SAUDI VIEWS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000009

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IR SA SY IZ
SUBJECT: SAUDI VIEWS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN
IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE

REF: RIYADH 00007

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and
General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) director Prince Muqrin
bin Abdul Aziz sought and shared views on Iran and Syria
during a December 27 meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Khalilzad. They told the Ambassador that while it was
possible to understand Iranian concerns in Iraq, that did not
justify Iranian interference. The Foreign Minister and
Prince Muqrin maintained that Iran in fact had much to lose
by fomenting instability in Iraq, given the potential
repercussions among Iran's own fragmented political and
ethnic milieu. They said that Saudi Arabia had begun
discussions with Iran, including establishing a bilateral,
Foreign Minister-level committee, to pressure Iran to end its
interference in Iraq. They also discussed Iran's nuclear
program with Tehran, and were surprised by the Iranians'
"surprising degree of innocence." Despite the Kingdom's deep
concern about Iranian activities, the Saudi leaders cautioned
against threatening Iran to try to force a change in Iranian
policies. On Syria, the Saudi leaders questioned the level
of Syrian involvement in Iraq, and cautioned against
isolating Syria, lest that strengthen its ties to Tehran.
End Summary.


2. (S/NF) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad visited
Riyadh December 27 to discuss the post-December 15 political
situation in Iraq (Reftel). He met first with Foreign
Minister Saud al-Faisal and GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin
Abdul Aziz together, and later with King Abdullah, with the
Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin sitting in. Riyadh Charge
d'Affaires, Baghdad Political Counselor and the Ambassador's
Executive Assistant, and Riyadh PolMilChief (Notetaker)
attended both meetings. During their meeting with Ambassador
Khalilzad, the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin also sought
and shared views on Iran and Syria.

--------------
Iranian Interference in Iraq
--------------


3. (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal told Ambassador
Khalilzad that the SAG had spoken to Tehran about Iranian
interference in Iraq. He said the Iranians had sent former
Iranian Foreign Minister VelaYETI as Khameini's emissary to
meet with King Abdullah, a senior level of representation
that the Foreign Minister described as unheard of but that
was intended to make a point. According to the Foreign
Minister, King Abdullah responded to VelaYETI's claim of
Iranian interest in good bilateral relations by insisting on
an end to Iranian interference in Iraq. The King reportedly
told VelaYETI that "we believe you are doing something very
dangerous."


4. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said that so far the Iranians
have denied interfering in Iraq. They have, however, agreed
to form a committee, led by Foreign Minister al-Faisal and
Khameini advisor VelaYETI to allow the Saudis to present
evidence of Iranian interference and for the Iranians "to
prove they are not doing it." Foreign Minister al-Faisal,
who said the SAG would welcome any U.S. evidence to present
to the Iranians, commented that this dialogue would be a test
of Iran's future role in the region. The SAG was uncertain
whether there would be any positive results, but the SAG had
to try. It was one thing, he said, if a united Iraq was
established and then developed close ties with Iran.
However, Iranian attempts at interference and destabilization
in Iraq were unacceptable and had to stop.


5. (S/NF) Although he stressed there was no justification
for interference in Iraq, Foreign Minister al-Faisal
commented that he could understand the Iranian imperative.
Iran, he said, has faced war with Iraq for ten years. He
also noted that Iran's self-image, as well as its perception
of its regional role, responsibility, and pre-eminence,
likely drove Iranian activism in Iraq. He told Ambassador
Khalilzad that the way to deal with Iran was not with
threats, but by convincing Iran of its role and national
interest in working for a unified Iraq. Efforts to fragment
and destabilize Iraq could spill over into Iran, which has
even more factions, sects, and ethnic groups than Iraq.


6. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that Iran was
overreaching in Iraq, and that there seemed to be an Iranian
sense of entitlement to influence because of the Shia
population and eight years of war. He commented that Tehran
is very influential in Iraq right now, that Iranian leaders
appeared to believe events were heading in a favorable
direction and that time was on their side. He related to the
Saudi leaders a report that Iranian officials had visited
Kurdish leaders in Iraq, told them that Iran and not the U.S.
would be a permanent presence in the region, and suggested
that the Kurds needed to think about that. Ambassador
Khalilzad told the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin that
the U.S. had indicated a willingness to talk with Tehran
about Iraq, but that there also had to be a plan to contain
the Iranians and reverse their gains. He also stressed that
the U.S. had specific military concerns vis-a-vis Iranian
interference in Iraq, noting in particular the increased use
by insurgents of shaped-charge IEDs, of a kind developed and
used by Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon.

--------------
Iran's Nuclear Program
--------------


7. (S/NF) Finally, Foreign Minister al-Faisal told
Ambassador Khalilzad that Saudi Arabia had also pressed Iran
about its nuclear program, both because of the dangers of
regional proliferation and the danger posed to the entire
region by an accident at Iran's nuclear facilities. He said
the Iranians had responded to Saudi safety concerns with
assurances that the facilities were very safe because "we are
using Russian technology." Still clearly amazed by that
statement, the Foreign Minister commented that there was a
"surprising degree of innocence" about the Iranians. He
remarked that the current Iranian President's only
qualification for office is that he is a "Khomeiniite."

-------------- --------------
Syria - Level of Activity in Iraq, Coordination with Iran
-------------- --------------


8. (S/NF) Both the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin
sought Ambassador Khalilzad's views on the both the level of
Syrian involvement in Iraq and the extent to which any such
involvement was coordinated with Iran. They noted Syrian
denials of involvement in Iraq, and pointed out that Damascus
had been complimented by the Iraqi government and even
General Casey for the SARG's efforts against foreign
fighters. They said that the SARG seems to feel that it has
done what is necessary.


9. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that Damascus
had taken some positive steps, such as tightening visa
requirements and closing parts of the Syrian-Iraqi border.
He agreed that General Casey had made some statements about
Syria that could be taken as positive, but cautioned that the
remarks were not as positive as some wanted to believe.
Ambassador Khalilzad said that despite some positive
measures, Syria had not made a strategic decision to break
with the foreign fighters and continued pressure was required.


10. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Coalition did
not have a clear view of the degree of Iranian-Syrian
coordination in Iraq. Foreign Minister al-Faisal noted
ongoing Syrian-Iranian cooperation in support of Lebanese
Hizballah in Lebanon, but suggested that the SAG did not
perceive a similar level of cooperation in Iraq. He noted
that Syria is a Ba'thist state and that there was not much
love for Ba'thists in Tehran. He said he doubted that Iran
would want Syria much involved in Iraq because of the
potential Ba'thist influence. Likewise, he commented that it
would be too sensitive for Syrian President al-Asad to
cooperate with Iran in Iraq because the potential for
alienating Ba'thists in both Iraq and Syria.


11. (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal cautioned that the
more Syria feels isolated, the more it will strengthen its
ties with Iran. He maintained that the SARG was open to
listening if talked to seriously. At the same time, the
Foreign Minister appeared to acknowledge the difficulty of
dealing with Damascus. He said the SARG missed an
opportunity to leave Lebanon as "heroes." The Foreign
Minister said the SAG had urged Damascus to call for a
Lebanese government of national reconciliation and sign
proposed border agreements. Instead, the Syrian leadership
obfuscated. Now, he said, there has been too much bloodshed
and irresponsibility.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister's comments on Syria mirror
past statements by him and other Saudi leaders. They reflect
the conflicting Saudi views of Damascus; frustration and
anger with the Bashar regime, but also a deep concern that
pressure and isolation could cause it to collapse, leading to
a greater instability and Islamist threat in the region.
Concerning Iran, the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, coupled with
measures being taken to encourage unity (Reftel),suggest a
SAG decision that the Kingdom must now play a role in
stabilizing Iraq. End Comment.


13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this cable.
OBERWETTER