AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, IRAN, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000111

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN ETTC YM KWAC COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND FONMIN DISCUSS ZINDANI, IRAN, AND
GTMO

REF: A. STATE 10554

B. STATE 4645

C. 2005 SANAA 3618

D. SANAA 0091

E. STATE 9449

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (
D).


1. (C) Summary. In a January 21 meeting, FonMin Abubakr
al-Qirbi presented Ambassador with a copy of President
Saleh's response to President Bush's December 30 letter
protesting ROYG support for UN-designated terrorist financier
Sheikh Zindani and HAMAS leader Khalid Mishaal (ref A).
Qirbi continued to justify the inclusion of Zindani as a way
to politically marginalize the powerful Sheikh and his
extremist views. Ambassador reiterated ref B points on USG
concern over the blatant violation of UNSCR 1267, stressing
that the ROYG must immediately follow through on their
obligation to freeze Zindani's assets and ban his travel. On
Iran, Qirbi said "let us see what happens," adding that the
ROYG expected a visit soon from the Iranian Deputy Minster of
Foreign Affairs. Finally, Ambassador delivered ref E files
and urged an immediate reply to post's November diplomatic
note proposing the transfer of 13 Yemeni detainees from
Guantanamo Bay. End Summary.

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Marginalizing Sheikh Zindani
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2. (C) FonMin presented Ambassador with a copy of President
Saleh's response to President Bush's December 30 letter
protesting (1) the inclusion of UN-designated terrorist
financier Abdul-Majid Zindani in the ROYG's official
delegation to the December 6-7 Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) Summit in Mecca and (2) reception of HAMAS
political chief Khalid Mishaal in Sanaa (ref A). Qirbi
continued to characterize the conscious decision to include
Zindani as an attempt to "get him out of the (opposition)
political camp." He rhetorically asked if the USG really
wanted Zindani arrested and tried, saying the ramifications
of attacking a powerful opposition supporter could
potentially damage CT-cooperation.


3. (C) Ambassador reminded Qirbi that Committee 1267
obligations are narrow, calling only for the freezing of
assets and the banning of travel. These simple yet required
steps, he continued, must be taken regardless of internal
political dynamics and were essential to demonstrating
Yemen's commitment as a partner in the Global War on Terror.

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Comment
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4. (C) Comment: Despite clear protestations from Department
and post, ROYG continues to consider isolating Zindani a much
greater political problem than flouting its UN obligations.
Until the underlying factors driving this calculation change,
either through a neutralization of Zindani as a political
force or the threat of serious consequences for the 1267
violation, ROYG policy is unlikely to change.


5. (C) Comment continued: ROYG remains uncommitted on
referring Iran to the Security Council. Qirbi has requested
a meeting with the European, Russian and American Ambassadors
on January 25 to discuss Iran, at which time he may provide
more insight into the likelihood of ROYG support at the
February 2 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. End Comment.
Krajeski