ITALIANS TO DAS BRYZA: RUSSIA NOT READY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM NATO IT RU GG UP
SUBJECT: ITALIANS TO DAS BRYZA: RUSSIA NOT READY FOR
AUSTRALIA GROUP MEMBERSHIP, WILL WORK WITH U.S. ON GEORGIA
AND NATO

REF: STATE 41331

Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. On March 17, DAS Bryza met with Deputy
Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Francesco Talo and MFA
Director General Giulio Terzi to discuss Caucasus security
issues and Russian Australia Group (AG) membership. Bryza
told his interlocutors that the USG believed that Russian
membership in the AG was not appropriate and Russia had not
been a constructive partner in other nonproliferation
control regimes. Bryza asked the GOI not to raise this at
G8 meetings, but rather allow Russian candidacy to be
discussed in AG fora. Bryza also told the Italians that
closer engagement with Georgia, including a NATO Membership
Action Plan (MAP),could be useful in helping resolve
tension around the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues.
Bryza encouraged Italy and the EU to support Ukraine if it
should
decide to revisit its recent gas supply deal with Russia.
While this could cause some short-term supply problems for
Europe,
a more transparent arrangement would benefit the Euroatlantic
community(septel). Both Talo and Terzi agreed
that Russia was not at the point where it could be a
productive member of the AG but Talo commented that it was
better to have Russia involved in as many control regimes
as possible. Terzi added that the AG might
consider extending an offer to Russia with clear
conditionality with regard to other regimes. Both agreed
that the G8 was not the appropriate forum for this
discussion. On Georgian NATO membership, Terzi and MFA
NATO advisor Gianni Bardini told Bryza that MAP would create
clear expectations that Georgia would be extended an early
invitation to join NATO, something the GOI believed was
premature. End summary.

PM's office: No to Russian AG membership, concerned about
Georgian NATO membership
-------------- --------------


2. (C) DAS Bryza met with Talo on March 17 to discuss
energy security and its implications on regional security.
Bryza told Talo that the U.S. sought a mutually beneficial
energy
relationship with Russia, and to channel Gazprom toward more
constructive, market-based behavior. The Georgian government
was
convinced (rightly or wrongly) that the explosion of Russian
gas
pipelines to Georgia in January marked a deliberate attempt
to pressure
Georgia, including to sell a strategic gas pipeline to
Gazprom.
The January 1 gas cutoff to Ukraine similarly reflected an
effort to
use energy as a political weapon, and to pressure Ukraine to
sell key
portions of its pipeline infrastructure to Gazprom as well.
The USG
hoped that the EU would support Ukraine and Georgia in their
efforts
to resist such pressures while enhancing Europe,s own energy
security by
inject more market forces into the energy sector through
diversification
of supply, focusing on the Caspian Sea(septel). On Georgia,
Bryza told
Talo that if Georgia continued to advance its defense and
democratic
reforms, a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the near-term
could change
the strategic map in a positive way, bolstering GOG
confidence, and
thereby helping the GOG to resist to provocations from Russia
and
South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists.


3. (C) Talo agreed that Russia would not be an appropriate
member of the Australia Group (AG),and in fact, had not
officially requested candidacy. The GOI believed
that nonproliferation regimes were better off bringing in
as many countries as possible rather than leaving them
out, and that it would be useful to have Russia in, but only
after it
fulfilled necessary criteria. Bryza replied that this


mirrored the U.S. position. Talo agreed that the G8 was not
an appropriate setting
for a discussion on Russian AG membership. On Georgia, Talo
expressed the need for Georgia to advance its defense reforms
before considering NATO membership. He agreed that Russia
needed
to refrain from stirring the pot in Georgia,s separatist
conflicts.
He concurred with the strategy outlined by Bryza for South
Ossetia,
involving: Euroatlantic support for Georgia,s action plan;
participation
by the U.S., Russia, EU, and OSCE in a South Ossetia donors,
conference
in May; and eventual evolution of the donors, conference
into a forum for negotiating a political settlement. Talo
agreed that the existing
Joint Control Commission was inadequate for negotiating a
political
settlement for South Ossetia. He noted that Russia suffered
from an
outdated strategic mindset that had not yet adjusted to the
idea that
failed states and border disputes on its periphery were not
in its
interests.


4. (C) Bryza outlined for Talo our emerging ideas on working
with
Europe to counter Islamic extremism. Bryza stressed our
search for
ways to counter not only European Muslims, secular
alienation (through
poverty reduction, education, job creation, and fighting
prejudice),
but spiritual alienation as well. The latter arose among
Europe,s
second- and third-generation Muslims, who know they are
Muslims but
have never been taught their about their families, Muslim
traditions.
The result is a vacuum of yearning for some sense of Islamic
identity,
which extremist recruiters seek to exploit. To counter such
recruiters,
the Euroatlantic community might explore ways to reconnect
second- and third-generation Muslims with their tolerant
Muslim traditions. Talo
said he was intrigued by this approach, and would explore it
with a
range of colleagues in the GOI.

MFA: Open to Russian AG membership, cautious on NATO
Membership
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Bryza raised the same issues with MFA DG for
Multilateral Affairs Terzi. Terzi agreed that Russian AG
membership was premature and stated that the GOI was in
full unity with the rest of the AG. He noted that Russia
had not officially requested candidacy and agreed that the
G8 was not the appropriate forum for discussion of AG
membership for Russia. He added, however, that the AG
should not oppose Russian candidacy on principle alone.
The MFA believed that nonproliferation regimes functioned
better when there was greater inclusiveness. One option
would be to grant Russian membership with strict
conditionality that could include results in other
nonproliferation regimes. On Georgian NATO membership, MFA
NATO director Bardini, told Bryza that
the GOI was concerned that a Membership Action Plan for
Georgia might create expectations for early membership.
Terzi countered that the GOI looked forward to explore with
the U.S.
and other NATO partners how best to advance Georgia,s NATO
aspirations, including the possibilities of both Intensified
Dialogue and MAP.


6. (C) Bryza also walked Terzi and Bardini briefly through
our Eurasian
gas strategy, and our desire to find an appropriate
Euroatlantic forum
for geo-political discussions on energy. Bryza described
the briefing
offered the previous day to the NAC/R by Assistant Secretary
Wayne.
Terzi and Bardini agreed that such consultations were useful


on an
ad-hoc basis. But the GOI wanted to make preserve the
integrity of
the NATO-Russia council (NRC). The NRC was useful if it
constituted a discussion among 27, not 26 vs. 1, with Russia
in an adversarial position.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Bryza
SPOGLI