjects, but decided to check with the ROYG on the
feasibility of such a campaign in Yemen. RSO advised the EAC
of the possibility of including some of the other escapees in
the RFJ program, if they met the criteria. EAC agreed that
avenue was worth exploring.
Krajeski