Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RIYADH4723
2006-06-13 08:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
SHI'A CLERIC ASKS U.S. TO EXERT MORE INFLUENCE
how-toVZCZCXRO6708 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHRH #4723 1640837 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 130837Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8560 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2652 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0590
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 004723
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A CLERIC ASKS U.S. TO EXERT MORE INFLUENCE
TOWARD REFORM
REF: RIYADH 1053
Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reason 1.4
(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 004723
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A CLERIC ASKS U.S. TO EXERT MORE INFLUENCE
TOWARD REFORM
REF: RIYADH 1053
Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reason 1.4
(d).
1. (C) Sheikh Mohammed Hassan, introduced by a post contact
as a leading Saudi follower of Karbala-based Ayatollah
Mohammed Taqi Al-Mudarassi, told PolOff in a June 11 meeting
that the U.S. should play a more active role in calling for
reform in Saudi Arabia. "All reform in the Kingdom is taking
place because of the outside environment," Hassan argued,
"but the government may be looking at the environment like a
storm that will blow over. If it does, the government will
revert back to its old practices." Asked for an example,
Hassan replied, "Yes there is more freedom of expression now.
If you say something the government doesn't like, the
mubahith calls you in and makes you sign a contract saying
you won't do anything like that again. Before, they would
have put you in prison. But there's no guarantee they won't
start jailing people again, if the environment changes."
2. (C) Anticipating a question about the municipal councils,
Hassan called them "a paper reform," arguing that they had no
real power and that the government would use them to deflect
criticism. He further argued that elections were not the key
to reform in Saudi Arabia: "Americans think that elections
will bring democracy, but they won't. Look at Iraq - it is a
democracy only on paper. If you had elections in Saudi
Arabia, the Salafis would win." In Hassan's opinion, Saudi
Arabia had to lay the foundation for democracy before
advancing to further elections, particularly in the areas of
civil society, rule of law, and education. "It is far easier
to open a business here than a civil society organization,"
he noted. "In fact, new civil society organizations are not
officially permitted. If they were, you would see a flood of
new organizations, which would be very healthy for the
country." He acknowledged that new cultural groups had
formed recently in Qatif, but said they could never reach
their full potential as "they were formed in spite of the
government, not with its blessing."
3. (C) Hassan also commented briefly on his relationship
with Ayatollah Al-Mudarassi, saying that he had visited
Al-Mudarassi in Karbala several times since the fall of
Saddam and that Al-Mudarassi had also visited Saudi Arabia
during a haj (confirming the report in reftel). Since the
death of Al-Mudarassi's uncle and mentor Ayatollah Mohammad
Al-Shirazi (in 2001),Hassan explained, Al-Shirazi's
followers had split, with one group following Al-Mudarassi
and the other following Al-Shirazi's brother, Sadiq
Al-Shirazi. Mohammed Al-Shirazi, Hassan noted, was very
politically active and was not considered a marja'. In
contrast, Hassan continued, Al-Mudarassi had chosen "to
remove himself from direct involvement in politics in the
mold of Ayatollah Sistani" and was considered a marja'.
Asked if Al-Mudarassi followed the political situation in
Saudi Arabia, he replied that Al-Mudarassi's interest was in
the welfare of the Shi'a population and that he would involve
himself in Saudi Arabia's political affairs only in the most
dire of scenarios.
4. (C) Comment and bio note: The post contact who arranged
the meeting with Hassan described him as "one of the
Shirazis" who had gone into exile in Iran, and later Syria
and elsewhere, in the early 1980s and returned to the Kingdom
in the 1990s. While clearly very interested in political
issues, Hassan is certainly not as politically active as
other Shirazis like Hassan Al-Saffar. He seems to be an
example of a former Shirazi follower who now concentrates on
more genuinely religious and community welfare pursuits. For
example, he leads a small, informal hawza, or Shi'a religious
school, to provide continuing and advanced training for Saudi
Shi'a students who had studied in hawzas in Iran and Syria.
Hassan's analysis of the political situation in Saudi Arabia
was somewhat more pessimistic than what we have heard from
other Shi'a clerics and activists. End comment and bio note.
(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
OBERWETTER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A CLERIC ASKS U.S. TO EXERT MORE INFLUENCE
TOWARD REFORM
REF: RIYADH 1053
Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reason 1.4
(d).
1. (C) Sheikh Mohammed Hassan, introduced by a post contact
as a leading Saudi follower of Karbala-based Ayatollah
Mohammed Taqi Al-Mudarassi, told PolOff in a June 11 meeting
that the U.S. should play a more active role in calling for
reform in Saudi Arabia. "All reform in the Kingdom is taking
place because of the outside environment," Hassan argued,
"but the government may be looking at the environment like a
storm that will blow over. If it does, the government will
revert back to its old practices." Asked for an example,
Hassan replied, "Yes there is more freedom of expression now.
If you say something the government doesn't like, the
mubahith calls you in and makes you sign a contract saying
you won't do anything like that again. Before, they would
have put you in prison. But there's no guarantee they won't
start jailing people again, if the environment changes."
2. (C) Anticipating a question about the municipal councils,
Hassan called them "a paper reform," arguing that they had no
real power and that the government would use them to deflect
criticism. He further argued that elections were not the key
to reform in Saudi Arabia: "Americans think that elections
will bring democracy, but they won't. Look at Iraq - it is a
democracy only on paper. If you had elections in Saudi
Arabia, the Salafis would win." In Hassan's opinion, Saudi
Arabia had to lay the foundation for democracy before
advancing to further elections, particularly in the areas of
civil society, rule of law, and education. "It is far easier
to open a business here than a civil society organization,"
he noted. "In fact, new civil society organizations are not
officially permitted. If they were, you would see a flood of
new organizations, which would be very healthy for the
country." He acknowledged that new cultural groups had
formed recently in Qatif, but said they could never reach
their full potential as "they were formed in spite of the
government, not with its blessing."
3. (C) Hassan also commented briefly on his relationship
with Ayatollah Al-Mudarassi, saying that he had visited
Al-Mudarassi in Karbala several times since the fall of
Saddam and that Al-Mudarassi had also visited Saudi Arabia
during a haj (confirming the report in reftel). Since the
death of Al-Mudarassi's uncle and mentor Ayatollah Mohammad
Al-Shirazi (in 2001),Hassan explained, Al-Shirazi's
followers had split, with one group following Al-Mudarassi
and the other following Al-Shirazi's brother, Sadiq
Al-Shirazi. Mohammed Al-Shirazi, Hassan noted, was very
politically active and was not considered a marja'. In
contrast, Hassan continued, Al-Mudarassi had chosen "to
remove himself from direct involvement in politics in the
mold of Ayatollah Sistani" and was considered a marja'.
Asked if Al-Mudarassi followed the political situation in
Saudi Arabia, he replied that Al-Mudarassi's interest was in
the welfare of the Shi'a population and that he would involve
himself in Saudi Arabia's political affairs only in the most
dire of scenarios.
4. (C) Comment and bio note: The post contact who arranged
the meeting with Hassan described him as "one of the
Shirazis" who had gone into exile in Iran, and later Syria
and elsewhere, in the early 1980s and returned to the Kingdom
in the 1990s. While clearly very interested in political
issues, Hassan is certainly not as politically active as
other Shirazis like Hassan Al-Saffar. He seems to be an
example of a former Shirazi follower who now concentrates on
more genuinely religious and community welfare pursuits. For
example, he leads a small, informal hawza, or Shi'a religious
school, to provide continuing and advanced training for Saudi
Shi'a students who had studied in hawzas in Iran and Syria.
Hassan's analysis of the political situation in Saudi Arabia
was somewhat more pessimistic than what we have heard from
other Shi'a clerics and activists. End comment and bio note.
(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
OBERWETTER