AL-QA'IDA ESCAPE: COORDINATING MARITIME EFFORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000385

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PTER PHSA YM MARITIME SECURITY
SUBJECT: AL-QA'IDA ESCAPE: COORDINATING MARITIME EFFORTS

REF: SANAA 272

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: On February 11, Office of Military
Cooperation (OMC) Chief and NAVCENT Liaison Officer (LNO) met
with Yemeni military and coast guard officials to discuss
maritime cooperation to capture 23 escaped al Qa'ida
prisoners (ref A). Led by the Chief of Staff for the Yemeni
Armed Forces, MG Mohammad Qassimi, the meeting delineated
efforts between the Yemen Navy (YNAV),Yemen Coast Guard
(YCG) and Coalition forces from the Bahrain-based Combined
Task Force 150 (CTF-150) to block possible maritime escape
routes and capture the prisoners if interdicted. Qassimi
requested that the YCG and YNAV create a joint-plan
indicating which maritime areas Yemeni assets could not
cover, in order to help focus CTF-150 efforts. End Summary.


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Who,s in Charge?
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2. (C) On February 10, NAVCENT announced that the Dutch-led
Coalition force CTF-150 is supporting the ROYG's efforts to
recapture 23 Al Qa'ida operatives who escaped from a Yemeni
prison on February 5. On February 11, Qassimi convened a
meeting with Chief OMC, NAVCENT LNO, and Yemeni officials to
coordinate efforts to block possible maritime escape routes.
Also in attendance were BG Ali Ahmed Siayani, Director
Military Intelligence (DMI),BG Ali Rassa, YCG Commander, Col
Ali Supe, YCG Chief of Operations, and YCG and YNAV
operations officers.


3. (C) MG Qassimi thanked CTF-150 for supporting the ROYG's
efforts to capture the Al-Qa'ida suspects. He then
delineated the areas of responsibility between the various
forces:

A) Land: The Yemeni Army and security forces (not further
identified) are responsible for patrols and intelligence
assets working to apprehend the escapees on land.

B) Territorial Sea and Ports: YCG is responsible within
the 12 nautical mile territorial limit, while YNAV and YCG
are jointly-responsible for covering ports and coastal areas.
YNAV is also tasked with positioning radar to provide
coverage of areas not covered by patrol craft or other
surveillance.

C) International Waters: CTF-150 is responsible for its
own mission in international waters, within its normal
operating area in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea.


4. (U) MG Qassimi also designated the YCG Aden-based
operations center to serve as the communications hub between
Yemeni forces and CTF-150.

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Big Sea, Little Ship: Focusing Efforts
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5. (C) Chief OMC explained that CTF-150 had limited assets
and efforts would, therefore, be better served if Yemen could
provide information on where internal assets provided the
least coverage. CTF-150 could then focus their efforts south
of these areas in international waters.



6. (C) Qassimi also requested CTF-150's assistance stopping
all ships departing from Somalia carrying refugees, saying
these ships present a direct threat to Yemen because
smugglers could be carrying drugs, weapons, and/or
terrorists. Chief OMC and NAVCENT LNO quickly explained that
CTF-150 was operating in international waters, and the focus
of their mission would be on southern bound ships from Yemen
in order to block possible maritime escape routes or capture
suspected terrorists.

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Who,s Job is it Anyway?
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7. (C) MG Qassimi asked YCG and military officials on their
current ability to provide coverage. Unable to answer
immediately, the Yemeni officials began discussing their
individual service's capabilities in smaller groups. When
Qassimi called the meeting back to order, DMI and Army
officials requested that the YCG expand its operations beyond
port areas. YCG officials replied that limited equipment
(small boats) and bases (only in Aden, Hodeida and al-Salif)
restricted them from expanding operations to a larger area.
Qassimi asked YNAV and YCG to create a joint-plan specifying
which areas Yemeni forces could realistically cover. Qassimi
also invited the NAVCENT LNO to participate in the planning
session and assist in coordinating communication between
Yemeni forces and CTF-150.

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Comment
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9. (C) This "coordination" meeting highlights the poor
level of planning for joint-operations between Yemen's
military services and the lack of understanding of each
other's capabilities. CTF-150,s offer of assistance clearly
encouraged the coordination of Yemen's maritime response, a
process which had not already begun.


10. (C) Coordination between military and coast guard
forces, which fall under the Interior Ministry, has generally
been weak to non-existent. YNAV, an ineffectual force with
inoperable equipment, resents the upstart Coast Guard, which
has steadily grown into a capable and professional force
after being established in 2002 with USG assistance.


11. (C) This current crisis could provide an excellent
opportunity for a break from tradition, resulting in the
first major YCG and YNAV coordinated mission. While its
unlikely that the combined efforts of Yemeni and Coalition
forces can succeed in providing full coverage for Yemen's
long and porous sea borders, the presence of maritime forces
makes the maritime escape route less attractive. Also, the
establishment of joint-communications procedures should pave
the way for future cooperation between Yemeni and Coalition
forces in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Krajeski