Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA1833
2006-06-24 13:16:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN

Tags:  PREL MNUC PINR IR YE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHYN #1833/01 1751316
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241316Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4427
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001833 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MNUC PINR IR YE
SUBJECT: YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN
INTERFERENCE AND REGIONAL INTENTIONS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001833

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MNUC PINR IR YE
SUBJECT: YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN
INTERFERENCE AND REGIONAL INTENTIONS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: President Saleh and Minister of Interior
Rashad al-Alimi told CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid on
June 18 that, while Iran's Revolutionary Guards have been
active in Yemen since 1983, their recent support for
insurgents in Yemen's Saada region was unacceptable and,
along with other activities in the region, constituted proof
of Tehran's desire to "re-establish the Persian empire." In
that connection, President Saleh asked GEN Abizaid to provide
imagery of 1/50,000 resolution of Saada in order to assist
the Yemeni Government's plans to "strike" insurgent leader
Abdul Malik al-Houthi and finish this insurgency once and for
all. END SUMMARY


2. (C) The MinInt, who is concurrently Deputy Prime
Minister, met with GEN Abizaid on June 18 with the new
Minister of Defense and Chief of Armed Forces also in
attendance. After a brief update on the needs and plans of
the Yemeni Coast Guard, the discussion turned to the growing
threat from Iran and cooperation in improving regional
defenses.


3. (C) Warming to the subject, the MinInt explained that
Iran's interference in Yemen began in 1983, when the
Revolutionary Guard trained terrorist groups and executed
operations in Yemen. A cinema was bombed, acid was thrown in
women's faces, and an attempt was made to bomb the Saudi
Embassy in Sanaa.


4. (C) In 2004, Alimi continued, Shia from Iran and Saudi
Arabia began supporting followers of insurgent cleric Badr
al-Din al-Houthi in the northern governate of Saada.
"Documents we seized in Saada proves this support," Alimi
contended. The Yemeni Government rolled up a cell linked to
al-Houthi in Saana that was planning to attack the Embassy
and assassinate the Ambassador. "This is what the
Revolutionary Guards are doing in Yemen," Alimi concluded.


5. (C) GEN Abizaid noted that Yemen was facing threats from
al-Qaida on one hand and from the Revolutionary Guards on the
other, to which a senior military official added, "and the
threat from the Revolutionary Guard is greater." Alimi
opined that the threat from Iran was actually greater for
Gulf countries than for Yemen, but that Iran's support of the
al-Houthi insurgency was nonetheless dangerous, "given
Saada's proximity to Shia areas of Saudi Arabia and the oil
fields."


6. (C) In a separate meeting on the same day, President
Saleh advised GEN Abizaid that Iran has destructive
intentions in Iraq and Bahrain, because Tehran "wants to
restore the Persian empire." He said it was in the interests
of all nations to work with the USG to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons.


7. (S) Responding to a statement by GEN Abizaid about the
importance of Yemen working with the USG to improve border
and coastal security, Saleh said that what Yemen needed most
urgently was imagery of Saada at 1/50,000 resolution. Saleh
explained, "I want a decisive operation in Saada before the
election against Abdul Malik al-Houthi," the current leader
of the insurgency. "I want to track his phone calls and then
strike him like we did Harithi." (NOTE: Saleh was referring
to Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al-Qaida affiliate who was killed
with a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. unmanned aerial
vehicle in Yemen in 2003.)


8. (S) GEN Abizaid said that this kind of imagery would
require overflight permission from the Yemeni Government and
that he would see what he could do to fulfill Saleh's
request.


9. (C) COMMENT: Saleh from time to time rails in private
meetings with us about Iranian meddling in Yemen's internal
affairs, but he is careful to keep a correct relationship
with Tehran. Ambassador pointed out during the meeting with
MinInt Alimi that Iran's National Security Advisor had
recently visited, but we heard nothing but statements that
were positive and supportive of Iran. Alimi replied simply
that Yemen had voted with the USG to refer Iran to the UNSC
in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Post

SANAA 00001833 002 OF 002


believes Yemen's concerns about Iranian involvement here are
genuine and Saleh does not wish to see a nuclear Iran at his
doorstep. Given the balancing act that the ROYG has to play,
however, we can expect quiet votes from Yemen at the IAEA,
but not outspokenness against Iran's nuclear ambitions.


10. (U) GEN Abizaid has cleared this message.
Krajeski