Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA349
2006-02-13 07:55:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING

Tags:  AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000349 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: A) SANAA 266 AND B) SANAA 306

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/12/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees.
Members in attendance were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO,
POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.

S E C R E T SANAA 000349

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: A) SANAA 266 AND B) SANAA 306

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/12/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the embassy and it's employees.
Members in attendance were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO,
POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.


1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and
sections on the situation, 10 days after the reported escape
of the Al-Qaida prisoners. Members were advised that none of
the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts
were still unknown. Relevant office and section heads
advised that the ROYG has been cooperative in sharing what
information there is, but that there was nothing new to
report at this time.


2. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel
restrictions put in place in RefTel's were still warranted in
light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts
of the escapees. Personal security and travel restrictions
agreed to by the EAC are as follows:


A. Embassy personnel are strongly urged to maintain a low
profile in Sana'a until the capture of the escapees or
information of their whereabouts are learned. Unnecessary
travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods, shopping and
social venues and areas on the outskirts of Sana'a should be
curtailed. Post personnel are reminded to avoid numerous
trips to grocery stores and other venues frequented by
Westerners. All personnel were reminded to vary their routes
and times to and from work.


B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen.
Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Travel to Yemen by official Americans
will also be considered on a case-by-case basis. The RSO and
section heads will review all travel and TDY requests and
make recommendations to the DCM.


C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and
access to armored shuttles.


D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential
security forces will be alerted and will maintain a
heightened security posture.


E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance
at the three approved hotels used by official American
personnel.


F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain
vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems
suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1.


G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately
reflected the situation and no change was necessary at
present.


3. (S/NF) EAC members discussed timelines and potential
tripwires and all agreed that the one month mark would be the
point at which discussion on future security restrictions and
an enhanced embassy response might be warranted. All EAC
members agreed that, absent significant numbers of the
escapees captured or information concerning their
whereabouts, post would have to make changes in the operation
of the mission and the security of it's personnel. EAC
members felt that the longer the terrorists were at large,
the more likely they were to start planning operations
against the embassy and its personnel.


4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and
to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation.
Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received
that increased the threat to the embassy or it's personnel.
Post will immediately report developments as they occur.
Krajeski