Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME216
2006-01-23 16:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

OLYMPIC SECURITY COORDINATOR - PRE-GAME

Tags:  ASEC KOLY IT AMGT OLYMPICS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000216 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/AS, DS/DSS, DS/EX, DS/IP, DS/P, DS/T/ATA, S/CT,
EUR/EX, EUR/WE
ROME FOR RSO, IMO
ATHENS FOR RSO
BEIJING FOR RSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KOLY IT AMGT OLYMPICS
SUBJECT: OLYMPIC SECURITY COORDINATOR - PRE-GAME
SITUATIONAL REPORT.


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000216

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/AS, DS/DSS, DS/EX, DS/IP, DS/P, DS/T/ATA, S/CT,
EUR/EX, EUR/WE
ROME FOR RSO, IMO
ATHENS FOR RSO
BEIJING FOR RSO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KOLY IT AMGT OLYMPICS
SUBJECT: OLYMPIC SECURITY COORDINATOR - PRE-GAME
SITUATIONAL REPORT.



1. This pre-game situational report provides information
pertaining to continued efforts by RSO Rome Nancy Rolph-
O'Donnell, OSC Daniel Weber, and FBI OC Ray Mey, in the
USG's planning and preparations in support of the 2006
Winter Olympic Games in Turin.


2. Commencing on January 4, 2006, USG Olympic security
operations were initiated in Turin with the arrival of 19
DSS agents, 10 FBI agents, 2 DOD JOC/TIC representatives, 4
NGA representatives, 2 NCTC representatives as well as
continued IMO support from American Embassy Rome, American
Consulate Milan and RIMC Frankfurt. OSC Weber and FBI OC
Mey provided the newly arrived USG TDYERS with the following
briefing and training activities:

January 10 Overall security Olympic, Joint Operations
Center and Threat Integration Center briefing
and the USG Olympic operational planning
briefing.

January 11 Comprehensive venue tour of all significant
Olympic sites and villages.

January 12 Briefing by TOROC security management and
Introduction to respective security
venue commanders, key security contacts.

January 12 SOCOM Briefing on tactical survey information
for all Olympic venues
and villages.

January 13 DSS and FBI field liaison elements begin
site surveys and protective intelligence
liaison activities.


3. At this time, the USG Coordination Office in Turin is
not in possession of a detailed and comprehensive operations
plan from the GOI for it's Olympic security concerns. Based
on a number of GOI official responses to the USG over the
past seven months, it appears to the RSO, OSC and FBI OC
that Italian operational plans remain in a developmental
process both in Rome and in Turin as the games approach.
Predicated upon previous briefings on Italian security
efforts for special events it appears to the RSO, OSC and
FBI OC that this process is a standard procedure for the
host government efforts to address and complete final
operational planning for special events such as the Olympic
Games. As we are all aware, The GOI has on a number of
occasions utilized this particular security process to
address previous high level major events security
requirements throughout Italy. Because of previous GOI
successes such as hosting the G-8 summit, large soccer
matches and the recent funeral of the Pope in Rome, the GOI
has chosen to adopt this same process for Olympic game
security planning.


4. RSO Rome Rolph-O'Donnell, OSC Weber and FBI OC Mey note
that while we have made and are enjoying some advancements
in our relationships with our senior Italian law enforcement
counterparts, we continue to look for and explore ways in
which to further address outstanding emergency contingency
planning questions such as TOROC and GOI venue evacuation
procedures, identification of law enforcement venue
commanders, as well as specific procedures pertaining to
Italian law enforcement response, i.e.hostage situations,
WMD matters and command and control. RSO, OSC and FBI OC
note that we have thoroughly reviewed the GOI, MOI's
responses to what has commonly become known as the " five
questions", specifically five questions posed via American
Embassy Rome for RSO, Weber and Mey to the MOI in our
attempt to better understand the GOI's Olympic contingency
planning. These questions were provided to the MOI via a
Diplomatic Note from the American Embassy, Rome in mid
October 2005.


5. The MOI's response has not included the same level of
specificity as those of a USG effort for special event
responsibilities. Clearly the GOI security efforts are not
synonymous with USG domestic special events planning and
preparations. Conversely, it is also apparent to the RSO,
OSC and FBI OC that Italian planning and capabilities far
exceed those capabilities and planning put forward in Athens
by the GOG in their attempt to host a summer Olympics.


6. Over the next 20 days, as we approach the opening
ceremonies in Turin, RSO, OSC and OC FBI will continue to
work closely with our Italian hosts to ensure all USG, USA
Sponsor and Corporate America, USOC security concerns are
properly noted and addressed. Further more, USG field
liaison components will continue to develop close working
relationships with TOROC and GOI law enforcement
representatives in furtherance of our commitment to a safe
and secure winter games. RSO, OSC, FBI OC will update
accordingly.
Spogli