ITALIAN ELECTIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES (PART I OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ IT NATO ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN ELECTIONS: THE POSSIBILITIES (PART I OF
II)

REF: A. ROME 0725

B. ROME 0141

C. 05 ROME 3037

D. ROME 0768

E. ROME 0724

F. ROME 0502

G. ROME 0371

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) This cable is the first of two outlining possible
post-election scenarios and our engagement with the
center-left on various issues. Though opposition leader
Romano Prodi holds a slight lead in opinion polls, it remains
unclear whether he can hang on to defeat incumbent PM Silvio
Berlusconi in Italy's April 9-10 national elections. Under
most election scenarios, we expect relative continuity in
Italy's foreign policy on the fundamental issues, even if we
might have to work harder for less certain results.
Certainly, we would have to invest more energy with a
center-left government if we expect comparable returns. We
also see a possible relapse to Italy's traditional state of
frequent government turnover, which characterized most of
Italy's post-war period. END SUMMARY.

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THE RACE, CHANGES UNDERWAY, AND FOREIGN POLICY
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2. (C) Under former EU President Romano Prodi's admittedly
uninspiring leadership, the center-left (CL) opposition leads
Berlusconi's coalition in the polls. Nevertheless,
Berlusconi's effective campaigning has kept him in the race,
and it remains difficult to predict the outcome with
confidence (REF A).


3. (C) Berlusconi's five-year term as Prime Minister is
unprecedented in Italian politics. Developments in Italy's
political climate as well as a recent electoral reform law
could make it an historical aberration regardless of who wins
Italy's national elections on April 9-10 (REF B).


4. (C) With Berlusconi's leadership and unwavering belief in
the principles of freedom, liberty and democracy, Italy has
become our most reliable ally in continental Europe.
However, not all members of Berlusconi's center-right
coalition (CR) may possess his courage to pursue those goals
with such uncompromising tenacity (REF C). Regarding the
opposition, our conversations with the core of the
center-left (CL) leadership indicate it would like to steer a
foreign policy that respects many of the fundamental pillars
of Italy's current foreign policy (REFS D-G). However, an
overly accentuated pro-EU bias might cause some rhetorical,
and even practical, dissonance in our bilateral relationship,
and we suspect we would inevitably have to spend more time
attending to bilateral irritants. The CL's ability to engage
in a moderate foreign policy also would depend on the nature
of any CL victory--specifically, on the strength of the far
left.

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THE FIVE SCENARIOS: FROM STATUS QUO TO QUO VADIS
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STRONG CENTER-RIGHT VICTORY
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5. (C) Possible though unlikely, the status quo in Italian
politics and in Italy's support for our policies would
continue. In the medium to long-term, Berlusconi's allies
could stir for a leadership change, but probably not in the
near future.

WEAK CENTER-RIGHT VICTORY
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6. (C) Berlusconi would likely form the next government and
maintain his foreign policy agenda, but his allies could
eventually try to engineer a leadership change, bringing some
change of tone to the government's foreign policy.

STRONG CENTER-LEFT VICTORY
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7. (C) CL leaders tell us Prodi could govern a full five-year
term, but we are doubtful. Prodi could indeed form a
government with some minimal stability, but the degree of
stability will depend on the importance of far-left parties.
We should be able to work with a Prodi government on
fundamentals, but it could require greater effort for fewer
returns.

WEAK CENTER LEFT VICTORY
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8. (C) A weak CL victory would likely produce a weak Prodi
government, especially if the far-left is essential to a
viable governing coalition. We believe reformists inside the
CL want to steer a responsible foreign policy and have
positive relations with us. However, this would be more
difficult under this scenario.

DIVIDED RESULTS
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9. (C) Italy's electoral reform law raises the possibility
that different coalitions win the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate. Such an outcome could usher in a period of
protracted instability or gridlock with uncertain short-term
implications for our policy goals.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Despite the relative stability of Italy's politics
over the past five years, currents have shifted. Together
with Italy's recently enacted electoral reform law,
significant changes could occur in Italian politics after its
April 9-10 elections. Those changes could trigger a return
to short lived governments. On foreign policy, we believe
the core of the CR and the CL believes in the importance of
the Transatlantic Alliance and would seek to preserve
substantial continuity in foreign policy. The question is
will either side be in a political position to maintain both
government stability and deliver? END COMMENT
SPOGLI