PRESIDENT SALEH SHARES INFORMATION AND INVITES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000347

SIPDIS

STATE/NEA FOR A/S WELCH; U/S BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH SHARES INFORMATION AND INVITES
EMBASSY TO JOIN IN THE SEARCH FOR ESCAPEES AND VISIT PSO
PRISON

Classified By: AMBASSADOR KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d)

--------------
Summary:
--------------


1. (S) Ambassador, DCM and SIMO met with President Saleh,
Wednesday, 2/8, to ask for an update on the status of the
al-Qa'ida escapees and to stress the need for absolute
transparency on ROYG findings and steps being taken. Saleh,
the Director of the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the
Attorney General jointly briefed Ambassador and Emboffs on
details of the escape, shared photos and reports and invited
Emboffs to visit the PSO prison to see the tunnel for
themselves. Saleh indicated that the PSO was in a state of
dissolution and showed Emboffs letters of resignation from
the three top leaders of the PSO. Saleh revealed that the NSB
had warned the PSO of a possible escape being planned and
complained that the PSO had taken no special steps to
investigate. Upon Emboffs' request to see the tunnel, Saleh
arranged for DCM and SIMO to visit the PSO prison to see
evidence of the escape which had been left intact to
facilitate in the investigation. End summary.

--------------
I'm shocked!
--------------


2. (S) President Saleh responded very quickly to Embassy's
request for a meeting on the issue of escaped al-Qa'ida
prisoners. Saleh opened the meeting with an expression of
profound shock and dismay over the escape and said that he
fully realized the damage this does to Yemen's image abroad,
to the image of his security forces inside the country and to
his own trust in the PSO, an institution he has relied on
heavily for the entire period of his rule. Saleh added that
preliminary investigation suggests that gross mismanagement
and corruption made the escape possible but that other
motives were still under investigation. Saleh seemed
confident that the escapees would be rounded up but that his
shattered confidence in his top security advisors poses some
difficult questions. Saleh assured us that he would be
cooperating with the USG closely on recapturing the fugitives
and that he had already been in touch with the Saudis to
share information and coordinate next steps. Typical of all
such meetings with Saleh, there was a request for assistance
but not of the monetary kind. Saleh repeated a request he had
made during a previous crisis (the capture of al-Qa'ida
operative Kanaan) for geolocation equipment. "You have the
most sophisticated equipment in this area," said Saleh, "it
would make a difference in tracking these criminals if we
could make use of it."

--------------
PSO or NSB?
--------------


2. (S) Saleh said that he had received letters of resignation
from his three top PSO leaders. "The PSO should be considered
in a state of dissolution," declared Saleh; "If these guys
had not submitted their resignation, I would have fired
them." Informed of Embassy concerns over a security gap,
should the entire PSO become paralyzed, Saleh stepped back
from his earlier assertion and turned to NSB Director, Ali
al-Anesi, and directed him to tell the PSO leadership that
their resignations would remain on hold while they continue
to discharge their duties and assist in the capture of the
escapees. Told of Embassy's lack of confidence in NSB's
ability to fill any security void (and, in particular, lack
of confidence in his nephew's leadership),Saleh called in
his nephew and Deputy Director of NSB and instructed him to
be fully cooperative and work hand-in-hand with Emboffs in
the days and weeks to come. (Comment: DCM had met separately
with Ammar Saleh the day before to warn him that any lack of
transparency on the prison escape and how it is handled would
be taken very seriously by the USG and would have
repercussions on future dealings with the ROYG).

--------------
Dead or Alive:
--------------


3. (S) Both Ammar Saleh and his uncle, the President, said
separately that Director of the PSO, Ghalib Gamesh, was not
under suspicion for collusion in the escape but that he had
failed miserably by trusting the wrong people and not heeding
warnings about a possible escape plan being hatched.
(Comment: Indications are that Gamesh would be allowed to
continue in his job for the time being, though with
circumscribed movements and under scrutiny by NSB Director
al-Anesi. End comment). NSB Director al-Anesi and Attorney
General al-Ulfi, then described the ongoing investigation as
taking place inside NSB headquarters and involving 17 prison
officials, including the deputy director of the prison, floor
wardens and several guards. So far, according to al-Anesi,
material incentives seem to have swayed the deputy director
who took advantage of the incompetence of other responsible
officials. Saleh announced that different rewards were under
consideration to help bring in citizen participation in the
hunt and that it would be different amounts for information
leading to an arrest, the arrest itself or the killing of any
of the escapees. Told by his nephew that six escapees (but
not the most important ones) were under surveillance at
fifteen possible locations, Saleh instructed his nephew to go
after them once it was clear that no one else could be
tricked into joining them and ordered, "If they offer any
resistance, kill them."


4. (S) The plan, so far according to the Attorney General,
was to disseminate information on the escapees as widely as
possible throughout the country and the region, to offer
rewards and to watch and/or arrest relatives and friends of
the escapees in the hope of catching them trying to get in
touch with family or contacts. Al-Ulfi offered to share with
us the names of those currently under investigation and to
share any leads that result from interrogations.

--------------
Tunnel Vision?
--------------


5. (S) DCM and COS responded to Saleh's invitation to view
the escape tunnel and ascertain for themselves evidence of
the escape. The visit was well worth it and yielded the
following observations:

- The PSO prison, nominally a maximum security prison, was
anything but.
- The cell where the 23 plotted their escape held only three
of them originally, their requests for their friends-in-crime
to visit them were all granted.
- The cell was actually part of a suite that included two
cells and a large bathroom. The outside door was used as the
controlled entrance while the inside doors were left open so
the prisoners could wander freely within the suite.
- The prisoners reportedly asked not to be disturbed and
waived their right to fresh air and exercise for two weeks
prior to the escape.
- The smaller of the two cells, used for digging the tunnel,
was almost totally filled to the ceiling with compacted dirt
that came out of the tunnel. The larger room, where the 23
lived, was one third filled with the same compacted dirt.
Water from the bathroom was used to press it down.
- Graffiti on the walls was limited to some of the prisoners
names and the names of some of the operations they had
undertaken. There was one reference to the British Embassy,
with three names listed above it. (SIMO is tracking and
analyzing this reference).
- The tunnel itself (44 meters long) was videotaped by a PSO
technician after the escape and the tape showed only a couple
of wrong turns taken and then corrected by the diggers. Other
than the points of entry and exit, which were larger and
deeper, the rest of the tunnel provided only crawling space
for one escapee at a time.


6. (S) General Ghalib Gamesh, the now discredited Chairman of
the PSO, was in his office when emboffs called and he
accompanied the group to the prison, in a bloc just adjacent
to the PSO headquarters. Gamesh was visibly drawn and
depressed and did not display the usual spark and arrogance
with which he greeted visitors in the past. PSO guards still
clicked their heels and saluted him as he passed by but NSB
Director al-Anesi seemed to be calling the shots and acting
as tour guide of the prison. DCM asked Gamesh how he felt and
if he was up to the task of catching the bad guys and Gamesh,
practically in tears, said that it was a very difficult thing
to function under the circumstances. "It's a big blow to me.
My life's work has been destroyed in one day by some stupid
mistakes. I don't know if I can take it." Details of the
tunnel, the escape and tools used by the escapees were
detailed to us as we walked by al-Anesi and by a PSO
technical expert. Gamesh stayed in the background and did not
say much.

--------------
Comment:


8. (S) We were struck by the seriousness and professionalism
of NSB Director al-Anesi. His relationship with President
Saleh seemed comfortable and professional, in contrast to the
demeanor of the President's nephew and NSB Deputy Director,
Ammar Saleh, who was visibly nervous in his uncle's presence
and barely able to deliver his report on the status of
recapture efforts. Attorney General Ulfi was already well
known to post for his professionalism and cooperation and
also behaved like a person who has his president's trust and
confidence. General Gamesh, probably saved from immediate
dismissal by our questioning how Saleh planned to fill the
gap at the PSO, looks like he might hang in for only a few
more months while the investigation and the recapture efforts
unfold. The future of the PSO and the NSB remain to be
determined. The NSB's mission, never clearly defined from the
outset, may have taken on a new shine under the
circumstances, but Saleh did not come across as a man with a
vision as to where his security and intelligence
establishments were headed in the near term. Separately, the
retaining of MOI Allimi and his promotion to Deputy Prime
Minister in the recent cabinet shuffle may indicate a more
prominent role for law enforcement in the months ahead. End
comment.
Krajeski