GOI LEADERS SAY ITALY WILL REMAIN STAUNCH ALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 001450

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IAEA IT IZ IR SR
SUBJECT: GOI LEADERS SAY ITALY WILL REMAIN STAUNCH ALLY

REF: ROME 1399

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Classified By: Classified by Anna Borg, Deputy Chief of Mission, for re
asons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. PDAS Kurt Volker met May 8-9 with a
cross-section of political and MFA representatives and
stressed to elected GOI leaders the importance of continued
cooperation on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the Balkans and other
global issues. He said that Italy would remain an important
ally but there should be careful coordination and no
surprises - particularly on Iraq, Iran and the Israeli -
Palestinian conflict. Romano Prodi, leader of the winning
coalition and the next likely PM of Italy, welcomed the
message and said his government looked forward to working
closely with the USG (reftel). Margherita party members
echoed that sentiment and added that the new center-left
governing coalition would not end Italy's engagement in Iraq,
but transition its presence toward reconstruction and
training for Iraqi security forces. Additionally, they added
that the new government would be more critical of Russia,
Cuba and Venezuela than Berlusconi had been. MFA Political
Director Terzi told Volker that the while the new government
would refocus its attention on being a more engaged EU
player, this focus would not come at the expense of Italy's
relationship with the U.S. Terzi added that, historically,
the GOI had maintained a consistent foreign policy and
despite domestic political changes. Volker's visit was an
excellent chance for both sides to underscore strong interest
in maintaining excellent ties during the next government.
End summary.

Volker: USG wants to work with you
--------------


2. (C) Volker met with Romano Prodi and two advisors for a
breakfast meeting on May 9, the second and most crucial day
of voting for the Italian president. He had lunch with
Margherita Party members Gianni Vernetti and Antonio Polito
and met separately with DS party members Luciano Vecchi and
Federica Mogherini. Volker also met MFA Director General
for Political Affairs (Terzi),DG for the Americas
(Bisogniero),Special Coordinator for Iraq (De Martino),
Deputy DG for European Integration (Oliva),senior advisor in
the office of Middle Eastern affairs (Scarantino),and
director of the Balkans office (De Cardona). Volker had
separate meetings with Francesco Talo and Marco Carnelos,
diplomatic advisors to the Prime Minister, and Carlo
Baldocci, diplomatic advisor to Finance Minister Tremonti.
Volker's public diplomacy program included a lunch with
foreign affairs editors of newspaper and television media
outlets, a dinner with think tank leaders, and a press
briefing for foreign affairs journalists.


3. (C) In his meetings with newly elected leaders and with
MFA officials Volker stated that the USG valued Italy's
international engagement and expected that the excellent
relations between the two countries would continue. He noted
that the USG expected a new government to make some
adjustments to Italy's foreign policy but asked that the GOI
work with the USG and other allies before making any major
changes to Italy's commitments abroad. On Iran, Volker said
the USG welcomed Italian efforts to expand the dialogue but
only if the message remained consistent. The EU3 mechanism
was a configuration chosen by the EU, not the U.S. Changing
the channels of communication could allow the Iranians to
focus on the messengers, not the message. Nevertheless, the
U.S. supported finding a way to add Italy to the mix,
possibly through the G8 consultation. On Iraq, Volker noted
that Italy had been an important ally in working to bring
stability to the region and any changes in Italy's posture
should be done in consultation with other coalition partners
and the Iraqi Government. Volker noted the need to find
mechanisms to provide humanitarian assistance to the
Palestinian people while not giving legitimacy to Hamas as
long as they refused to recognize Israel, renounce violence,
and abide by previous agreements. On Venezuela, Volker
encouraged Italy to avoid giving legitimacy to Hugo Chavez by
meeting him and to speak out against his undemocratic
behavior at home. So far, Chavez had characterized criticism
of his behavior as one-sided, coming only from the U.S. It
would be helpful for Italy and other European nations to
speak out as well.

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Prodi, Coalition Partners Stress Continuity
--------------


4. (C) Prodi told Volker and the Ambassador that Italy's
close relationship with the U.S. would continue (reftel).
MFA officials and diplomatic advisors Baldocci and Talo told
Volker that Prodi was eager to get off to a good start in his
relationship with the U.S. and would be very careful to
ensure that Italy's closer relations with the EU did not come
at the expense of its relations with the U.S. Margherita
party leaders Vernetti and Polito told Volker that the new PM
and his coalition were glad to hear that the USG was
committed to maintaining excellent relations. Many of the
Center-Left politicians had feared that the relationship
depended heavily on the personal relationship between Bush
and Berlusconi. Baldocci added that Prodi would seek to gain
tangible recognition from the USG of the importance of
Italian participation on key international decisions. Terzi
urged the U.S. to take note of Italy's consistent and
reliable partnership with the U.S. throughout the turbulent
times that have stressed USG relations with other EU and NATO
partners and insisted that the excellent relationship between
the U.S. and Italy would continue.

Party Leaders: No Zapatero Move in Iraq
--------------


5. (C) Margherita and DS party leaders, as well as MFA
officials, assured Volker that Italy would remain committed
to helping maintain international peace and security.
Margherita party leader Vernetti grudgingly admitted that
Berlusconi and Fini had made irreversible gains in Italian
foreign policy that the new government would continue to
build on. Terzi added that NATO would be a cornerstone of
foreign policy and Italy would support enlargement of both
NATO and the EU. Vecchi (DS) said the main difference on
foreign policy between the Berlusconi and Prodi governments
would be a new enthusiasm for the process of EU integration
and revitalization. He assured Volker that despite rhetoric
from the far left, military missions abroad will continue to
have important symbolic value for Italy and the majority of
the center left would continue to support them. Italy, he
said, would work to strengthen European security and defense
policy as part of a unified effort of cooperation with the
U.S. and NATO.


6. (C) On the issue of Iraq, a key point of disagreement
between Prodi and Berlusconi during the election, party
leaders and MFA officials stated that despite campaign
rhetoric, there would not be a Spanish-style withdrawal of
Italian troops from Iraq. Instead, Italy would transition
its presence to reconstruction and training roles, as planned
by the Berlusconi government. MFA officials noted that the
transition to a PRT presence would necessitate the deployment
of troops for force protection and the details and
configuration of troops would have to be worked out in
coordination with the coalition and Iraqi leadership.
Margherita party leader Polito told Volker that the Center
Left would seek to characterize its involvement in Iraq as a
humanitarian mission and support for the new Iraqi government
and would not derail plans for an Italian PRT. Vecchi said
Italy would take care not to create additional security
problems for the Iraqi government as it transitions to its
new structure in Iraq.


Iran: next challenge for the international community
--------------


7. (C) On Iran, party leaders and MFA officials stated that
a Prodi-led government will want to be among the key nations
that work to resolve the problem. Italy was Iran's biggest
EU trading partner. It was open to expanding the EU3 or
holding a discussion on Iran within the G8. Despite Italy's
disappointment about the EU3, Italy agreed in substance on
the message being delivered to Iran. MFA officials and party
leaders insisted that should Italy join the discussion on
Iran, it would not allow Iran to create a distraction from
the issue by focusing on the channel of communications rather
than on the message. They noted that for diplomatic pressure
to be most effective, Italy should be included. Talo noted
that the Iranian issue had to be carefully coordinated

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between the U.S. and EU, particularly in order to gain
Russian cooperation. Carnelos wondered aloud whether the
recent fatal attack against Italian troops in Iraq was a
signal to Italy from Iran. The explosive device had been
extremely sophisticated and it was suspected by some that
expertise may have been supplied by the Iran.

Improved Relations with Israel Must Continue
--------------


8. (C) Margherita party members told Volker that Prodi had
erred in accepting a congratulatory phone call from the Hamas
after his election. The new government, however, was
committed to maintaining the good relations that had
developed between the Berlusconi government and Israel.
Party leaders and MFA officials agreed that the conditions
placed on Hamas by the international community must be
enforced before direct assistance to the Palestinian
Authority could be offered. The key challenge would be to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to help the
Palestinian people to understand that the financial problems
facing the PA were the result of Hamas actions, not the
international community. Carnelos warned that France was
prepared to make major concessions on the policy of not
legitimizing Hamas in order to prevent a public outcry
resulting from Palestinian suffering. He urged the U.S. to
lobby the GOF and other EU members not to soften the stance
against Hamas. Internationally supervised distribution of
assistance in PA-controlled areas could offer a solution to
this problem.


9. (C) MFA Middle East Specialist Scarantino said that an
important key to defusing many of the conflicts in the Middle
East was finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. So far, Israel seemed to be moving in the
direction of a unilateral solution - a direction that would
not offer lasting peace. Margherita party member Vernetti
suggested that closer NATO cooperation, or even membership in
NATO could offer Israel the type of security guarantees that
Israel needed in order to make major concessions. Volker
responded that NATO does have a relationship with Israel,
raising this issue formally now would be divisive.

Ready for Renewed Efforts on Democratization
--------------


10. (C) In the context of the discussion of the Middle East,
MFA officials and party leaders noted that Italy was prepared
to work bilaterally and through the EU and NATO to advance
the cause of democracy in the Middle East. Prodi was
particularly interested in the EuroMed dialogue. Scarantino,
however, observed that the push for democracy was seeing a
greater influence of Islamist parties in Egypt, Palestine,
and other places. Margherita party reps were more
optimistic, noting that the party was committed to expanding
contacts with NGOs, civil society, businesses and moderate
party leaders in the Middle East. Vernetti noted that he
recently met with the wife of imprisoned Egyptian opposition
leader Ayman Nour. Volker told the MFA and Margherita party
leaders that structures such as the NATO Mediterranean
Dialogue and the Forum for the Future could use increased
Italian attention.

Balkans: Bipartisan support for Italian role
--------------


11. (C) Balkans Office Director De Cardona told Volker that
Italy's role in the Balkans was secure. Both Center Right
and Center Left politicians had recently spoken out in
support of the current policy. He argued in favor of Contact
Group unity and close coordination with Ahtisaari and
cautioned against allowing Russia to split Contact Group
unity over discussions on the timing and possible imposition
of a solution. Italy recognized that Kosovo was headed in
the direction of some sort of phased or supervised
independence, but the recent suspension of Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) talks with Serbia and Montenegro
coupled with the death of Milosevic was producing a
nationalist backlash in Serbia. According to Oliva, many
Serbian politicians recognized that EU membership was a
long-term goal but he worried that some believed the EU had
reached its "absorption capacity" and EU membership might
never be achieved. This removed a significant incentive for

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the Serbs to cooperate in the status talks. Terzi added that
if the Contact Group was leaning toward an imposed solution,
the status should be imposed in ways that would be palatable
to the Serbian public - there should be no discussion about
NATO-interoperability with Kosovar security forces, for
example. The issue of representation in international
organizations should also be carefully considered in the
short term. De Cardona questioned whether the Contact Group
might reconsider the Mladic issue in light of all of this.
De Cardona also noted that the failure of Bosnian
constitutional reform presented a strong challenge to the
CG's efforts in Bosnia. Terzi and De Cardona recommended
that this issue be raised on the margins of the G8.


12. (C) Volker agreed that the Kosovo issue would be
difficult for the Serbian population and argued that the
Mladic issue was symbolic of the failure of the Serbian
public to make the psychological changes to disassociate
itself from its nationalist past, but this condition was
non-negotiable. The international community should make
clear what the incentives and consequences for Serbia's
behavior were and that the door for Serbia to enter the EU
would remain open. He agreed that Russian comparisons
between Kosovo and Abkhazia had no legal basis and the U.S.
would continue to argue this.

Backsliding: Russia, Cuba, Venezuela and others
-------------- ---


13. (C) Margherita party leaders noted that one legacy of the
Berlusconi government that would not carry over would be the
lack of criticism of undemocratic behavior. Vernetti told
Volker that the Margherita's roots as a Christian Democratic
and Social Democratic Party compelled it to be more forceful
in its criticisms of Russia, Belarus and Cuba (which he
referred to as "an island prison"). Vernetti said that his
party was glad that Prodi was not meeting with Hugo Chavez
during his visit to Rome. Vernetti worried that Chavez,
Castro, and Morales of Bolivia were ushering in a period of
failed policies in Latin America. Vernetti said he would
like to use his party contacts to encourage other
left-leaning governments in the region to speak out against
Chavez. He noted that he would like to see Italy become more
involved in Latin America.


14. (C) Terzi and Talo cautioned that Italy's dependence on
Russian oil and Russia's role in the Iran crisis would
dictate a non-confrontational approach to Russia. Terzi
suggested that the U.S. consider ways to avoid having the
Adapted CFE Treaty lose momentum since it remains important
to Italy. Volker told both Talo and Terzi that the U.S. did
not see a contradiction in working with Russia on various
issues and criticizing the GORF when necessary. The U.S. was
hoping to use the G8 and OSCE to reenergize efforts to solve
the frozen conflicts on Russia's periphery. The U.S. was
trying to break Russia's
strategically outmoded mindset with regards to its neighbors.
Having unstable governments on its periphery would only
create problems for Russia. After several years of defending
OSCE and ODIHR from Russian attempts to water down their
role, the USG would make proposals to strengthen the role of
the organizations. On CFE, Volker told Terzi that the U.S.
opposed Russian efforts to avoid complying with their
Istanbul commitments and rejected any notion of letting
Russia have veto power over foreign troops stationed in
Georgia and Moldova.

UN Reform: No Tears over Stalled UNSC Expansion,
Dissatisfied with HRC
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15. (C) Terzi and Talo said Italy was glad that efforts to
expand the UN Security Council were not progressing. Terzi
asked the U.S. to hold the line at no expansion beyond 21.
Italy understood that the U.S. was unlikely to pursue UNSC
reform while HRC and administrative reform had either not
progressed well or not progressed at all. Terzi said the HRC
reform was a weak compromise that had roughly preserved the
status quo, but that Italy would continue to participate in
its work. Volker noted that Italy had put itself up for
candidacy in 2007, and while the U.S. could not endorse
candidates prior to voting, Italy met the criteria for
countries that the U.S. would support.

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16. (C) Comment. All of our interlocutors stressed that
Prodi wanted to make sure that U.S.- Italian relations did
not suffer from the transition and portrayed him as a man who
would be extremely careful not to send the wrong messages to
the U.S. as he takes the reins of power. The willingness of
party and GOI officials to make time for these meetings
during a particularly intense day of political activity
reinforced that message. Post was grateful that PDAS Volker
could visit at the very early stages of transition.


17. PDAS Volker did not have an opportunity to clear this
message before departing.
SPOGLI