Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA3618
2006-01-03 09:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003618 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS
AND REFORM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003618

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, KIDNAPPINGS
AND REFORM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 2 meeting, FonMin Abubakr
al-Qirbi told Ambassador that the ROYG had made a conscious
decision to include UN-designated terrorist financier Abdul
Majid Zindani in its official delegation to the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Saudi Arabia, claiming
it would help "moderate" Zindani's right-wing, extremist
views. Qirbi reiterated the ROYG's request for any evidence
of Zindani's support for terrorism so that the Government
could prosecute him within Yemeni law. Addressing the recent
spate of kidnappings, Qirbi said they were related to blood
fueds that the tribes wanted to force the Government to help
resolve, not protestations over lack of government services,
as had been the case in the past. The FonMin also raised
Yemen's efforts to re-qualify for the Millenium Challenge
Account (MCA) Threshold Program, asserting that it was "time
to take action" on reform. END SUMMARY

--------------
ENLIGHTENING SHEIKH ZINDANI
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador told Qirbi that he could not emphasize
enough the USG's frustration and anger over Zindani's
inclusion in the ROYG's official delegation, headed by
President Saleh himself, to the December OIC conference.
Zindani was designated by the UN 1267 Committee as a
terrorist financier, he said, and Yemen was obligated as a
member state to freeze his assets and prevent him from
traveling outside the country. Ambassador noted that Qirbi
had no doubt received a read-out of the meeting between
Undersecretary Burns and Ambassador al-Hajri in Washington
covering the same points.


3. (C) Qirbi said the ROYG saw Zindani's visit to Saudi
Arabia "in a different light," arguing that because Zindani
is "looked at as a man with rather extreme religious views,"
government officials thought it would be beneficial to
include him in the ROYG's delegation. "We thought attending
the conference, especially with the paper it produced on
'Enlightened Islam,' would help him re-think his positions as
an extremist and right-wing scholar," he said.


4. (C) Ambassador noted that the USG was encouraged by the
increased determination shown at the OIC conference to combat

both the results and the root causes of terrorism, but
reminded the FonMin that the issue of Zindani's travel was a
legal one. As we had explained to ROYG officials on several
occasions, only Zindani himself could apply for de-listing
with the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset
Controls, and unless a decision is made to formally remove
him from the 1267 list, the ROYG must comply with its
obligations as a UN member state.


5. (C) Qirbi complained that this procedure "complicates
things," stating that "we exchange information all the time
without individuals getting involved." He argued that the
Zindani issue was "hampered by a lack of progress" on the USG
side, because the ROYG had asked several times for the USG to
present it with whatever evidence it had about Zindani's
support for terrorism so that it can "take action in
accordance with Yemeni law." Ambassador made the point that
Zindani's application for de-listing or the sharing of any
information were separate issues that could be pursued, but
in the meantime, Yemen could not shirk its legal
responsibility to freeze his assets and restrict his travel.

--------------
TRIBAL KIDNAPPINGS ON THE RISE AGAIN
--------------


6. (C) Turning to the recent spate of tribal kidnappings of
foreign tourists, Ambassador told Qirbi that this caused
concern for the safety of foreigners in Yemen, and could
adversely affect the country's recently revived tourism
sector. Qirbi agreed, stating that the ROYG "always seeks to
protect kidnapping victims," and hoped to prevent future
incidents by "mobilizing public opinion" against the
practice. He noted statements he and President Saleh had
made on local television the previous day, saying he hoped
the tribal leaders would "listen to the message." Qirbi said
these kidnappings were different from those that took place
routinely several years ago, in that the tribes were no
longer seeking services or money from the Government, but
were trying to pressure the Government into intervening in
tribal fueds or releasing tribesmen it had imprisoned.

--------------
REFORM: TIME TO ACT?
--------------


7. (C) The FonMin then asked the Ambassador about the status
of Yemen's MCA Threshold Program suspension, to which
Ambassador replied that the major donors were working with
the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation on
specific steps that could be taken in order for Yemen's
suspension to be re-considered in May. Donor recommendations
focused on good governance, among other areas, he said, and
included concrete proposals such as rendering public the
reports of the Central Organization for Control and Audit.
Qirbi confirmed that the ROYG was "looking at" the proposals,
and said it was clearly "time to take action" on reforms,
particularly after the ruling party conference in December
laid out a platform focusing on the subject.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) COMMENT: Qirbi's assertion that the ROYG pondered
the possible beneficial results of including Zindani on its
delegation to the OIC is a half-hearted attempt to come up
with an ex-post facto explanation. The reality is that
Zindani probably made clear his desire to attend, and
President Saleh found it difficult to back down, UNSC
Resolutions notwithstanding. The fact is that Zindani
continues to wield a great deal of influence among Yemen's
religious conservatives, and Saleh has made a calculated
decision that it is easier for him - for now - to raise the
ire of the international community rather than pick a fight
with the Sheikh.
Krajeski