Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME383
2006-02-09 11:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: ITALIAN MFA CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV SR YI IT 
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3491
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 0937
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 6420
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 0993
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000383 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SR YI IT
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ITALIAN MFA CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF
CONTACT GROUP UNITY IN MESSAGES TO BELGRADE


Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000383

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SR YI IT
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ITALIAN MFA CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF
CONTACT GROUP UNITY IN MESSAGES TO BELGRADE


Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Italian MFA is concerned that US and UK
messages to Belgrade regarding the final status of Kosovo may
be creating high expectations among Kosovar Albanians and
anxiety in Belgrade that could complicate negotiations. The
Italians have the impression that US and UK messages may gone
beyond their understanding of the agreed Contact Group line.
As a result, MFA Political Director Terzi is considering a
trip to Belgrade to affirm the GOI view that Kosovo's final
status has yet to be determined. End Summary.


2. (C) On February 7, MFA Director of Balkan Affairs Raimondo
De Cardona briefly raised with visiting PDAS Volker GOI
concern that a recent message delivered to the Belgrade
leadership by US Special Envoy Wisner (septel) had left the
impression that the US believed Kosovar independence would be
the most likely outcome of the negotiations. De Cardona
cautioned that, if this was indeed the message, it went
beyond what was agreed at the last Contact Group meeting.


3. (C) On February 9, De Cardona followed up with poloff,
noting that a recent high-level UK delegation had told the
Belgrade leadership that it must begin to prepare the Serbian
public for a change in Kosovar status. According to De
Cardona, this message was poorly received in Belgrade and has
caused some backlash against the international community's
efforts to lead negotiations on
Kosovo.


4. (C) According to De Cardona, the GOI impression of the
Contact Group's agreed message was that Ahtisaari would urge
both sides to prepare for the compromises that would be
necessary to ensure the success of the status talks. Cardona
noted that, while "everyone knows where the talks will lead".
But, he said, sending a message in advance of negotiations
that the international community expects the final result to
be phased independence provides little incentive for Belgrade
to be helpful on important issues other than status that must
be worked out between the parties. In the worst-case
scenario, De Cardona fears that the fragile Belgrade
government could collapse in advance of, or during, the
discussions, further complicating the process.


5. (C) De Cardona noted that he believes the message
delivered by the UK represents a British attempt to take
control of the policy direction the EU is taking on the issue
- partly out of impatience with the pace of the process and
partly for political reasons. The GOI will attempt to exert
its influence on the process beginning with a hastily
organized trip by MFA Political Director
Terzi to Belgrade on February 14 or 15 to affirm the GOI view
that no decision has been made on the final status of Kosovo.



6. (C) Comment. The GOI pays close attention to all
developments in the Balkans, and has worked hard to maintain
CG unity on the Kosovo issue. Through meetings, contacts,
and even a letter from FM Fini to the Secretary, the GOI has
tried to coordinate with the USG and other CG members on this
issue. De Cardona's evident concern was to urge the US and
UK to keep Italy squarely in the policy loop as the
international community engages with the parties on Kosovo.
SPOGLI