AN ECONOMIC AND FOOD SECURITY ISSUE SHOULD AVIAN

UNCLAS SANAA 001147

SIPDIS

STATE FOR G/AIAG
STATE PASS TO AID/ANE/GH FOR ACLEMENTS
STATE PASS TO AID/ANE/MEA FOR JWOOD,
USDA FOR APHIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EAGR KFLU YM
SUBJECT: AN ECONOMIC AND FOOD SECURITY ISSUE SHOULD AVIAN
INFLUENZA OCCUR IN YEMEN

SUMMARY


1. (U) Summary: Even though there are currently no reported
cases of Avian Influenza (AI) in Yemen, Ministry of
Agriculture (MAI) officials are extremely concerned AI will
breakout in Yemen soon. To assist the Republic of Yemen
Government (ROYG),the USG has to date: provided US$8,500 in
reagents and antigens to the Central Veterinary Laboratory
(CVL),facilitated assistance from the Department of Defense
Naval Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU 3) in Cairo, and funded
a poultry epidemiologist to assist MAI. Post will continue
to monitor and report on the issue. End Summary.

BACKGROUND


2. (U). Even though there are no reported cases of AI in
Yemen currently, MAI officials are extremely concerned AI
will breakout in Yemen soon. The new Minister of
Agriculture, Dr. Galal Ibrahim Fakirah, in meetings with the
US Ambassador in early March 2006, listed Avian Influenza as
his number one priority for his new administration. Avian
Influenza is spreading worldwide at a rapid rate and has
been identified nearby in Egypt. With the identification of
Avian Influenza in the region, this virus is expected by
Government of Yemen officials to reach Yemen soon. Yemen is
exposed with over 2000 kilometers of coastline along the Red
Sea and Arabian Sea coast. These zones are historical
migratory bird flyways between Africa, Europe and Asia with
70 identified put-down locations for migratory birds


3. (SBU) At a meeting on March 3, 2006 in Sana'a, both the
Deputy Minister of Agriculture and the Head of the Central
Veterinary Laboratory stated their fear that the H5N1 virus
could already be in Yemen. It was stated at the same meeting
that Avian Flu is being viewed by Yemeni officials as an
economic issue with food security implications.

POTENTIAL IMPACT ON YEMENI ECONOMY


4. (U) Yemen is a country of over 20 million people.
Beginning in the early 1980's, USAID projects introduced
modern poultry production practices into Yemen. Prior to
that time, limited imports of frozen poultry and low quality
local produced chicken were mainly available. The result has
been that by 2006, poultry meat and eggs have become the
primary protein source within the Yemeni diet. The impact of
the Avian Influenza H5N1 virus on the poultry industry in
Yemen would have a severe economic impact and a potential
food security problem. Over 65% of the meat consumed in
Yemen is poultry (white meat) according to official sources.
It is estimated that 277,778 broilers and 92,593 flats of
eggs are produced daily on average for the local market. An
average loss from an outbreak of theH5N1 virus to the
poultry industry in Yemen would be nearly USD1 million per
day.


5. (U) This loss of food can not be replaced easily by fish,
sheep, goat or beef meat. Fish is available in Yemen but
primarily in coastal areas and selected large market centers
in limited quantity. It is estimated that fish accounts for
less then 10% of "meat" consumption in Yemen due to
traditional patterns of consumption, limited distribution
country wide and a higher cost of USD3.57 per kilogram
average. Cattle and small ruminants (sheep and goats) sell
for USD6.15 per kilogram average which considered to be high
priced and out of the reach of most Yemeni's. Poultry sells
on average for less than USD2.00 per kilogram.

GOVERNMENT OF YEMEN RESPONSE


6. (SBU) In November 2005, an assessment was undertaken by
the NAMRU team to determine the capability and capacity for
the MAI/CVL in case of an AI outbreak. The capacity for the
CVL to accurately test was hindered by lack of proper
testing equipment, poorly trained staff and shortage of
supplies. A field surveillance system was established by the
MAI in January 2006 with approximately twenty five two man
teams positioned primarily along the coastal areas. However
this number can cover only a small portion of the country
and the surveillance teams rely on farmers to bring
suspected birds to them. Lack of adequate training of the
team members in proper surveillance methods, poor sample
handling techniques, inadequate sample storage and lack of
any protective clothing for handling of suspect birds are

obstacles to proper identification and containment of an
outbreak of AI. Transport of specimens to the only testing
facility in Yemen, the CVL in Sana'a, is currently done
without any cold storage or proper packing. Most suspected
specimens arrive unable to be tested at the CVL.

USG RESPONSE


7. (U) In November 2005, the NAMRU-3, the US Naval
laboratory in Cairo, Egypt sent a team to Yemen at the
request of USAID/Yemen to investigate a potential outbreak
of the H5N1 virus because the CVL kept getting false
negative readings. The results from NAMRU's field findings
identified a severe Newcastle outbreak.


8. (U) The MAI/CVL had not been capable of testing due to
lack of materials including reagents or antigens. On
February 22, 2006, in response to a request from the MAI,
USAID Representative handed over USD8500 worth of reagents
and antigens to the Ministry of Agriculture. This supply is
expected to last only a month, but it will allow the CVL to
begin testing for the presence of the H5N1.


9. (U) USAID/Yemen is working with the MAI to identify
actions needed to be taken and funding sources available. An
International Poultry Epidemiologist consultant funded by
USAID/Yemen arrived in Yemen on April 18, 2006. The
consultant will collaborate with USAID/YEMEN, the USAID
funded Yemen Agriculture Support Program and the Ministry of
Agriculture to profile and assess the Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (HPAI) surveillance and detection
capabilities of the MAI. This includes identifying and
prioritizing the needs related to HPAI surveillance and
containment and evaluating and synthesizing the existing
Government of Yemen Avian Influenza Emergency Plans
including agriculture, health, planning, Avian Flu High
Committee and other ministries and authorities as required.
The consultant will also review the ROYG Emergency Action
Chain of Command structure, make policy and training
recommendations and conduct workshops and trainings with key
stakeholders. The intent will be to produce specific outputs
including an AI Action Plan Framework, priority policies
needed for implementation, a draft Action Plan and
surveillance needs and laboratory requirements.


10. (U) Post's AI Working Group, which includes the
USAID/Yemen Health Strategic Objective Team Leader and the
Senior Economic and Agricultural Advisor, has developed a
Mission Emergency Response Plan and monitors the AI
situation in country.

OTHER DONORS RESPONSES


11. (U) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has
approved a USD400,000 six country regional project entitled
"Emergency assistance for early detection and prevention of
Avian Influenza in the Middle East region". Implementation
has not yet started and it is expected that funding for the
Yemen activity will be limited. A proposal has been
developed by MAI but not yet submitted to the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for development of
a regional veterinary laboratory in the coastal city of
Hodeidah. World Bank(WB)/Yemen is assisting the MAI with an
activity to assess surveillance capabilities. The World
Health Organization (WHO) continues to assist the ROYG
Ministry of Public Health and Population (MOH) in
integrating international guidelines into the National Avian
Influenza Preparedness Plan.

COMMENTS


12. (SBU) Yemen is not prepared for an outbreak of the Avian
Influenza. The Central Veterinary Laboratory, the only
facility of its type in Yemen, is not equipped or operating
at acceptable world standards to properly identify the H5N1
virus. Surveillance teams are not trained to conduct
acceptable field surveillances for disease identification.
There are no personal protective clothing units available in
Yemen. No containment program is in place with the military,
police or any other government authority. Policy is in place
with the National Avian Influenza Preparedness Plan but this
plan has gaps and is not being implemented appropriately.
Compensation, should culling be required, is not being
considered as an option. The MAI and MOH have established

Technical AI Working Committees operating under the guidance
of the High Committee on Avian Influenza however none of the
committees are actively implementing actions regarding AI
prevention or preparedness.


KRAJESKI