TERRORISM FINANCE: POST'S RESPONSE ON THE RADICAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 008826

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EMBASSIES TEL AVIV AND KUWAIT - PLEASE PASS TO APHSCT STAFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2031
TAGS: KTFN EFIN PTER PREL ETTC SA
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: POST'S RESPONSE ON THE RADICAL
IDEOLOGUE INITIATIVE

REF: A. SECSTATE 135332

B. RIYADH 8415

Classified By: Ambassador James Oberwetter for reasons 1.5 (b),(d),an
d (g).


1. (S/NF) Mission Saudi Arabia supports the aim of the
Radical Ideologue Initiative to sanction individuals and
entities that provide both monetary/material support and
ideological support to terror organizations (ref a). This
initiative underlines the international community's need to
counter the terrorists, attempts to recruit followers and
supporters based on ideological appeals. Post does have four
general concerns on implementation of this initiative, based
on our understanding of Saudi sensitivities.

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Legal Concern
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2. (S/NF) Post's reading of the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions (especially op para 2 of UNSCR 1617) is that the
UN Sanctions Committee is authorized to sanction acts that
directly support and facilitate the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida,
e.g., recruiting terrorists, and financing or planning
terrorist acts.


3. (S/NF) The SAG's policy as articulated to us at nearly
every meeting, is that they will undertake to fulfill their
obligations as a UN member. This includes implementing UN
Committee designations against prominent SAG citizens such as
Yassin Al-Qadi and Abd Al-Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mua'jjil. Given
their legalist rationale for taking these actions, they might
see our Radical Ideologues Initiative as a new interpretation
of the UNSCRs to broaden the scope of sanctions to include
ideological support. If not properly explained to the
Saudis, this initiative may have the potential of lessening
their cooperation with us on implementing UN Committee
designations.

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Tactical Concern
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4. (S/NF) Post's liaison representatives have been working
with the SAG in a ongoing program to deter radical clerics
from their radical preaching and teachings in the Kingdom.
This program has three goals: 1) to monitor radical clerics;
2) co-opt radical clerics; and 3) remove the clerics if they
are not cooperative. The SAG believes it has been proactive
in its response to radicalism in the Kingdom. The SAG
believes its approach demonstrates a willingness to deter
this type of radical ideologue behavior. For the U.S. to
designate individuals that the SAG is targeting for
co-optation might be seen as a US effort to undercut the
Saudis. Thus our Radical Ideologue Initiative must be
closely coordinated with the SAG at the initial stages of
targeting these individuals/organizations and throughout the
process.

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Potential for Media Backlash
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5. (S/NF) Post understands that this Initiative would aim to
deter radical ideological support for terrorists, by ensuring
some of its headline exponents (who are also financing or
recruiting terrorists and thus sanctionable under relevant
UNSCRs) are sanctioned by the UN Committee. But a public
affairs posture that stresses the ideological support, rather
than the evidence of financing/recruiting, could play into
the hands of the extremist preachers. They could point to
this as an example of a war on Islamic ideas, not on criminal
acts of terrorism.

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Avoiding Inadvertent Political Tensions
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6. (S/NS) In implementing and managing the Initiative, it
will be vitally important to keep in mind that the Saudi
political system is based on a 260-year-old alliance between
the ruling Al Saud royal family and the Al al-Shaykh family,
the guardians of the Kingdom's religious institution. The Al
al-Shaykh are the descendants of Muhammmad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,
the founder of the Wahhabi movement. Just as the Al Saud
dominate the Saudi government, so the Al al-Shaykh dominate
the Kingdom's religious life, courts, and educational system.
We currently know of no Al al-Shaykh members who might be
impacted by the designation process under the Initiative.
That said, the designation process will need to take this key
alliance into account, in order to avoid inadvertently
affecting the core of the Saudi political system. If forced
to choose between their bedrock domestic political allies and
interests and the US, the Al Saud will always choose the
former.


7. (S/NF) In conclusion, we fully support prioritizing
extremist imams and inciters of terrorism, who also qualify
for designation under the UNSCRs, as long as we closely
coordinate through liaison channels with the SAG. We do
question the benefits of rolling out a new Initiative when
this prioritization can be accomplished without public
fanfare and within the USG,s counter terrorism interagency
process.
OBERWETTER