MOI UNDERSCORES NEED FOR BROAD AND FLEXIBLE ENERGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 008989

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE PASS TO GPERSON AND AALVAREZ
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: EPET PGOV PINR PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: MOI UNDERSCORES NEED FOR BROAD AND FLEXIBLE ENERGY
FACILITIES SECURITY COOPERATION

REF: A. RIYADH 8836

B. RIYADH 8811

C. RIYADH 5781

Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Silverman for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) Economic Counselor Silverman and Energy Attache Ross
met with Dr. Saad al-Jabri, Advisor to the Assistant Minister
of Interior, on November 26 to discuss the draft Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation to improve security at
critical infrastructure facilities. Dr. al-Jabri underscored
the SAG's request for a wide-ranging, long-term, and flexible
partnership with the USG to protect critical Saudi Arabian
infrastructure. He indicated the MOI had decided in
principle to purchase 30 Sikorsky helicopters, but the
proposed delivery date presented a significant obstacle. Dr.
al-Jabri also expressed both in this meeting, and in several
other late night discussions, worries regarding Al Qaida
recruitment of Saudis from the northern part of the Kingdom,
many of whom share tribal ties with Iraqi Sunnis. "We will
have a rough six months ahead," he predicted. End Summary.

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SAG Seeks a Long-Term Security Relationship
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2. (S) Dr. al-Jabri underscored his consistent message
(refs A and C): the SAG is seeking a long-term security
relationship with the USG on critical infrastructure
protection (CIP),which they hope will go far beyond
protection of a handful of pre-determined sites. He views
the proposed MOU as a strategic document to broadly define
the cooperation. He noted his concern that language
referring to a long-term partnership had been removed from
the draft MOU, and requested it be re-inserted. He was
perturbed with changes which narrowed the scope of proposed
cooperation. While Dr. al-Jabri agreed the initial focus of
this cooperation should be on energy infrastructure, he
emphasized the need for a flexible agreement which coudl
encompass a variety of potential targets, saying "threats are
changing from one day to the next."


3. (S) Dr. al Jabri argued the MOU must provide flexibility
to allow the Joint Working Group (JWG) of experts to do their
job to evaluate and implement plans to protect critical
infrastructure. If the MOU pre-judges which facilities are
included in the CIP program, he told us the JWG experts would
be hamstrung and unable to respond to rapidly evolving
threats. For example, Dr. al-Jabri noted that an attack on
one of Saudi Arabia,s key three power plants would shut down
all oil production and exports, while an attack on a facility
such as Qateef Junction would shut down "only" six million
barrels per day. Finally, he noted Saudi Aramco, not the
MOI, would make the determination as to which petroleum
infrastructure were considered "critical."

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JWG Should Evaluate and Designate
Critical Infrastructure Sites
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4. (S) Dr. al-Jabri indicated only the expert JWG should
make any designations of critical infrastructure. The first
meeting of the JWG is now planned to take place during an
MOI delegation's early December visit to Washington DC. Dr.
al-Jabri and the other meeting participants agreed among the
JWG's first tasks should be the development of criteria for
selection of critical infrastructure sites. To date, there
has been no comprehensive joint analysis of criteria for
designating various forms of critical infrastructure, nor
discussion of which facilities would meet designated
criteria. While the DOE-DOS infrastructure protection team
selected Ras Tanura, Abqaiq Oil Processing plants, and the
Qateef pipeline Junction as priority energy sites, Saudi and
U.S. technical experts have not made a comprehensive
assessment of other critical sites, including power and water
infrastructure, which could also impact petroleum production
and exports. Dr. al-Jabri is also concerned with sites which
impact the ability of the SAG to govern and ensure the
security of the Saudi population.

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HRH Bin Nayif Prepared to Sign Broad MOU
Which Avoids Prescriptive Details
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5. (C) Finally, Dr. al-Jabri noted that if the CIP MOU
broadly outlined the nature of the government-to-government
cooperation, HRH Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, Deputy Minister
of Interior, would be prepared to sign the document during
his early December visit to Washington. However, the MOI did
not consider it appropriate for HRH to sign a document which
outlined minutiae, such as financial details or a detailed
work program. The MOI views these details as appropriate for
discussion and implementation by the JWG at the working
level. Dr. al-Jabri further noted the MOU should only
discuss issues relevant to both governments, not issues
relating to internal USG administrative procedures. As an
aside, Dr. al-Jabri indicated there were ample funds in the
MOI's modernization program to handle reasonable expenses
associated with the program.

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MOI needs the MOU To Cooperate
Efficiently and Effectively
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6. (C) Dr. al-Jabri reiterated the value of the MOU from
his perspective is to provide cover to MOI staff to work
directly with the USG without having to jump over significant
SAG bureaucratic impediments. He told us three weeks prior,
Saudi ministries had again received a notice forbidding
meetings with foreign diplomats without MFA approval. Dr.
al-Jabri believes efficiently working with the full range USG
experts on urgent facilities security will be impossible the
facilitating mechanisms the MOU provides.


7. (C) Finally, Dr. al-Jabri re-iterated earlier statements
regarding the need for an MOU to institutionalize
cooperation. He hinted he may move on from his position
within a few months, possibly by promotion or retirement, and
is seeking a mechanism to ensure the continuity of the CIP
program.

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Aramco: On the Defensive on Security Issues,
and an Issue to Manage for the MOI
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8. (C) Dr. al-Jabri outlined his perspective on Saudi
Aramco's relationship to the MOI CIP initiative. He praised
Saudi Aramco's industrial safety practices, but said the
company does not pay enough attention to security issues. He
stated Saudi Aramco officials become "defensive" when their
security practices come under scrutiny from MOI. Dr.
al-Jabri noted MOI would bring Saudi Aramco into the CIP
program discussion soon, but wished to exclude them from
policies and guideline discussions more appropriate for a
government-government forum. He frankly believes Saudi
Aramco would present an impediment during such discussions.
Once the USG and SAG JWG determines CIP program policies and
guidelines, the High Commission on Industrial Security,
chaired by HRH Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, Deputy Minister of
the Interior, would communicate them to Saudi Aramco.


9. (C) (Note: Despite MOI claims that they can order Saudi
Aramco to cooperate with the CIP program via the High
Commission on Industrial Security, we have experienced
difficulties with MOI's practical ability to broker access to
Aramco facilities. Saudi Aramco officials have instead
claimed they take their orders from the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources (MOPR). While MOI eventually plans to bring the
MOPR to the table on this initiative, the timing and manner
of MOPR's involvement remain vague. We will continue to
monitor and discuss appropriate access to Aramco facilities
for officials working on the CIP program. End note.)

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Helicopter Purchase May Hinge on Delivery Date
-------------- -


10. (S) Discussing procurement of systems under the CIP
effort, Dr. al-Jabri told us the MOI had decided to purchase
30 Sikorsky helicopters. He indicated funds had been
allocated for the purchase. However, he stated Sikorsky was
attempting to shift the delivery date, putting the purchase
in jeopardy. If Sikorsky re-instated the original delivery
date, the sale could be completed, he said.

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Iranian Intentions and Influence vis a vis Iraq
-------------- ---


11. (S) Dr. al-Jabri discussed his deep concerns with the
Iran's long-term strategic interests and the challenge this
presents to Saudi Arabia. He is deeply pre-occupied with
growing Iranian influence in the region, stating that if
Tehran obtains a nuclear bomb, Riyadh, not Tel Aviv, would
likely be the first target. He noted Iran wanted Iraq's
Shi'a areas, while Jordan's and Turkey's long historical
ties to parts of Iraq also led them to territorial
aspirations. He underscored the SAG's long-term interest in
a "united, Arab Iraq," and stated every neighbor of Iraq
except Saudi Arabia has some territorial interest in some
piece of Iraq. Discussing the precarious situation in Iraq,
he stated the USG had requested assistance from the SAG in
reaching out to Iraqi Sunni leaders. In turn, he said the
SAG had asked for a formal request of assistance from the
USG, but despite the SAG's willingness to help, no such
request had ever been forthcoming.


12. (S)At another point in our conversation, Dr. al-Jabri
commented on the US congressional elections that "the
terrorists are celebrating." He explained that al-Qaida
and the Iranians both were misinterpreting the results as a
weakening of US will in IRaq. Asked if he saw any
operational results from this, he pointed to increasing
recruiting in Syria, and chatter that the MOI picks up of
operations being planned. "We will have a rough six months
ahead," he predicted, adding that the Mubahith are on
heightened alert.

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Internal Security: Al Qaida Recruiting
Shi'a in the North of Saudi Arabia
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13. (S) Turning to internal security challenges, Dr.
al-Jabri stated al Qaida recruiters frequently targeted
Saudis residing in the north of the country. He lamented,
"We are fighting a hidden war, and our own people are being
recruited to fight against us." He emphasized the deep
tribal and family ties which bind Saudi and Iraqi Sunnis in
the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border region. He stated prior to
9/11, al Qaida had recruited in the south of Saudi Arabia,
from al-Ghamdi and Qahtani tribes while now they were seeing
recruits from the north, from the Shammari and Anaiza tribes.
He also claimed there were Al Qaida sleeper cells in Qateef,
Eastern Province.

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Comment
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14. (C) Dr. al-Jabri is Assistant Minister Muhammad bin
Naif's "go to" man on a range of issues, including on the
energy facilities protection initiative. Like several other
key staff of Prince Muhammad, he has an extensive academic
background, including in his case a PhD in Arabic grammar
from al-Imam University in Riyadh, and a PhD in computer
science form the US. He is from al-Qasim in northern Saudi
Arabia.
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