ITALY PROTESTS IRAN DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER IAEA IT IR
SUBJECT: ITALY PROTESTS IRAN DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

REF: STATE 11254

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Classified By: DCM Anna M. Borg for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
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1. (C) The GOI January 25 expressed concern about the
upcoming London meeting on Iran and the emergence of a P6
format for decisionmaking on the issue. To drive home its
unhappiness about being sidelined, the GOI had blocked EU
agreement that same day on EU-3 draft language regarding
Iran. While Italy agreed on the substance of referring Iran
to the UNSC, it could not accept that the EU-3 had arrogated
to themselves, without consulting key stakeholders like
Italy, decisionmaking on Iran and other regional issues.
Noting the P5 plus one (Germany) meeting scheduled January 30
in London, Political Director Giulio Terzi said the UK was
the main opponent to adding Italy to the Iran policy
discussions. But Italy had a significant interest and would
be insisting; in fact, there had been a difficult discussion
in Brussels that day. Terzi said the GOI PermRep had
maintained that the EU communique should refer to an agreed
position by all 25 EU states, to which the EU-3 had objected.
Terzi said that if there was no EU agreement on language by
January 30, it would undermine EU-3 credibility. The
political director's presentation follows a steady build-up
in recent months of Italian concern about the EU-3 format.
This now appears to have boiled over and, absent changes,
could herald a wider tussle within the EU over the structure
and coordination of decisionmaking on key external affairs
issues. End summary.

Iran: EU-3 Alone Can't Decide for EU
--------------


2. (C) MFA Political Director Giulio Terzi, acting on Foreign
Minister Gianfranco Fini's instructions, January 25 requested
an urgent meeting with the Ambassador to discuss Iran. The
meeting took place in the Ambassador's office, DCM and POL
M/C attended. Terzi came alone. The political director said
the Italian charge in Washington would also be calling on EUR
PDAS Volker later in the same day.


3. (C) Terzi expressed concern about the emergence of a P6
format for decisionmaking on next steps with Iran, citing the
Group of Six meeting called for London on Monday to discuss
next steps with Iran and the UNSC. He said the GOI's concern
about this meeting was not about the substance of confronting
Iran, or referring it to the UNSC, with which it was in
complete agreement, but with the structure and distribution
of responsibilities for decisionmaking within the EU on
important issues of external affairs. Italy could not
concede a blank check on key external issues, where its
interests were engaged, for three EU countries to act as
interlocutors for the others without consultation.


4. (C) And now, Terzi said, the P5 had become a P6 grouping
for discussions on Iran. This, in the Italian view, was
extremely damaging. Italy's views carried some weight in
Iran (Comment: Italy is Iran's largest EU trading partner.
End Comment). FM Fini had addressed the need to form a
consultative group that doesn't exclude Italy, in meetings
two days before in Washington with both the Secretary and the
Vice President.


5. (C) Terzi recalled that the US had played a key role in
securing Italy's inclusion in the Balkan Contact Group. He
stressed again the GOI concern was not with the substance of
the Iran UNSC referral issue, but that it could not accept
that the EU-3 arrogate to themselves EU decisionmaking on key
issues. Terzi said UK opposition to including Italy in
discussions was at the heart of the issue. But the GOI was
insisting. He noted there had been a very difficult
conversation earlier in the day among the European Union perm
reps on this issue.


6. (C) The Ambassador told Terzi that Italy's support for
UNSC referral was important, and said he would report GOI
concerns on policy coordination.

Failure to Agree on Language Will Undermine EU-3 Credibility
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7. (C) As POL M/C escorted Terzi out, the political director
elaborated that the Brussels PermReps had been discussing

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language on Iran for a draft communique (Note: presumably in
preparation for the January 30 meeting of the General Affairs
and External Relations Council (GAERC). End Note). The
Italian perm rep, according to Terzi, had said the communique
needed to refer explicitly to the agreement of all 25 EU
nations, and the EU-3 had objected to this.


8. (C) POL M/C asked if that meant Italy would not agree to
the communique language absent agreement on that phrase.
Terzi said yes, and pointedly added that, if there was no
agreement by January 30, it would affect the credibility of
the EU-3. Terzi said the problem went beyond the immediate
issue of Iran. When the EU-3 met, they discussed other
important regional issues as well. This had the effect of
taking EU decisionmaking on external affairs outside
established channels.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The political director's presentation follows a
steady build-up in recent months of Italian concern about the
EU-3 format. This now appears to have boiled over and, the
quick, three-pronged GOI response to the London meeting (in
Brussels, Washington, Rome) suggests the GOI is not going to
let go easily. Absent changes, then, this could herald a
wider tussle within the EU over the structure and
coordination of decisionmaking on key external affairs
issues. Italy is unlikely to stand in the way of a UNSC
referral, since the GOI is in complete accord on the
substance. But it looks ready to rumble with its EU partners
over the structure of EU decisionmaking and coordination on
Iran and other key regional issues. End Comment.

SPOGLI