SHI'A TRADITIONALIST LAMENTS SHIRAZI ASCENDANCY IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 005513

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A TRADITIONALIST LAMENTS SHIRAZI ASCENDANCY IN
QATIF

REF: A. RIYADH 3312

B. 2005 RIYADH 9396

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

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A Latent Conflict Seethes
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1. (C) Kamal Al-Khatti, a Riyadh-based social researcher
formerly employed by Prince Abdulaziz bin Fahd and son of
Qatif's late and revered Judge Abdulhamid Al-Khatti, told the
CG and ConOffs that the Shirazis (ref A) now dominated Qatif
and the Saudi Shi'a community politically, but that a latent
conflict seethed below the surface between the Shirazis and
Qatif's traditional families. Al-Khatti described the
Shirazis, led by Hassan Al-Saffar and including Jafar
Al-Shayeb and several others of Qatif's elected municipal
council members, as well-organized activists whose power
bases, developed through charitable societies and other
means, extended well beyond the traditional central area of
Qatif (known as the Qala', or fortress) and into neighboring
towns and villages. The expansion of the Shirazis' power,
Al-Khatti continued, came at the expense of the powerful
traditional families of the Qala', e.g. the Khunaizis,
Jishis, Awamis, Seifs, Ghanems, and others. "You can't see
it from the outside," he said, "but these families resent the
Shirazis and are just waiting for an opportunity to regain
their power." Al-Khatti noted that the traditional families
currently lacked strong leadership, saying that his uncle
Abdullah Al-Khunaizi, Shi'a judge from 2002 to 2005, was "too
short-tempered to be an effective leader" and that Sayyid
Mounir Al-Khabbaz, a well-regarded cleric, was "an excellent
scholar but with no political ambitions and not good in
public affairs."


2. (C) In addition to Shirazi dominance at the municipal
council ballot box, Al-Khatti named several other ways the
Shirazis were pushing the traditionalists out. He said that
Ghalib Al-Hammad, whom the SAG appointed to replace Abdullah
Al-Khunaizi as Qatif's Shi'a judge (ref B),was not a Shirazi
himself, but he received the support of the Shirazis partly
because he was from Tarut, and not from a traditional Qala'
family. Citing Hassan Al-Hamza's two volume book on the
Saudi Shi'a (not translated into English),he also claimed
that the Shirazis were attempting to rewrite Qatif's history
to downplay the leadership role of the traditional families
and exaggerate the importance of groups from the outlying
towns and villages. Al-Khatti said that he was hoping to
write a modern history of the Shi'a that would take issue
with Al-Hamza's portrayal.


3. (C) Al-Khatti described the Shirazis as a "political
party" but said that their main goal was to lead the Shi'a
community rather than to implement any particular platform.
"Even if some of them would want to partition Saudi Arabia
(thus creating an oil-rich state the Shi'a could dominate),"
he volunteered, "they know it cannot be done and that it's
not realistic. What they want is to be the recognized
leaders of the Shi'a in Qatif and Al-Ahsa." Al-Khatti, who
admitted that he was against the Shirazis "only because I am
from a traditional family," gave Hassan Al-Saffar credit for
his role in making the Shirazis a political force in the
Shi'a community in Saudi Arabia and beyond. "Once (Mohammad
ibn Mahdi Al-Hussaini Al-) Shirazi died (in 2001),the
religious leadership went to his brother (Sadiq Al-Shirazi)
and nephew (Mohammad Taghi Al-Mudarrasi),but it is Hassan
Al-Saffar and Hadi Al-Mudarrasi (another nephew) who are the
real political activists. Look at Hadi Al-Mudarrasi's work
with the Shi'a in Bahrain. Anywhere the Shirazis are strong,
it is because of one of these two."

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The Shirazis, Iran, and Saudi Hezbollah
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4. (C) Asked by the CG about the Shirazis' feelings toward
Iran, Al-Khatti said that their interests had diverged.
"They used to agree with Iran on two things," he noted.
"They both opposed the Saudi government and (Ayatollah Abu
Al-Qasim) Al-Khoei, whom the Shirazis disliked because he
didn't recognize Al-Shirazi as a marja'. But then Al-Khoei
died (in 1992) and the Shirazis and the Saudi government came
to an understanding (in 1993)." Al-Khatti said there was
plenty of latent sympathy for Iran among the Saudi Shi'a
community, giving an example from some years ago of a popular

RIYADH 00005513 002 OF 002


cleric from Seihat with an Arab nationalist bent who found
himself shunned by the community after warning that Iran
would use the Saudi Shi'a for its own national interests.
Al-Khatti characterized Saudi Hezbollah as "inactive and
idle" but identified a Saudi Shi'a named Hassan Al-Mustafa,
jailed by the SAG for 18 months after the Khobar Towers
bombingin 1996 but then released, as one of its younger
intellectual leaders. Al-Mustafa, he said, followed in the
political tradition of former president Khatami of Iran and
his Minister of Culture: "They make themselves out to be
reformers and are open to talking about women's rights, but
at the end of the day they believe in wilayet al-faqih."
Asked by the CG if Iran was active in the EP, Al-Khatti said
he did not know of any current activities but claimed that
"Iran could revive its network at any time it wants."

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Comment
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5. (C) Al-Khatti is the first Shi'a to speak so openly to us
about the rivalry between the Shirazis and the traditional
families of Qatif, although we have certainly sensed it from
his uncle, among others. Individuals who fit the Saudi Shi'a
"Shirazi" profile - i.e., former followers of Mohammad
Al-Shirazi who spent a significant portion of the period 1980
to 1993 outside Saudi Arabia - seem to be in most leadership
positions in the Saudi Shi'a community and to be the most
active politically. They seem united in their current agenda
of pushing for greater rights and recognition for the Shi'a
within the Saudi system (ref A). We plan to explore further
over the coming year the extent to which and the mechanisms
by which leading Shirazis coordinate their actions, as well
as possible differences among them. End comment.

(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
OBERWETTER