ITALY ON SOMALIA: ARAB LEAGUE, CIVIL SOCIETY KEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF SOMALIA DESK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO IT
SUBJECT: ITALY ON SOMALIA: ARAB LEAGUE, CIVIL SOCIETY KEY

REF: STATE 162369

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Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Poloff met with MFA Somalia Coordinator
Giancarlo Izzo November 3 and with Angelo Masetti, Spokesman
for the Italy-Somalia Forum, October 26 to discuss the
situation in Somalia. Izzo and Masetti agreed that the TFIs
were weak, and that the CIC's goals were unclear. They both
believed that increased involvement of the international
community with representatives of Somali civil society was
critical to understanding and improving the situation on the
ground. Izzo and Masetti each suggested organizing a
meeting, sponsored by an independent organization, that would
bring civil society leaders together. Izzo noted that a
meeting or communique of the International Contact Group
could be timely. End summary.

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GOI:
TFIs weak; CIC an unknown; Arab League, Civil Society Key
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2. (C) Following the postponement of the Khartoum talks, Izzo
suggested that an International Contact Group meeting or
communique could be timely. Although it would be hard for
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) to walk back from the statements they
had made, dialogue should be the contact group message. Izzo
observed that putting together the Arab League and
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had not
worked because they did not have well-defined roles in the
process. Having initially favored Arab League involvement in
the hope that it could bring forth moderate elements in the
CIC, Italy now worried that the Arab League was willing to
support any Muslim element in Somalia, regardless of its
level of extremism. If Islamists took over in Somalia, Izzo
argued, it would set a bad precedent for other African
countries with a Muslim population. The Arab League should
look at the situation in Somalia as a long-term challenge of
building a modern Islamic state, not through a short-term
perspective in which any Muslim actor was worth supporting.
Italy believed Egypt in particular needed to hear this
message.


3. (C) On the TFIs, Izzo said they seemed to be the party
that was most reluctant to dialogue at this point. While
Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan felt he had
been marginalized, Izzo said the ineffectual Prime Minister
Gedi had been given "another six months" by the Ethiopian
Foreign Minister, who had met with Gedi, Hassan Adan and
President Yusuf. Izzo observed the TFI leaders were using
the support of the international community to ensure their
own positions, rather than doing something for the Somali
people. Looking to Ethiopia to intervene and the
international community to save them, Izzo argued the TFI
leaders were increasingly seen by the Somali people as
representatives of outside interests.


4. (C) The CIC was a problem, Izzo said, because its
composition and goals were an unknown. If there was conflict
between the CIC and Ethiopia, he thought Ethiopia could
encounter difficulties. Fighting the CIC's more motivated
recruits, along with Addis's other domestic and international
problems, could cause serious problems for Ethiopia,
according to Izzo. Moreover, Izzo thought Egypt and Saudi
Arabia might decide to provide support to the CIC.
Ethiopia's actions, however, would be guided by its fear of
any type of Muslim government in Somalia, according to Izzo.
Izzo noted that it would be difficult to say how Italy would
respond to Ethiopian involvement in a conflict in Somalia
would be, and that if Ethiopian forces were to protect Baidoa
from the CIC, the TFIs would lose all legitimacy with Somalis.


5. (C) Izzo said that while the UK had joined with Italy in
calling for a partial exception to the arms embargo in
August, the U.S. had not supported the move. He suggested
that the measure could have shown international support for
the TFIs and reassured Ethiopia. Izzo suggested that IGASOM
could be called on at this point to protect Baidoa and
provide training to strengthen TFI capabilities. He noted
that Kenya was now supportive of IGASOM involvement. The
international community had not been well served by UNSYG
Special Representative Fall, Izzo said. Fall's approach had
not been decisive enough, and had needed the Contact Group
and the European Task Force for support.


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6. (C) The international community needed to have more
contact with Somali civil society, and especially women,
according to Izzo. Noting that the conference in Nairobi had
not included civil society representatives, he argued that
holding an event with civil society leaders and NGOs, with an
emphasis on the participation of women, could have a dramatic
impact. Izzo suggested that a non-governmental entity could
sponsor the event as an impartial actor. Traditional Somali
culture could be our greatest ally, Izzo observed. However,
the youth, as evidenced by the extremism of the Shebab, had
grown up under different circumstances and could radically
change the face of Somali culture.

--------------
Diaspora Representative:
Need more contact with Somalis
--------------


7. (C) Masetti, in a separate meeting with Poloff, also
emphasized the importance of increasing contact with civil
society. The international community needed to work on
creating a space for participation by Somali civil society,
in Masetti's view. He noted that, while civil society had
been sidelined, robust contact by the international community
with individuals in key social positions could not only help
create political movement, it could also help increase
outsiders' understanding of internal dynamics within Somalia.
The Italy-Somalia Forum, an independent organization of
Italians and Somalis, founded in 2000 to promote peace and
reconstruction in Somalia, has been working to identify key
players within civil society, according to Masetti. He
offered the Italy-Somalia Forum as a facilitator/partner in
organizing a conference that would bring together Somali
civil society and the international community.


8. (C) Explaining that he had extensive contact with Somalis
in Somalia of various clans through his work on behalf of the
Italy-Somalia Forum, Masetti commented on the internal
dynamics there. According to Masetti, while initial support
for the CIC had come from the people because the courts were
seen as an alternative to the warlords and their checkpoints,
Somalis were beginning to chafe at the new limitations on
their freedom imposed by the CIC. The courts movement was
losing popular support and the business community was
distancing itself. While the CIC had external support in the
form of arms and imported radicals, Masetti said the group
was not prepared for the possibility of a popular revolt and
that Somalis increasingly saw the CIC as distant from
traditional Somali culture. While the youth was more
supportive of the CIC, older Somalis were protesting controls
it had imposed, especially the bans on radio and television.


9. (C) Though Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was the commander of
the CIC, he did not have absolute control of the courts with
their assortment political views, Muslim beliefs, and clans,
Masetti said. The main glue holding the CIC together was the
courts' joint opposition to the TFIs and Ethiopia, not a
common vision. Without an opposing force, Masetti argued, it
would be hard for the CIC to maintain unity. While Aweys was
not a person the USG could dialogue with directly, Masetti
suggested that it was nevertheless important to keep contact
with him through intermediaries since he was an adept
politician and not a mindless radical.


10. (C) The TFIs were on the verge of collapse, according to
Masetti, and parts of the government possibly were planning
to stage a legal coup by convening parliament in Mogadishu
and electing a new prime minister and president. Among the
TFI leaders, Yusuf and Gedi were irrelevant, Masetti said,
with Speaker Hassan Adan the only figure who had continued to
prove his worth and wanted to keep a dialogue open with the
CIC. Hassan Adan had the trust of the Arab countries and the
CIC, but was hampered by the fact that he was from a weak
tribe. Authorizing an international peacekeeping force (who
would have no peace to keep) to support the TFIs could send
the whole region into crisis, Masetti argued, while working
to boost internal security by providing training, on a clan
basis, for those members of the former police forces who had
shown respect for human rights could make a positive
difference.
SPOGLI