Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA305
2006-02-08 12:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING

Tags:  AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000305 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: SANAA 266

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/08/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the EAC. Members in attendance
were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.

S E C R E T SANAA 000305

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT,
NEA/EX, D, P, DS, CA, INR, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: AEMR ASEC PTER CASC YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING

REF: SANAA 266

Classified By: RSO William Mellott for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY. (S/NF) DCM convened the Embassy's EAC on 02/08/06,
to discuss the ongoing situation concerning the 23 escaped
Al-Qaida members. EAC discussed the immediate security and
personal safety concerns of the EAC. Members in attendance
were AMB, DCM, RSO, POLM, OMC, DAO, POLE, CONS, FBI, AID, FPD.


1. (S/NF) EAC was briefed by all relevant agencies and
sections on the situation, six days after the reported escape
of the Al-Qaida prisoners. Members were advised that none of
the escapees had been captured as yet and their whereabouts
were unknown.


2. (S/NF) AMB advised the EAC that he and the DCM had met
earlier in the day with President Saleh and that Saleh had
pledged full cooperation and information sharing with the
U.S. Embassy in the matter. President Saleh advised the AMB
and DCM that they were closing in on some of the escapees and
that the re-capture of subjects was the highest priority for
the ROYG.


3. (S/NF) EAC members agreed that the security and travel
restrictions put in place in RefTel were still warranted in
light of the lack of information concerning the whereabouts
of the escapees. Personal security and travel restrictions
agreed to by the EAC are as follows:


A. Maintain a low profile in Sana'a for the next two weeks.
Travel to the Bab al-Yemen, local neighborhoods and areas on
the outskirts of Sana'a are restricted. All post personnel
are reminded to avoid numerous trips to grocery stores and
other venues frequented by Westerners. All personnel were
reminded to vary their routes and times to and from work.


B. Limit all non-essential travel within or to Yemen.
Official travel outside of Sana'a will be considered on a
case-by-case basis. Travel to Yemen by official Americans
will also be considered on a case-by-case basis.


C. All American employees will be allowed flex time and
access to armored shuttles.


D. Local Guard Force, Residential Guards and ROYG residential
security forces will be alerted and will maintain a
heightened security posture.


E. RSO will notify ROYG security forces to increase vigilance
at the three approved hotels used by official American
personnel.


F. All embassy personnel were reminded by the RSO to maintain
vigilance and immediately report any incident that seems
suspicious or unusual to the RSO office or Post 1.


G. EAC agreed that the most recent Warden Message adequately
reflected the situation and no change was necessary at
present.


4. (S/NF) EAC agreed to continue monitoring the situation and
to liaise with their ROYG counterparts on the situation.
Members agreed to reconvene if any information was received
that increased the threat to the embassy or its personnel.


5. (S/NF) Post will continue monitoring the situation and
immediately report developments as they occur.
Krajeski