AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000018

SIPDIS

FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME

FOR S/ES-O/CMS, CA/OCS/ACS/EUR, OES/IHA AND IO/EX

E.0. 12598: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR IO UN AVIAN INFLUENZA
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
TRIPWIRES US Mission UN ROME

REF: A) 05 ROME 4188 B) 05 STATE 219189

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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1. Embassy Rome's response (Ref A) to the Department's
ref B action request regarding Avian Influenza (AI)
contingency planning and tripwires includes logistical
and other related plans for the entire Rome tri-mission
community. This message provides US Mission UN Rome-
specific considerations and planning.


2. In formulating operational requirements in such a
contingency, we note that the Rome-based UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead UN agency
responsible for working the animal-related aspects of
Avian Influenza. We anticipate that this Mission would
continue to be the primary USG liaison with FAO in the
event of an epidemic. We would also expect to both
participate in any FAO working group efforts to deal with
a local or global outbreak as well as to bring FAO
expertise to the tri-mission planning process. This will
affect our tripwire responses differently than at the
Embassy, particularly in how we structure the Mission in
the event of reduced staffing.


3. In addition, the World Food Program (the UN's
emergency feeding organization, heavily supported by U.S.
tax dollars) is also concerned that an AI outbreak could
lead to severe food pipeline disruptions, endangering the
lives of millions of people dependent on WFP food
assistance. WFP is also the lead UN Agency for
logistics, and could be called upon to organize and
support a broader UN response to an AI crisis. We assume
that should such an event occur, this Mission might also
continue to have critical liaison requirements with WFP.


4. Our plans for drawdown of staff, who would remain on
a "skeleton crew," and how we would function in the event
of a drawdown are based on these assumptions.

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TRIPWIRES
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5. For local logistical and planning purposes, including
the provision of medical and emergency supplies as well
as liaison with the GOI, we will rely heavily on the
Embassy's management section, RSO, and Health Unit, as
outlined in Ref A.


6. Tripwire 1: a spike in the number and/or broadening
geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained
human-to-human transmission in a neighboring country

US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 1:


A. Keep Mission community including families and
dependents informed; disseminate any travel warnings
issued by the Department or those posts affected.


B. No travel to affected areas; recall any employees
traveling in areas in or near the region of outbreak.


C. Consider drawdown to skeleton-staff, with the
realization that this may not be desirable nor possible.
At a minimum keep on duty those officers with liaison
duties with FAO and WFP.


D. Encourage staff to stockpile water, food, blankets,
and medicines to be used under quarantine status of in
case of a run on local markets.


E. Ensure mechanisms (such as the FOB) are in place to
allow work from offsite locations.


F. Make a determination on evacuation of dependents and
any employees with relevant health problems.


7. Tripwire 2: a spike in the number and/or broadening
geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained
human-to-human transmission in any area of Italy

US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 2:


A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed,
inform and provide latest information to all employees
and dependents. Coordinate briefings with Embassy.


B. Make determination on whether to move to skeleton
staffing. At a minimum keep on duty those officers with
principal liaison responsibilities for FAO and WFP.


C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP
expertise in any response strategy or emergency response
capability. Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working
Group meetings.


D. No unofficial travel to affected areas. Recall or re-
direct to the U.S. any staff traveling worldwide.


E. Consider an ordered departure of non-essential staff
and family members, again with the realization that this
may not be either desirable or possible. (Coordinated
with Tri-Mission team)


F. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission issuance of
public announcement and travel warning to include expert
advise from FAO.


G. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission press guidance.


H. Require any employee with flu-like symptoms to take
mandatory sick leave and assure that Health Unit is
alerted.


I. Ensure staff is stockpiling water, food, blankets, and
medicines to be used under quarantine status of in case
of a run on local markets.


J. Issue protective equipment (gloves, masks),following
MED guidance.


8. Tripwire 3: a sharp further spike in the number and/or
broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or
sustained human-to-human transmission near or within Rome

US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 3:


A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed,
inform and provide latest information to all employees
and dependents. Coordinate briefings with Embassy. This
may have to be done by phone or e-mail, in coordination
with Embassy.


B. Reduce to skeleton staffing to include only Executive
Office and FAO/WFP liaison officers. Instruct all non-
essential staff to remain home on administrative leave,
and for children to remain home from school. Limit
movement of all personnel and dependents in the city.


C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP
expertise in any response strategy or emergency response
capability. Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working
Group meetings (again, possibly by phone or e-mail).


D. Cancel any incoming official travel not related to
investigation or containment.


E. Coordinate with Embassy and FAO on travel warning and
press guidance to ask that any non-essential travel be
deferred.


F. "Home quarantine" any individuals or individuals with
cold or flu symptoms.


G. Coordinate with Embassy on home visits to sick
individuals from health unit for monitoring and
medication. Consider delivery system for any essential
supplies (groceries, water, etc.).


H. Coordinating with Health Unit and MED, consider
prophylactic Tamiflu treatment.

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TRIPS INPUT
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7. DCM J. Michael Cleverley, Management/Political Officer
Bruce Berton and/or OMS Alison Lewis will be responsible
for TRIPS input.

CLEVERLEY