Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RIYADH5106
2006-06-25 16:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 27 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV OVIP PTER IZ SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHRH #5106/01 1761602
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251602Z JUN 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0364
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8991
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 005106 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY ADDRESSEE ADDED

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP PTER IZ SA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 27 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR
KHALILZAD TO SAUDI ARABIA

RIYADH 00005106 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador James C. Oberwetter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 005106

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY ADDRESSEE ADDED

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP PTER IZ SA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE JUNE 27 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR
KHALILZAD TO SAUDI ARABIA

RIYADH 00005106 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador James C. Oberwetter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) The U.S. Mission to Saudi Arabia warmly welcomes your
visit to Jeddah June 27. Ambassador Oberwetter and Consul
General Tatiana Gfoeller look forward to meeting you and will
accompany you on a number of your calls on Saudi leaders.
Per your request, appointments are being requested in Jeddah
with King Abdullah, Crown Prince Sultan, Foreign Minister
Saud al-Faisal, Director of the General Intelligence
Presidency, Prince Muqrin, and the Head of the National
Security Council, Prince Bandar.


2. (S) Your visit to the Kingdom takes place at a time of
relative internal stability but continuing concern over
regional developments. Saudi leaders always look to USG
visitors for assessments on regional security issues,
especially with regard to Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The
SAG shares most U.S. concerns about a range of regional
issues, including Iran and Iraq, and is quietly pursuing
initiatives to help promote political stability in Iraq and
urge Iran to cooperate with the international community
regarding its nuclear program. The February 24 terrorist
attack on the Abqaiq oil facility came much closer to success
than the SAG has been willing to acknowledge publicly,
causing Saudi leaders to intensify internal security and
counterterrorism efforts -- and to look to the U.S. for
assistance. Recent visits by U.S. security and helicopter
assessment teams were well-received by the Ministry of
Interior (MOI).


3. (S) Your visit also comes during a time of some tension
in U.S.-SAG relations. On the one hand, Saudi leaders have
warmly welcomed a large number of senior USG visitors and
confirmed the strength of the bilateral relationship.
Counterterrorism cooperation remains strong and effective,
and the importance of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship
has been repeatedly reaffirmed by Saudi officials to visiting

senior U.S. commanders. Recent Strategic Dialogue meetings
in Washington went well, and the thousands of Saudis,
especially students, now seeking U.S. visas offer clear
evidence that we have progressed beyond the decline that
followed 9/11. Nevertheless, obvious tensions exist. Saudi
public opinion is on edge after the recent two suicides at
Guantanamo, and the SAG is working with us to keep this
matter low profile. Further, recent independent polling
shows an 11% approval rating for the U.S. among Saudis. While
Saudi leaders do share U.S concerns about Iran, Iraq, and
other regional issues, there is a clear reluctance by the SAG
to cooperate directly and openly with the U.S. to address
them. Saudi leaders are very worried about nuclear
proliferation, but they perceive a double standard in
U.S.-driven pressure against Iranian nuclear weapons
development and have argued instead for a nuclear-free Middle
East that would include Israel. King Abdullah, who has in
the past accused the U.S. of handing Iraq to Iran "on a
golden platter," told General Abizaid May 13 that the U.S.
regional and possibly world reputation was "broken."

--------------
Iraq
--------------


4. (S) In the June 6 meeting with U/S Edelman, King Abdullah
asked if General Abizaid relayed his message to President
Bush concerning engaging former Baathists in Iraq, and in
part stated that "it would be very wise to co-opt the former
Baathist elements into the new Iraqi government." The King
and Crown Prince both expressed concern over what they
perceived to be a growing Iranian threat, including their
growing influence in Iraq, and questioned the wisdom of
consulting with Iran about Iraq.


5. (S) Additionally, during the same visit, U/S Edelman met
with the Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs,
Prince Muhammad bin Naif. Prince Muhammad raised several
concerns regarding Iraq, including the transfer of Saudi
detainees from Iraq to SAG authority as well as the
recruitment of terrorists from Saudi Arabia to fight in Iraq.
Regarding the transfer of detainees, U/S Edelman reiterated
that both the SAG and the USG want the detainees to be
transferred, but that the SAG needs to coordinate with the
Iraqi government; Prince Muhammad acknowledged this need. He
was concerned that the SAG is losing public credibility
because the prisoners are not returning to the Kingdom.


RIYADH 00005106 002.2 OF 002



6. (S/NF) COMMENT: Overall, throughout discussions in recent
months, senior SAG leaders have told us that the SAG is
taking steps to promote Iraqi stability and unity, including
encouraging the involvement of other regional governments and
consideration of targeted media campaigns and humanitarian
aid. The SAG believes that its support was critical to the
increased participation of Sunni elements in the most recent
elections but, in the face of continuing sectarian violence,
Saudi leaders also likely believe there is little they can
directly do to foster peace. They remain particularly
sensitive about being perceived as supporting only the Sunni
side, as this would damage their credibility with Shia Iraqis
and put them in direct conflict with Iran. The Saudis are
still hesitant to take major concrete steps on such issues as
debt forgiveness and diplomatic representation (for security
reasons). Saudi leaders have missed few opportunities since
the December 15 Iraqi elections to convey to us their view
that Iraq is now more susceptible to political instability
and Iranian influence. Despite their willingness to quietly
encourage Iraqi unity and stability, Saudi leaders,
especially King Abdullah, have been very worried about the
chances for success. Saudi leaders continue to worry that
Sunni Takfiri insurgents in Iraq will eventually redeploy to
Saudi Arabia just as they did after the Soviet-Afghanistan
War and target the regime. END COMMENT.
OBERWETTER