Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME3223
2006-12-04 15:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
SOMALIA: ITALY WANTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT TFI-CIC
how-toVZCZCXRO5528 PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHRO #3223 3381504 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041504Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6653 INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 1933 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8024 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2067 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0673
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003223
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR AF/E SOMALIA DESK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO IT
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ITALY WANTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT TFI-CIC
DIALOGUE
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003223
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR AF/E SOMALIA DESK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO IT
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ITALY WANTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT TFI-CIC
DIALOGUE
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Poloff met with Italian MFA Somalia Coordinator
Giancarlo Izzo November 30 to discuss the situation in
Somalia and the possible deployment of a regional force.
According to Izzo, Italy believed that the dialogue between
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and the Council
of Islamic Courts (CIC) was not yet exhausted. The CIC
ultimately needed the dialogue because it wanted recognition
as a Somali movement, he said. The TFIs were weaker than
before and, as a result, seemed to be less open to dialogue
than the CIC. Izzo stressed that the international community
needed to pressure the leaders of the TFIs to work together.
2. (C) On a potential UN Security Council Resolution that
would authorize a regional force, Izzo said that Italy
supported an IGASOM force along the lines of the September 5
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) agreement.
Specifically, Izzo noted that neighboring countries should
not be troop contributors, and that the duration, area, and
mission of an IGASOM force should be limited. Italy also
believed, according to Izzo, that a UNSCR should specify that
the TFIs and CIC should meet again for talks in Khartoum,
before IGASOM deployment would be authorized.
3. (C) Izzo also noted that the verification and monitoring
group considered in the October Contact Group meeting could,
along with the UN embargo monitoring group, create conditions
on the ground that would increase the possibility for
dialogue. With an Ethiopian intervention as the contingency
plan, Izzo argued that there was time to try again in
Khartoum before sending an IGASOM force into Somalia. He
noted that, while Italy believed IGASOM was probably the best
way to deal with the problems in Somalia, it also carried
great risk in that it could further destabilize the situation.
4. (C) According to Izzo, the MFA's Director General for
Sub-Saharan Africa, Armando Sanguini, was planning to travel
to Washington December 11-13, and would meet with AF
Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer. Izzo noted that Somalia
would be a key agenda item for Sanguini.
SPOGLI
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR AF/E SOMALIA DESK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO IT
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ITALY WANTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT TFI-CIC
DIALOGUE
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor David D. Pearce for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Poloff met with Italian MFA Somalia Coordinator
Giancarlo Izzo November 30 to discuss the situation in
Somalia and the possible deployment of a regional force.
According to Izzo, Italy believed that the dialogue between
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and the Council
of Islamic Courts (CIC) was not yet exhausted. The CIC
ultimately needed the dialogue because it wanted recognition
as a Somali movement, he said. The TFIs were weaker than
before and, as a result, seemed to be less open to dialogue
than the CIC. Izzo stressed that the international community
needed to pressure the leaders of the TFIs to work together.
2. (C) On a potential UN Security Council Resolution that
would authorize a regional force, Izzo said that Italy
supported an IGASOM force along the lines of the September 5
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) agreement.
Specifically, Izzo noted that neighboring countries should
not be troop contributors, and that the duration, area, and
mission of an IGASOM force should be limited. Italy also
believed, according to Izzo, that a UNSCR should specify that
the TFIs and CIC should meet again for talks in Khartoum,
before IGASOM deployment would be authorized.
3. (C) Izzo also noted that the verification and monitoring
group considered in the October Contact Group meeting could,
along with the UN embargo monitoring group, create conditions
on the ground that would increase the possibility for
dialogue. With an Ethiopian intervention as the contingency
plan, Izzo argued that there was time to try again in
Khartoum before sending an IGASOM force into Somalia. He
noted that, while Italy believed IGASOM was probably the best
way to deal with the problems in Somalia, it also carried
great risk in that it could further destabilize the situation.
4. (C) According to Izzo, the MFA's Director General for
Sub-Saharan Africa, Armando Sanguini, was planning to travel
to Washington December 11-13, and would meet with AF
Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer. Izzo noted that Somalia
would be a key agenda item for Sanguini.
SPOGLI