AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD SEEKS POST-IRAQI ELECTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000007

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ SA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD SEEKS POST-IRAQI ELECTIONS
SUPPORT FROM SAUDI LEADERS

REF: SECSTATE 23102

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad met
with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, and
General Intelligence Presidency director Prince Muqrin bin
Abd al-Aziz on December 27, to seek Saudi support in Iraq for
building an Arab Sunni-Kurdish-Alawi coalition to engage the
Shia-Kurdish alliance in forming a national unity government.
Ambassador Khalilzad stressed that the elections had gone
well; turnout was very high and, while accusations of fraud
and corruption had to be investigated thoroughly, experts who
had significantly observed the elections did not believe that
the level of fraud and corruption had affected the results.
He acknowledged that the results were not what had been hoped
for, and stressed the need to build a coalition and establish
a national unity government, both to stabilize Iraq and to
contain and turn back Iranian political successes in the
country. King Abdullah promised Saudi cooperation, but was
deeply skeptical of the chances of success and even appeared
to question the bonafides of U.S. policy in Iraq. He
commented that whereas in the past the U.S., Saudi Arabia,
and Saddam Hussein had agreed on the need to contain Iran,
U.S. policy had now given Iraq to Iran as a "gift on a golden
platter." In their meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad,
Foreign Minister al-Faisal and Prince Muqrin listened
carefully to the Ambassador's proposals and reviewed ongoing
Saudi political efforts in Iraq. They also asked whether the
U.S. would approve SAG officials meeting with radical Iraqi
dissident cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his representatives in
an effort to detach him from Iranian influence. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met
December 27 in Riyadh with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al
Saud, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and General
Intelligence Presidency director Prince Muqrin bin Abdel
Aziz. Ambassador Khalilzad met with the Foreign Minister and
Prince Muqrin together and, later in the afternoon, with King
Abdullah, with the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin sitting
in. Riyadh Charge d'Affairs, Baghdad PolCounselor and
Ambassador's Special Assistant, and Riyadh PolMilChief
(Notetaker) attended both meetings.

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December 15 Election Went Smoothly
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3. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad told the Saudi leaders that
procedurally, the December 15 elections had gone well. The
70% turnout rate had eclipsed the voting levels of the
January elections (58%) and the constitutional referendum
(63%). In parts of western Iraq, such as Anbar, there had
been dramatic increases in voter participation. Anbar
Province had a turnout rate of over 50 percent,versus 2-3
percent last January.


4. (S/NF) All three Saudi leaders expressed concern about
reports of voter fraud, including allegations that not enough
ballots or ballot boxes had been available in Sunni areas,
and that stuffed ballot boxes had been brought into Iraq from
Iran. Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged the reports and said
that while experts who had observed the elections did not
think that the level of fraud had significantly affected the
overall results, the allegations of fraud had to be
thoroughly investigated, to assure Iraqis that the elections
were legitimate. He said that while the Iraqi Election
Commission would have to substantiate the allegations,
ideally any investigation should have some international
involvement. The Ambassador said that, if the Iraqis agreed,
the U.S. would support U.N.-sponsored international
participation.


5. (S/NF) Responding to the concerns of the Foreign Minister
and Prince Muqrin about the large number of candidates
removed because of their Ba'thist affiliations, Ambassador
Khalilzad said the De-Ba'thification Commission (DBC) had
looked at 180 names, of which 90 were ultimately removed from
candidate lists. He acknowledged the Foreign Minister's
argument that it was difficult to not be a Ba'thist under
Saddam's regime and that the DBC had made some inappropriate
decisions. He agreed that there needed to be a change in DBC
procedures, to bring to justice those who had committed
crimes while also stressing reconciliation with former
Ba'thists against whom there was no evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.

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Post-Election: Build a Coalition, then build a Government
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6. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that the
election results were not what had been anticipated or hoped
for. The Shia list, he said, had done better than expected
and would probably win 131 seats in the Assembly - down from
a past high of 146, but still an excellent result. The
Ambassador estimated that other significant results would be
57-58 Assembly seats for the Kurds, 54-55 seats for the two
major Sunni factions together, and 25 seats for Alawi's
party.


7. (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad told Saudi leaders that the
Kingdom's support was needed for the vital next step of
building a post-election coalition between the Kurds, Alawi,
Tawafuq and Mutluq. He said that such a coalition could
amount to 130-136 Assembly seats, enabling the Kurds, Sunnis,
and others to engage with the Shi'a list in forming a
national unity government. Ambassador Khalilzad stressed the
importance of encouraging the various groups to think
strategically, not tactically, and to dissuade them from
striking a separate deal with the Shia. He said in
particular that Alawi must not leave Iraq, lest his group
fall apart. The Iranians, who he said would seek a
Shia-Kurdish alliance, might then buy Alawi's electoral slate.

-------------- --
Foreign Minister - Now they must come together"
-------------- --


8. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister, who indicated that Prince
Muqrin was in charge of Saudi outreach to the Iraqi spectrum,
commented that "An election is divisive, now they (the
Iraqis) must come together." Both leaders agreed with the
need for a coalition to engage the Shi'a and were guardedly
in agreement with the Ambassador's proposal for Saudi
support. They stressed that Saudi Arabia would remain
equally distant from all groups and was neither representing
nor exclusively supporting the Iraqi Sunnis. They said that
efforts to stabilize and unify Iraq must proceed without
anyone except Iraqis taking the lead. Saudi support for a
stable, united Iraq would include targeted media campaigns
and discrete humanitarian aid channeled through Iraqi
political and other groups.


9. (S/NF) According to the Foreign Minister and Prince
Muqrin, the Saudi government was already active in seeking
Iraqi stability and unity. The Foreign Minister said that
Riyadh had formed a group of "like-minded" states to work
toward these goals. Prince Muqrin added that after initial
meetings with other governments had been undertaken by
Ministry of Interior and GIP representatives during the OIC
summit in Mecca, Saudi officials had visited a number of
countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait, and the
UAE for further discussions. He said that in Iraq, the SAG
had contacted Iraqis who supported a united Iraq, and
encouraged them to pressure the insurgents to end their
violence.


10. (S/NF) Prince Muqrin offered to arrange for U.S.
officials to meet with some of the disaffected Iraqi leaders.
The Foreign Minister added that such meetings would give
those leaders great confidence. Ambassador Khalilzad replied
that such meetings might be possible, provided that the
Iraqis involved were not affiliated with terrorists like
Zarqawi or with Saddam. The Saudi leaders laughed at the
suggestion, noting that "Saddam's people are our enemies and
we are looking for Zarqawi."


11. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister asked for Ambassador
Khalilzad's view of Muqtada al-Sadr. Prince Muqrin explained
that al-Sadr had contacted the Saudis, and they believed they
had "51-49" chance of bringing him on board, despite his
Iranian support. The Ambassador replied that al-Sadr had a
large following and that the al-Sadr family members see
themselves as righteous leaders, but that Muqtada himself is
a little unbalanced. He also noted that al-Sadr was facing
murder charges and a warrant for his arrest for the slaying
of Iraqi Shi'a leader Abd al-Majid al-Khoie; those would have
to be resolved. Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Saudis
should talk with al-Sadr "with caution," and that it would be
a positive step if the Saudis could ultimately pry al-Sadr
away from Iran and Hizballah.

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King Abdullah - Giving Iraq to Iran on a Golden Platter
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12. (S/NF) In his meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad, King
Abdullah promised Saudi cooperation with U.S. efforts in
Iraq, but also pulled no punches about his skepticism of the
chances of success and his anger at developments in Iraq.
After thanking the Ambassador for his presentation, King
Abdullah remarked that he agreed with everything the
Ambassador had told him, though some of what he had said
reflected "hopes" and "wishful thinking" rather than reality.
He said it was important to separate the two.


13. (S/NF) The King said he would speak bluntly. In the
past, he noted, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Saddam Hussein
had agreed to fight Iran, to prevent Iranian intervention in
Iraq and the region. Now, he said, Iran has been presented
with Iraq as a "gift on a golden platter." He told the
Ambassador that while it was possible to work the Iraqi Shia,
most of whom are Arab, that reality is balanced by the
influence, threats, and intimidation of Iran.


14. (S/NF) King Abdullah said while the MFA and the GIP were
working the Saudi policy of unifying Iraq, it was his
personal assessment that it will be hard to stabilize Iraq in
less than five years. He commented that he believed it would
be very difficult and perhaps even impossible to achieve a
unified government in Iraq. The balance of political forces
is now uneven, with the Iraqi National Assembly dominated by
one large bloc. King Abdullah said that Saudi Arabia would
work with the U.S. in Iraq, and he prayed to God that the
U.S. would succeed, but he had his doubts that there would be
success. He told the Ambassador that he would trust to God.
In the end, he said, whether we succeed or not is up to God
Almighty.


15. (S/NF) Finally, the King appeared to caution the
Ambassador about the motivations of some of those working the
Iraq political process. He said that one of the most
important ingredients of success was to have noble, sincere
intentions at all levels. He said that "I trust in your
sincerity, but what about those under you?" He reminded his
visitors again of the will of the one God, to whom everyone
prays, regardless of whether they are Jewish or Christian,
Sunni or Shia. God, he said, always leads the faithful to
success. King Abdullah concluded the meeting by noting that
it was near prayer time and that, if he was lucky, he might
make it home in time to pray.

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Comment
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16. (S/NF) General Intelligence Presidency stewardship of the
Iraq portfolio reflects the degree of Saudi operational
interest in trying to effect political success in Iraq.
Ambassador Khalilzad,s meeting with the Foreign Minister and
Prince Muqrin made clear that the Saudis are concerned and
politically active over Iraq, which perhaps suggest that,
while willing to cooperate with the U.S., such cooperation
may be more clearly reflected in SAG parallel efforts to
unify the disparate Iraqi political groups and encourage an
end to the insurgency, as opposed to direct cooperation.
King Abdullah was upset and somewhat emotional and, while not
specific, even appeared to be questioning the bonafides of
U.S. policy in Iraq. He has on a number of occasions accused
the U.S. of handing Iraq to Iran on a golden platter. His
disturbing invocation of Saddam Hussein,s name in reference
to a consensus about Iran suggests that he believes that,
post-12/15, Saudi Arabia's fears about Iraqi instability and
an increased Iranian threat have been realized. End Comment.


17. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this cable.
OBERWETTER