Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA1359
2006-05-22 09:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

HAMEED AL-AHMAR: YEMEN'S NEXT KINGMAKER?

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS KDEM YE 
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VZCZCXRO3107
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHYN #1359/01 1420952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220952Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3919
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHRVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001359 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KDEM YE
SUBJECT: HAMEED AL-AHMAR: YEMEN'S NEXT KINGMAKER?

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KDEM YE
SUBJECT: HAMEED AL-AHMAR: YEMEN'S NEXT KINGMAKER?

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Hameed al-Ahmar, son of powerful tribal
leader Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, made his entry into Yemeni
politics this year by increasingly distancing himself from
his father's traditional alliance with President Saleh. To
the surprise of many, Hameed has emerged as an articulate
regime critic who enjoys a larger popular base than virtually
any other oppositionist, primarily due to his powerful tribal
ties and his personal fortune. Hameed bears watching as he
takes his place among the next generation of Yemen's power
brokers, but his implicit claim to the title of Yemen's next
"kingmaker" is probably overblown -- for now. END SUMMARY

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HAMEED'S DEBUTANTE BALL
--------------


2. (C) Over the past six months, Hameed al-Ahmar has become
an increasingly vocal critic of Saleh's administration,
laying out his concerns in newspaper interviews, press
conferences, and qat sessions -- Yemen's daily free flowing
discussions among men that take place in homes. Yemeni
political observers have remarked to poloff how surprised
they were to see that Hameed is articulate in both Arabic and
English. In an election season dominated by what many
contacts view as sterile debates about election procedures
and fantastical constitutional amendments, Hameed's entry
onto the political stage has piqued the interest of
oppositionists and has become a cause for concern for the
ruling party.


3. (C) Hameed's eloquence aside, family lineage and a
sizeable personal fortune are the primary reasons Yemeni
politicos take him seriously. Hameed is the son of the
ailing Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount sheikh of the
Hashid tribal confederation, of which President Saleh's
Sanhani tribe is a member. Abdullah, despite being the head
of the Islah opposition party, has been an important ally for
Saleh since 1978. Most observers believe that without
Abdullah's tribal support, Saleh would not have been able to
remain in power for so long. Similarly, Abdullah and his

family would not have been able to amass their fortune -- and
the friends it has bought -- without Saleh's staunch support.
As a result of this alliance, Islah nominated Saleh as its
presidential candidate during the 1999 election season,
before Saleh's own party had formally nominated him.


4. (C) According to Hameed, that alliance is now shifting.
In a private meeting with poloffs, Hameed said several times
that his father's support for Saleh "is not guaranteed" this
year, and that his father "does not want to see everything he
and others fought for swept away" during Saleh's next term.
Many observers speculated that Sheikh Abdullah's six-month
stay in Jeddah -- officially for health reasons -- was a
subtle signal to Saleh and the public that 2006 would not be
a re-play of 1999.

--------------
"JUST GIVE ME THE GREEN LIGHT"
--------------


5. (C) Brushing aside the issue of his father's lack of
support for Saleh this election cycle, Hameed told poloffs it
is "now time to look beyond Abdullah and Saleh" for the
future of Yemen. A new generation is ready and able to take
the reins of power, he said, in order to restore the
government's role of serving the people. Saleh's rule has
increasingly become a personal enterprise, with major cabinet
portfolios and business deals reserved for his family and
virtually no economic development or political involvement
for the south.


6. (C) What Yemen needs now, Hameed asserted, is a southern
presidential candidate backed by the tribes. "I can deliver
the tribes," he said, "but they are very expensive." Hameed
then stated that if the USG would "only give the green light
to the Saudis," then he could find financing to pay off major
tribal groups in exchange for their support for a southern
candidate, preferably Yassin Saeed Noman, the Secretary
General of the Yemeni Socialist Party.


7. (C) PolChief informed Hameed that the USG would not get
involved in Yemeni politics in this fashion, but would

SANAA 00001359 002 OF 002


continue to press the Yemeni Government to produce a free and
fair election. It is now up to the opposition, PolChief
emphasized, to field a serious candidate and seek broad
support for him. Hameed replied that a "relatively fair
election" would also result in an opposition victory -- which
makes USG public support for the process crucial.

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RATTLING THE SABER
--------------


8. (C) Asked what would happen if this year's election is
marred with fraud, Hameed replied that "war is possible." He
said there was no question that he would lead the opposition
in calling supporters into the streets in protest. "We will
not be violent," he emphasized, but said clashes instigated
by Saleh's Republican Guard would be inevitable.


9. (C) The problem with Saleh, Hameed continued, is that he
is Janus-faced. "One side of Saleh truly wants to be a
democrat, but the other side cannot stand the thought of
anyone more popular than him -- and that is the side that is
winning," he explained. The conflict between the two sides
has grown to the point that Saleh is no longer the rational
leader he once was, which is why it is time for a new man to
take power with the backing of the tribes.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) COMMENT: Hameed's idea of uniting powerful armed
tribal groups around a credible southern politician appears
to be the closest anyone in Yemen has come to suggesting a
truly national campaign that could present a challenge to
Saleh. The likelihood that it will happen is slim. Saleh
will seek to keep the tribes in check by sowing discord among
them -- a tactic he has successfully used for three decades.
He may even lean on Sheikh Abdullah to gain the support of
the Hashid Confederation once again, despite what Hameed may
want. Whether or not Hameed and his supporters can bring
protestors into the street if the elections are marred by
serious fraud is anyone's guess.


11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We suspect that, for all his
bluster, Hameed is actually setting his sights on the next
presidential election, not this one. Sanaa is rife with
rumors about how Saleh will engineer putting his widely
disliked son Ahmed in the presidential chair sometime during
his next term. Hameed is likely using this election cycle to
test the political waters and build tribal and political
alliances in order to be in a stronger position to oppose
Ahmed's ascendance.
Krajeski