SALEH SIGNALS SHAKE UP IN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000286

SIPDIS

STATE/NEA FOR A/S WELCH AND ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2013
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH SIGNALS SHAKE UP IN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
AFTER JAIL BREAKOUT

REF: A. A) SANAA 235 (EXDIS)

B. SANAA 266

C. B) SANAA 272

D. TD-314/08298-06

Classified By: DCM NABEEL A.KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 B & D

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Summary:
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1. (S) CDA Requested and received a phone call from President
Saleh, 2/5, on the heels of the jail break-out that yielded
23 al-Qa'ida operatives to the streets of Sanaa, and perhaps
beyond. CDA stressed to Saleh the importance of working in
close tandem with the USG on this critical issue and not
allowing any misunderstanding to develop because of delays or
reluctance anywhere in his services to share information and
coordinate efforts. Saleh assured CDA that the issue is being
accorded the highest priority and that coordination with the
U.S. would be very thorough. He requested assistance in
trying to locate and apprehend the escapees but suggested
that our cooperation would have to be with the relatively new
National Security Bureau (NSB) as opposed to the Political
Security Organization (PSO) which is undergoing a thorough
investigation "from top to bottom" because of their failure
to prevent the escape. The good news here is the seriousness
with which the matter is being treated; the bad news is that
the NSB lacks the experience and the staffing of the PSO and
has had a less than stellar record in its dealings with the
U.S. Embassy. End Summary.

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The Need to Know:
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2. (S) The Embassy's Emergency Action Committee met, 2/5, to
discuss the escape of 23 al-Qa'ida operatives from a high
security PSO jail in Sanaa on 2/3. Other than considering
immediate security implications for the Mission, members
looked at the long-term implications for the U.S. and the
region and agreed that the longer these individuals stayed at
large, the more dangerous they would become - with time on
their hands to reconnect with their old contacts and to plot
new operations in Yemen and the region. In that context, EAC
members worried about the level of cooperation the relevant
agencies at the Mission are likely to see from the Yemenis,
at a time when the temptation to cover up mistakes might be
strongest. The request to speak to President Saleh was made
with this anxiety in mind.


3. (S) During his subsequent conversation with the President,
CDA did not have a chance to finish expressing concern over
the escape when Saleh cut in,"If you are concerned, imagine
how I feel. I'm furious that my services have shown such
weakness and I'm concerned about our reputation and about
others taking advantage of this weakness. Please let
Washington know that we have no higher priority right now
than to find out what went wrong and to fix it." Saleh said
he was confident that the escapees would be rounded up in
short order but that discovering the vulnerabilities in his
"services" was the more serious challenge.

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Internecine Rivalry:
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4. (S) CDA urged Saleh to instruct his services to work
closely with the U.S. Embassy and
to leave no doubt in anyone's mind that this is a joint fight
in which all information is to be shared completely and in
real-time. Saleh responded by inviting the USG to join in the
investigation and the hunt but added, "you will be working
with the NSB because the entire PSO is under investigation,
from top to bottom." Knowing that Saleh's nephew, Ammar
Saleh, NSB's number two, was in charge and has been known to
horde information, CDA asked Saleh to please give clear
instructions to his nephew on working closely with the
Embassy. Saleh said that he had not yet spoken to his nephew
but had given instructions to NSB Director, Ali al-Anesi, to
do exactly that. (Comment: Ammar Saleh's competitiveness with
the PSO has not been such a well kept secret and the young
man is probably literally biting his fingernails in
anticipation of replacing the older, and still head of the
PSO, General Gamesh as his uncle's trusted advisor on
security and intelligence matters. End comment.)


5. (S) Saleh added a plea for assistance: "We will work
closely with you but you have to be more forthcoming in your
assistance. I need the right equipment to track these people
and you are the only ones who have the most sophisticated
machinery for this job. I also need you to hurry up with
military assistance we need to end the rebellion in the north
which is tying up our security forces. Please tell Washington
these are not normal times and we need your help fast."
Comment:
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6. (S) Saleh's anxiety seemed genuine. He was clearly shaken
and agitated by the event and realized what an escape of this
magnitude does to his reputation as a reliable ally in the
GWOT. The good news is that this is a good time to exercise
leverage over Saleh's decisions with timely, yet discrete,
assistance. The bad news is that the shake-up, already
underway in PSO ranks, might leave Yemen even more vulnerable
to security threats and ultimately place all terrorism
related matters under the control of Ammar Saleh, a corrupt
and immature young man with demonstrated suspicion of and
reluctance to work with the USG. We intend to speak very
bluntly to the younger Saleh about our lack of tolerance of
any delays or gaps in his coordination with us in the
challenges that lie ahead. End comment.
Krajeski