TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE EP:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 005904

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM SA
SUBJECT: TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE EP:
OPPORTUNITIES ABOUND

REF: A. RIYADH 5136

B. RIYADH 3315

C. RIYADH 3312

D. RIYADH 3301

Classified by Ambassador James Oberwetter for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Opportunities abound in Saudi Arabia's Eastern
Province (EP) for ConGen Dhahran to expand its work with EP
residents to help them transform Saudi Arabia's future.
Since September 11, EP residents have claimed, and the SAG
has tolerated, much greater latitude to discuss the country's
and province's problems publicly and to form civil society
organizations, albeit informally. This process is indigenous
and particularly strong in the Shi'a community, but it also
derives strength from the regional atmosphere of reform.
Thanks to well-regarded economic and social contributions of
Americans in the EP and, in the case of the Shi'a, to the
liberation of Iraqi Shi'a from Saddam's rule, many EP
institutions and individuals are eager to work with U.S.
counterparts. They generally do not seek financial
resources; instead, they want to tap the expertise and
networks of their U.S. counterparts and to gain implicit
support for their projects of transformation. We see
particular opportunities in three areas: educational
linkages, civil society organizations, and cultural
exchanges. End summary.

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The Right Time and Place?
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2. (C) Three features distinguish the EP from other regions
of Saudi Arabia: the large Shi'a population, the presence of
Saudi Aramco and related industries, and its geographic and
cultural proximity to the smaller Gulf countries. These
factors make many of the EP's Saudi citizens natural
advocates or supporters of transformation, whether political,
economic, or social. The Shi'a community sees political and
social reform as key to realizing its aspirations that Shi'a
be treated fairly and equally as Saudi citizens. The
business community sees economic reform as necessary to
unlocking the region's full economic potential. All
residents are well aware of the rapid changes occurring in
neighboring Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the U.A.E.


3. (C) Political and social change is taking place in the
EP, albeit at a slower pace than in neighboring Gulf states.
The most important changes are the increasing frankness and
openness of political discussion and the growing presence of
civil society organizations, many of them unofficial (ref D).
Our contacts view these changes as politically significant,
emphasizing that enhanced freedom of expression, assembly,
and organization are key building blocks to meaningful
political reform. On a more purely political front, the
Shi'a community in particular is "taking advantage of every
opening," as one of its leaders put it, to push for greater
freedom of religion, wider support for human rights, and
improved accountability of local government. The Shi'a
community views the reform process as essential to gaining
full rights of citizenship, and its leaders have made a
conscious choice to push for reform from within (ref C). The
move toward greater debate, a more active civil society, and
increased political participation is an indigenous,
home-grown process. While its leaders derive strength from
political and social changes in the neighboring Gulf states
and from regional dialogues about reform, at heart this
process is one of EP residents seeking to transform their own
future.


4. (C) Many EP residents and organizations are willing or
even eager to work with their American counterparts in this
process of transformation. This willingness, which runs
contrary to conclusions one might draw from opinion polls
showing that most Saudis have negative perceptions of the
U.S., comes partly from general if sometimes grudging respect
for American institutions found throughout the region but
also from two factors specific to the EP. First, most EP
residents appreciate the role Americans working for Aramco
and other companies have played in transforming the region

RIYADH 00005904 002 OF 003


economically. Many of the region's professionals and
businessmen have direct experience working for or with
Americans, giving them a deeper and better understanding of
the U.S. Second, the EP's Shi'a community (roughly 40
percent of the EP's Saudi population) appreciates core
American values of religious freedom and equality and is much
more favorable to U.S. intervention in Iraq and the broader
call for regional reform than other Saudis. (Note: The
Shi'a community is also more supportive of Hezbollah than the
broader Saudi population, and many Shi'a may be reluctant to
be involved directly in USG programs while the current
Israel-Hezbollah conflict lasts. End note.)


5. (C) Despite the opportunity to support a genuine process
of transformation and the willingness of many of those
involved to work with U.S. counterparts, practicing
transformational diplomacy in the EP involves a delicate
balancing act. Many of our contacts wonder if the region and
the country at large are currently experiencing a "Prague
Spring" and fear that the SAG may roll back the progress made
to date. It is clear that there is significant pressure on
the SAG from religious conservatives and extremists to stop
the process of social and political transformation (ref A),
and one of their central arguments is that it represents a
western agenda. In addition, some of our contacts question
the depth and sincerity of the U.S. commitment to supporting
reform in the region and in Saudi Arabia in particular, and
fear a return to the trade-off of stability at the expense of
democracy. The challenge of practicing transformational
diplomacy in the EP is to provide meaningful and enduring
support to the indigenous process of transformation without
provoking a backlash that will give ammunition to those in
the SAG who might want to roll it back.

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Target Areas: Education, Civil Society, and Culture
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6. (C) We see three areas as particularly promising for
practicing transformational diplomacy in the EP: higher
education partnerships, development of civil society, and
cultural programs. These areas offer opportunities to
support the process of transformation taking place in the EP
in ways that draw on U.S. strengths and that are not overtly
political.

Education


7. (C) Two important changes are occurring in higher
education in the EP. Because of the shortage and poor
quality of higher education opportunities (ref B),students
are rushing to take advantage of the SAG's recently expanded
scholarship program for study abroad, particularly in the
U.S. Informal networks and organizations have sprung up in
the Shi'a community to help students through the many
bureaucratic steps, and the interest among Sunnis is high as
well. Second, higher education in the EP itself is slowly
diversifying. A new private university is scheduled to open
this fall, and its investors have hired a U.S. consortium as
consultants on the academic program and administration. The
Shi'a community is lobbying actively for a new university in
Qatif focused on the medical sector, and several smaller,
more targeted colleges have also opened in the past several
years, as has a branch of the Arab Open University. One of
these institutions is explicitly seeking a partnership with a
counterpart institution in the U.S., and others would welcome
increased programming.


8. (C) Both of these processes - the rush of students
seeking to study in the U.S. and the gradual diversification
of educational opportunities in the EP - offer excellent
opportunities for transformational diplomacy. If successful,
both processes will transform the EP in the medium and long
term, and those involved explicitly view them as
transformational. Post can support these processes by
facilitating effective matching of Saudi students to U.S.
universities and linking of EP colleges and universities with
their U.S. counterparts. Because of the recognized
excellence of the U.S. in higher education, providing such
official support is not overly controversial.

Civil Society


9. (C) Civil society in the EP falls roughly into two
categories: formal and informal. Formal organizations are

RIYADH 00005904 003 OF 003


approved and supported by the government, though they must
increasingly rely on their own resources. Examples include
established charitable societies and literary clubs, as well
as several newer organizations like the EP branch of the
National Society for Human Rights. Informal organizations
include clubs, regular cultural forums, and online
communities. These organizations are newer and their status
more tenuous than their formal, established counterparts.
They are monitored but tolerated by the SAG, and their
organizers are well aware that they have no legal protection.
They are growing increasingly dynamic, particularly in Shi'a
communities, providing space for public discussion of
contentious issues and for forging bonds with others based on
shared interests as diverse as women's rights, astronomy, and
the arts. If the SAG relaxed its control over civil society
and allowed legitimate groups to register, many of these
informal organizations would seek to formalize and expand.


10. (C) Promoting civil society in the EP is an ideal area
for transformational diplomacy; the challenge is that civil
society is so sensitive to the SAG that our options are
limited. Organizers of unofficial civil society groups,
particularly the forums, are often asked by the SAG to cease
or tone down their activities. The SAG has sent warning
signals to leaders of several groups after ConOff visits,
although we remain welcome as visitors to these fora and our
hosts are uncowed. Yet even in this environment we have
several opportunities to support civil society through IV
programs, training for civil society leaders and managers (in
the U.S. or Bahrain, as the SAG may find it too sensitive if
done in Saudi Arabia),and visits by U.S. experts to work
with specific civil society groups as long as the subject
areas are not controversial.

Cultural Programs


11. (C) A number of our contacts - particularly
intellectuals, writers, and other "opinion shapers" - have
told us they would like to see more cultural programming
sponsored by post. EP residents, of course, are exposed to
American culture through movies, the media, American
products, and contact with Americans working in EP
businesses. What our contacts want is the opportunity for
direct interaction with Americans who are working and
creating in the cultural sphere. In the EP, "cultural" is
often a byword for political. Seeking to expand
opportunities for local cultural expression is in itself a
political act, and EP Saudis are also increasingly using
"cultural" events as vehicles to raise political issues. We
now have the contacts to reach audiences in a variety of
venues, from the government-sponsored and recently
liberalized literary and artistic clubs to regular but
informal cultural gatherings. The challenge will be to
select cultural programs that will engage these audiences and
implicitly support EP cultural activists, but which do not
cross the unwritten line of what is acceptable to the SAG.

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Conclusion
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12. (C) Education, civil society, and culture are certainly
not the only areas where the USG can help EP residents
transform their societies, but we think they represent the
best opportunities. Other important areas, including women's
empowerment and religion (i.e. promoting religious
tolerance),can and should be integrated into our activities
in these areas, to the extent possible. While it would be
feasible and productive to work with women's civil society
groups in the EP, for example, we would have to approach the
question of religious tolerance much less directly in any
EP-based program.


13. (C) Over the past year, with the assignment of the first
PAO to the Eastern Province in a decade, we have expanded our
contact base and our understanding of the indigenous
transformational efforts underway in the EP. We have also
learned lessons from programming undertaken (though not
necessarily in the framework of transformational diplomacy)
in the areas of education, civil society, and culture. Based
on these experiences, we believe that opportunities abound
for practicing transformational diplomacy in the EP, and we
look forward to working with Embassy Riyadh and Washington to
capitalize on them.
OBERWETTER