IRAQ: ITALY-US-UK TRILATS, JANUARY 19, 2006

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA, EUR/WE AND S/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IZ IT
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALY-US-UK TRILATS, JANUARY 19, 2006

REF: ROME 119

Classified By: Pol M/C David D. Pearce for Reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Italy confirmed it will lead a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Dhi Qar, for which it would
provide its own security, and the UK previewed its plans for
a PRT in Basra. U.S.-UK-Italy agreed on the concept for the
PRTs as providing capacity-building for local authorities.
Italy volunteered to continue and expand police training in
Dhi Qar and supported expanding the NATO training mission in
Iraq. It is prepared to consider the added task of border
guard training. All stressed the importance of Iraq forming
a broadly inclusive government with the participation of
Sunnis. Looking ahead in 2006, the three coalition partners
agreed on the need for wider international involvement in
tandem with a gradual shift in emphasis from a military
coalition focused on security to a broad partnership
dedicated to the success of the new Iraq.


2. (C) The Italians were quick to stress that Defense
Minister Martino's statement to the Italian parliament
indicating that Italy would finish its military mission in
Iraq by year's end did not mean that Italian forces would
depart before security conditions allowed or without
consulting coalition partners. Italian opposition parties
nevertheless had been quick to seize on Martino's remarks as
ammunition for their own calls for withdrawal in a separate
January 18 meeting with Deputy S/I Deutsch. The trilateral
meeting was a useful exchange that all agreed should reoccur
in late spring. End summary.


3. (SBU) The U.S., Italy, and UK held trilateral
consultations on Iraq on January 19 in Rome. The U.S.
delegation consisted of Deputy Senior Advisor for Iraq Robert
Deutsch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs Michael Coulter, Joint Staff Deputy J-5 RADM William
Sullivan, CENTCOM Deputy J-5 BG Mark Kimmitt, NEA/I Officer
Peter Evans, EUR/RPM Officer Tony Baird, Joint Staff J-5
LtCol Paul Muller, CENTCOM J-5 LtCol Chris Goedeke, Embassy
Political Minister Counselor David Pearce, Pol-Mil Counselor
Jonathan Cohen, PolOff Susanne Rose, and DAO LtCol John
Hesford. Italy's delegation consisted of MFA Iraq Task Force
Director Gherardo La Francesca, Ambassador-Designate to
Baghdad Maurizio Melani, MFA NATO Office Director Gianni
Bardini, MFA Office Director for Middle East Development
Cooperation Federica Ferrari Bravo, Diplomatic Advisor to
Defense Minister Martino Achille Amerio, Diplomatic Advisor
to PM Berlusconi Marco Carnelos, Deputy J-3/J-5 RADM Mario
Rino Me, J-3/J-5 Col. Stefano Cont, Col. Roberto Milano, and
Col. Rosario Castellano. MFA DG for the Mediterranean and
Middle East Riccardo Sessa, MFA Political Director Giulio
Terzi, Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Francesco Talo',
Joint Operations Staff Commander Lt.Gen. Fabrizio
Castagnetti, and Chief of Planning BG Roberto Lamana joined
the lunch discussion. The British delegation consisted of
FCO Iraq Policy Unit Director Dominic Asquith, Iraq Policy
Unit Pol/Mil Section Head Kevin McGurgan, MOD DG for
Operations Policy Martin Howard, Lt.Col. Mike Thorton, Deputy
Head of Mission Alastair McPhail, DATT Mike Montagu, and
Political Counselor Rebecca Fabrizi.

PRTS: UK ready to go in Basra, Italy Sets Sights on Dhi Qar
-------------- --------------


4. (C) S/I Deutsch initiated the PRT discussion, emphasizing
the concept is still a work in progress and the U.S. has not
yet made a formal decision on expansion beyond the three
"proof-of-concept" PRTs already in place. Local Iraqi
leaders have reacted positively, he said, stressing the need
to present PRTs as an effort to support local governments
rather than increase international control or return to
CPA-like structures. PRTs cannot, however, supplant security
forces. All concurred with the general strategic concept of
the PRTs as a vehicle for capacity-building for local
authorities and strengthening ties with the central
government, with an emphasis on local ownership.


5. (C) The UK, which circulated a notional wire diagram for
the Basra PRT it plans to stand up, is in the process of

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selecting its PRT leader and representative to the National
Coordination Team (NCT),and envisages three PRT deputies: a
U.S. civilian, a civilian Dane, and a UK military officer.
The UK was open to the Italian suggestion of incorporating UN
and other international organization participation, including
the EU (however the UK wiring diagram only includes the
UN/SIDG with a dotted line suggesting less than a formal
role). Echoing the need for Iraqi consent, McGurgan said the
southeast governors are all on board with the PRT concept.


6. (C) Italy announced it had formally decided to lead a PRT
in Dhi Qar Province, though the details still need to be
worked out. Italy also welcomed participation from other
countries and hoped for a slot in the NCT. La Francesca was
confident Italy could stand up the Dhi Qar PRT in a very
short time. Lt. Gen. Castagnetti said Italy's military is
ready to provide security and other support, such as
transport and logistics, as required. Amb. Melani echoed the
importance of local ownership and an increased role for
international organizations, especially the EU. (Note: Amb.
Melani's current position is Italy's representative to the
EU's Political and Security Committee. End note.) Stressing
the need for flexibility, La Francesca said each PRT must
adapt, in agreement with local authorities, to the local
situation and also to the capabilities of the lead-nation.

2006: Year of the Police
--------------


7. (C) The UK opened the discussion of training of Iraqi
security forces, noting that significant progress had been
made and that 2006 should concentrate on remaining weaknesses
such as top level security structures in the MOD and MOI,
logistical and life support, command and control, and
leadership training. Citing Gen. Casey, Howard said the
focus in 2006 should be on the police service, which is a
year or so behind the armed forces. Asquith stressed the
need to train the trainers as a way of guaranteeing Iraqi
self-sufficiency. British Gen. Cooper's visit to Dhi Qar on
February 9 is a good opportunity to study the potential for
increased police training in detail.


8. (C) Italy stated that its Carabinieri in Dhi Qar have
already trained 11,000 Iraqi police and 2,000 Iraqi army
personnel (according to Castagnetti, Italy has trained all of
the police requested by the Iraqi provincial government,
essentially the entire Dhi Qar police force),and view
expansion of this training positively. Italy prefers to
concentrate its training at Camp Whitehorse in Dhi Qar
province, though it welcomes trainees from other provinces,
and offered to set up a police training headquarters there.
It views MSU (Multinational Specialized Unit) and special
police unit-type training as the most useful and also is
prepared to consider adding border guard training, which
would require the involvement of Italy's Guardia di Finanza.
(Comment: While no one challenged Italy's training
assertions, more information is needed as such numbers do not
appear to be part of the overall MNSTC-I/Iraqi DOD developed
police training program. End comment.)


9. (C) The U.S. side stressed the need to keep an eye on the
security situation over the next few months, given the
unsettled political environment and the continuing activity
of militias. Embedding and partnering with Iraqi security
forces could help accelerate the training programs.


10. (C) On the role of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq
(NTM-I),Bardini stressed the need for consistency,
coordination and a long-term commitment. Much progress has
been made in training Iraqi security forces, but numbers
simply denoting throughput of ISF trained can be deceiving.
A general plan with clear needs (determined by the Iraqis)
and benchmarks would allow for better synergies. NTM-I could
expand its role both quantitatively and qualitatively, and
could also serve as an umbrella for the general training of
Iraqi armed forces. While Italy was prepared to see this
mission extended to include police forces, Bardini
acknowledged this remained a controversial issue within NATO.
At a separate meeting following the trilats, Bardini noted
that helping the Iraqis to help themselves was a good selling

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point with the Italian public. Bardini also suggested that
French opposition to decisions in Brussels about NTM-I can be
mitigated by isolating France and dissuading Germany,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece from following France's lead.

Pressing for National Unity Government
--------------


11. (C) Deutsch said the US was engaged in major outreach
efforts to the broadest range of Iraqis possible -- but not
those with blood on their hands. Many Sunnis, he said,
actually have more faith in the coalition forces than in the
(Shia-dominated) Iraqi security forces, while Shia are
nervous about our outreach efforts to the Sunnis.


12. (C) La Francesca said that, with the upcoming
announcement of the Iraqi election results, now was a good
time for the international community to send the Iraqis a
message that they should strive to form a national unity
government. Amb. Melani echoed the need for bringing in the
Sunnis without alienating others, and called for more
regional involvement, especially by the Arab League.


13. (C) Referencing Foreign Secretary Straw's recent visit to
Iraq, Asquith said many Sunnis regret taking part in the
December elections, an inevitable reaction that he ascribed
to unrealistic expectations. The message to the Sunnis
should be stay in the political process -- or risk alienating
yourselves from the international community. The game was to
stay at the table. He warned that the Shia might view a
national unity government that did not reflect the election
results as cheating them of their electoral rights. Finally,
Asquith agreed that Iraq's regional neighbors, and the Arab
League in particular, can help by demonstrating to Iraqi Shia
that their Sunni Arab neighbors are prepared to work with
them.

Broadening International Engagement
--------------


14. (C) Noting that the December elections signaled a new
phase in Iraq, Sessa said the coalition should be ready to
step back and let the Iraqis take full ownership. At the
same time, the security coalition should evolve toward
increased participation of the international community --
especially the UN, EU, NATO, and the Arab League -- in
capacity-building. Amb. Melani said many in the EU are
willing but member states like France and Germany were
skeptical of the EU's JustLex mission in Iraq and impeding
its success. US-EU consultations are another potential venue
for promoting greater international (EU) involvement. (Italy
is also actively engaging the UN in New York.) Deutsch said
that the Iraqis themselves need to reach out more to the
international community, to demonstrate their ownership of
the process and to garner broader support.


15. (C) Talo', responding to the UK's comment that the term
"security coalition" scares off potential new partners, said
that packaging is important for Italy, which prefers to avoid
military vocabulary and instead focus on a "strategy for
success." Public diplomacy strategies should be adapted for
two different audiences, the Iraqis and each country's
domestic constituency. For Italy, it is important to stress
the success of the Italian presence and, as the Iraqis take
ownership of their country, a new partnership based more on
civilian rather than military support.

Transitioning Italian Forces
--------------


16. (C) Lt. Gen. Castagnetti said Italy has provided all the
training requested by the Iraqis in Dhi Qar and that they are
now capable of handling the security situation there
themselves. Dhi Qar is quiet and, if things continue to
improve as expected, Italy's drawdown/transition to
civilian-focused operations will be smooth regardless of who
wins the April 9 elections in Italy. However, if things
deteriorate in Dhi Qar and the center-left wins in April,
there could be problems. (Comment: Castagnetti did not
elaborate, but he presumably meant there would be pressure

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within the center-left coalition to proceed with reducing the
Italian troop presence despite deteriorating conditions. End
comment.)


17. (C) Referring to Defense Minister Martino's address to
Parliament, which occurred at the same time as the trilats,
Sessa stressed Italy's "priority concept": any
reconfiguration of Italy's military presence in Iraq would be
done in very close coordination with coalition partners and
the Iraqi government. Amerio added that regardless of
numbers or timeframes cited, the Italian mission in Iraq
would continue and adjustments would be made based on the
evolving security situation on the ground, with the emphasis
shifting from military to civilian activities. DAS Coulter
noted that it is easier for the coalition partners to manage
public diplomacy when such announcements are worked out in
advance. La Francesca proposed that another trilat be held
to follow up the day's conversations later in the spring.
The U.S. and UK delegations concurred, and the three
delegations agreed to follow up later on timing.

Opposition Seizes on Martino's Statements on Troop Withdrawal
-------------- --------------


18. (C) Meanwhile, in a January 18 Deutsch meeting with
members of Italy's opposition from the Daisy Party and
Democrats of the Left, the oppositionists stressed that any
withdrawal of Italy's troops from Iraq would occur in a
phased manner, in consultation with the USG, and that there
would be no surprises that would jeopardize their
relationship with the United States. However, they did not
deny recent comments made to Pol M/C by a senior Prodi
adviser (ROME 085) that the opposition would likely announce
the withdrawal the day after April 9 elections and that the
commitment would not be open-ended. At the same time, they
brandished a press release by Minister of Defense Martino
that said Italy will have reduced its presence by half in
June and should complete its mission by the end of the year.
Deputy S/I Deutsch replied that he was allergic to calendars.
He pointedly emphasized the need not only for full
consultations before making decisions, but also to carefully
manage public statements and perceptions.


19. (U) Deputy Senior Advisor Deutsch has cleared this cable.
SPOGLI