SAUDI HEZBOLLAH FIGURE OFFERS A SLIGHTLY TOUGHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 004914

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI HEZBOLLAH FIGURE OFFERS A SLIGHTLY TOUGHER
LINE THAN OTHER SAUDI SHI'A

REF: A. RIYADH 3346

B. RIYADH 3312

C. 2005 RIYADH 9396

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) In a May 28 meeting with PolOff and PolFSN, Ahmed
Al-Nimr (Ahmed),brother and office manager of Shi'a cleric
Sheikh Hassan Al-Nimr (Hassan),explained that Hassan would
not meet with American diplomats because "he would lose the
respect of people on the street, who would ask why he met
with the Americans." (Note: Post had sought a meeting with
Hassan, whom contacts have described as a leading figure in
Saudi Hezbollah and who first came to ConOffs attention after
several news stories noted his participation and comments in
King Abdullah's National Dialogue. Ahmed, whose number a
contact had shared, initially said no, and then suggested the
May 28 meeting to discuss the idea further. End note.)


2. (C) Elaborating, Ahmed divided the Shi'a community into
three categories vis-a-vis their willingness to meet American
diplomats: "First you have the lightweights, who have no
importance in the community; of course they'll meet with you.
Next are the political class, like Hassan Al-Saffar, Jafar
Al-Shayeb, and the rest. Because they are political, they
are happy to talk with you; I am sure you can call any of
them up and arrange a meeting in five minutes. But they do
not truly represent the Shi'a community. Finally, it is
people like Sheikh Hassan al-Nimr, Ghalib Al-Hammad, and
Sheikh Ali Al-Nasr, who represent the deep religious core of
the Shi'a community. American policies make it impossible
for them to meet with U.S. diplomats." (Note: Al-Hammad was
recently appointed as the judge in Qatif's Shi'a court (ref
C). Contrary to Ahmed's assertion, Hassan Al-Saffar has
consistently refused ConOffs requests for meetings for a
number of years. End note.)


3. (C) Ahmed mentioned four issues in particular that
prevented Hassan from meeting American diplomats. He first
contrasted Secretary Rice's call in Riyadh in June 2005 for
the release of three jailed reformers with U.S. "silence" on
the issue of nine Shi'a who, Ahmed claimed, have languished
without trial in SAG prisons for six to ten years in
connection with the Khobar Towers bombing. "Why doesn't the
U.S. government speak out about their condition?" he asked.
Next, he criticized the USG for not pressuring the SAG enough
on reform: "People throughout Saudi Arabia, not just the
Shi'a in the Eastern Province, have suffered under the
Wahhabi regime and want change. If the U.S. were a true
partner to the Saudi people, it would be calling publicly for
reform." Finally, he alleged U.S. bias toward Israel and
pro-Sunni bias of Ambassador Khalilzad in Iraq as two other
problems with U.S. foreign policy. PolOff observed that many
Shi'a have raised similar concerns directly with American
diplomats and asked why these issues were apparently more
sensitive to Hassan than to other Shi'a. "If Sheikh Hassan
meets with American diplomats, he might lose the respect of
people on the street," Ahmed repeated, stressing that Hassan
was "open-minded" and noting that he had met with German,
Swiss, and Danish diplomats.


4. (C) Ahmed proceeded with an analysis of the political
situation in Saudi Arabia not markedly different from what we
have heard from other Shi'a interlocutors. He described
Shi'a as "desiring peace" and Saudi Shi'a as desiring to be
treated as full Saudi citizens without discrimination.
However good King Abdullah's intentions, he noted, reform was
moving "very, very, very slowly." The National Dialogue, in
whose most recent session Hassan participated, was a welcome
exercise, Ahmed continued, but "all its recommendations have
been swept under the table unimplemented." He lamented the
pressure that (Sunni) religious extremists put on all
reformers and Saudi institutions, noting that September 11
was a "golden opportunity for dealing with them (the
extremists),of which the government failed to take
advantage." On the positive side, he acknowledged the
increased cultural expression of the Shi'a community through
regular forums and other institutions of civil society.
Hassan's forum had been one of the earliest and most active,
Ahmed said, until the SAG shut it down one year ago after
Hassan chose "wiliyat al-faqih" as the discussion topic.


5. (C) Continuing on the theme of culture, Ahmed asked why
Embassy Riyadh and ConGen Dhahran did not have cultural
programs like the embassies in Beirut and Cairo. Referring

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approvingly to a recent visit by Noam Chomsky to Beirut
(though not claiming it was an Embassy-sponsored program),
Ahmed urged more cultural and intellectual dialogue between
the U.S. and Saudi peoples. When PolOff began his account of
the cultural activity undertaken by ConGen Dhahran over the
past year by noting that PAO had recently spoken to a forum
of 70 women in Al-Ahsa about our cultural programs (ref A),
Ahmed almost choked with laughter on his drink of water.
"You're so concerned with women, but you should first take
care of the men," he opined. (Comment: PolOff took this
reaction to indicate that Ahmed did not find programs with
Saudi women to be serious programs. End comment.)
Recovering himself, Ahmed suggested that post host a speaker
on human rights, work corroboratively with Saudi Aramco to
host a series of presentations on Aramco's history and
cultural significance, and explore ways of supporting Shi'a
charitable societies. He said that Hassan would consider
attending cultural programs organized by ConGen Dhahran if
they were held at neutral locations.

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Comment
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6. (C) This conversation was PolOff's first with someone who
clearly represents Saudi Hezbollah. As expressed above, one
noteworthy point is that most of Ahmed's positions seemed
remarkably similar to those of many of our other Shi'a
interlocutors. Differences in content, where present, were
ones of degree and not kind: Ahmed tacked a few more
"very's" on to the "reform is going very slowly" mantra, for
example, and was more direct in his criticism of the U.S. for
not urging due process for the Khobar Towers detainees. His
political and cultural points of reference, however, were
markedly different. He referred once to Hassan Nasrallah and
Mohammed Khatami (in reference to similar remarks each made
on Lebanon's diversity); once to (Lebanese) Hezbollah (as an
example of Shi'a cultural commitment to community services);
and, as mentioned above, to Noam Chomsky (who, according to
press reports, met with Nasrallah in Beirut in May).


7. (C) As noted in ref B, the nature of and extent of
support for Saudi Hezbollah remain open questions. Despite
Ahmed's contrast between "politicians" like Jafar Al-Shayeb
and figures like Hassan, who "represent the deep religious
core" of the Saudi Shi'a, Ahmed's instincts were clearly
political: several comments indicated that he closely
followed local, regional, and U.S. politics. His ultimate
justification for Hassan's refusal to meet with U.S.
diplomats was also political, namely that "people in the
street" might lose respect for Hassan's commitment to his
ideals. Ahmed's willingness to meet with PolOff and PolFSN
also indicates that Saudi Hezbollah's views toward the USG
are not so extreme as to rule out interaction. Indeed, his
last question to PolOff, who had earlier offered the
International Visitor Leadership Program as one example of
how Mission Saudi Arabia was promoting cultural exchange
between Saudis and Americans, was, "So can you tell me more
about this cultural visits program?" End comment.

(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
OBERWETTER