Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA1773
2006-06-15 08:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT SALEH ON SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC COURTS: LET'S

Tags:  PREL KCRS PTER SO YE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1773 1660829
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150829Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4363
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0151
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0572
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0067
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0488
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0154
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0344
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0146
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 001773 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/E AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KCRS PTER SO YE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH ON SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC COURTS: LET'S
WORK TOGETHER

REF: A. SECSTATE 93874


B. SANAA 212 (NOTAL)

C. SANAA 956 (NOTAL)

D. SANAA 1260

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 001773

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/E AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KCRS PTER SO YE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH ON SOMALIA'S ISLAMIC COURTS: LET'S
WORK TOGETHER

REF: A. SECSTATE 93874


B. SANAA 212 (NOTAL)

C. SANAA 956 (NOTAL)

D. SANAA 1260

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh and his Foreign Minister
are urging dialogue between the USG and factions of the
Islamic Courts not aligned with Al-Qaeda. The Courts are now
a "fact on the ground" and we must seek to influence them
now; if we wait until they take over Baidoa, we will have
very little leverage left. While Yemen is interested in
using its "moderating influence" to mediate between the
Courts and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),Yemen
will not hesitate to "strike," according to Saleh, if the
Courts set up a Taliban-like government in Somalia. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) During a meeting with Ambassador and DCM on June 15,
President Saleh said that "none of us are happy" about the
Islamic Courts' takeover of Mogadishu and Jowhar, but "they
are now a factor on the ground and we must deal with them."
Once the Courts take Baidoa, Saleh opined, "everything else
will fall into their hands," and they will be less flexible
in dealing with the international community.


3. (C) The Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) is continuing
its mediation efforts between the TFG and the Courts,
exerting a "moderating influence," according to Saleh. He
urged the United States to work with the ROYG in this regard
in order to establish a dialogue with non-AQ affiliated
members of the Islamic Courts.


4. (C) Saleh mentioned that he had sent a representative to
Mogadishu to talk with the Courts' leadership, and his
government is in contact with Yemen-based Somalis who are
associated with the Courts. These contacts include
Abdulkarim Salid, Hassan Tahir, Yusuf Da'an, and Abu Bakr
al-'Addani.


5. (C) The President also said he wanted to be clear that
the ROYG in no way supports the establishment of a
Taliban-like regime in Somalia. If the Courts take Baidoa
and form an extremist regime, he said, Yemen will "strike
them." (NOTE: Saleh is probably referring to the provision
of weapons at concessional prices to other Somali groups not
aligned with the Courts in the event an extremist regime is
put in place.)


6. (C) Separately, in several recent meetings, FM Abu Bakr
al-Qirbi also stressed the importance of a U.S.-Yemeni
dialogue on Somalia. He suggested the Yemen be made part of
the Somalia Contact Group, at least as an observer (ref A).
Qirbi urged the USG "not to equate every islamic group with
terrorism," and engage those members of the Islamic Courts
who are not affiliated with al-Qaeda. Perhaps the one
advantage to the Islamic Courts' takeover of Mogadishu, Qirbi
suggested, was that they are focused on bringing peace and
stability to the capital -- a possible topic for the
beginning of discussions with the USG and other international
actors.


7. (C) COMMENT: Post agrees that the USG should engage more
closely with Yemen on Somalia. To the extent it is possible,
we should allow Yemen observer status at Contact Group
meetings and consider exchanging views with them bilaterally.
It is in Yemen's interest to help bring some measure of
stability to Somalia, and we should engage the Yemenis when
possible to use their influence with Somali leaders to
further our common policy objectives there.
Krajeski