Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RIYADH3312
2006-05-02 14:55:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

THE SAUDI SHI'A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS SA 
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VZCZCXRO1004
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHRH #3312/01 1221455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021455Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6969
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2585
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0526
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 003312 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?

REF: A. RIYADH 3301

B. RIYADH 1196

C. RIYADH 888

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 003312

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A: WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE?

REF: A. RIYADH 3301

B. RIYADH 1196

C. RIYADH 888

Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Some Sunni Arab leaders, including Egypt's President
Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, have recently publicly
questioned the loyalties of Arab Shi'a populations in the
Middle East. Privately, senior Saudi officials raise similar
concerns. Given the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq,
increasing regional tensions vis-a-vis Shi'a Iran, and the
tenuous status of Saudi Shi'a within their own country, the
question of whether Saudi Shi'a loyalties belong primarily
with Saudi Arabia - or, alternatively, to their
coreligionists elsewhere in the Gulf - is a timely one. It
is also of central concern to U.S. strategic interests in the
region, given the concentration of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a
population in its oil producing areas.


2. (S) Our conclusion, based on discussions with a broad
spectrum of Saudi Shi'a contacts over the past eight months,
is that most Saudi Shi'a remain committed to the agreement
reached between the Saudi Shi'a leadership and King Fahd in
1993-4, whereby Shi'a leaders agreed to pursue their goals
within the Kingdom's political system in return for the
King's promise to improve their situation. Saudi Shi'a have
deep religious ties to Iraq and Iran and are inspired by the
newfound religious freedom and political power of the Iraqi
Shi'a; they also have a lengthy history of persecution by the
Al-Saud and face continuing discrimination (ref B).
Nonetheless, their leaders still appear committed to working
for reform from within, a strategy that, thanks to King
Abdullah, is slowly bearing fruit. In our view, it would
require a major internal or external stimulus to move the
Saudi Shi'a toward confrontation with Riyadh. Such stimuli
could include a major shift in SAG policy or leadership, the
spread of uncontained sectarian violence to the Kingdom, or a
major change in regional security arrangements, especially
escalating regional conflict involving Shi'a (ref C). Absent

these circumstances, the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a are not
likely to demonstrate significant external political
loyalties, either to Iran or to any inchoate notion of a
"Shi'a crescent." End summary.

-------------- --------------
A Tactical Choice: Advocating for Rights from Within
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) At 1.5 to 2 million strong, the Shi'a comprise 10
to 15 percent of Saudi citizens. They are concentrated in
the Eastern Province (EP),particularly the oasis areas of
Qatif (where the population is overwhelmingly Shi'a) and
Al-Ahsa (a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area). Saudi Shi'a do not have
the breadth of tribal and clan ties to Iraq and Iran as do
the Shi'a of Kuwait and Bahrain, though at least one major
Shi'a tribal confederation, the Al-Tamim, are present in
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.


4. (SBU) The Wahhabi Saudi state has a long record of brutal
persecution of both Saudi Shi'a and Shi'a living elsewhere in
the region. During the military raids of the first and
second Saudi states in the 18th and 19th centuries, Shi'a
were a frequent target of Wahhabi Saudi violence, including
an all-out attack on major Shi'a cities in southern Iraq and
the desecration of holy sites there. When the founder of
modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, conquered what is now
the EP, his fanatical Ikhwan army went on a murderous
anti-Shi'a rampage. A watershed moment in this troubled
history came in 1979 when thousands of Shi'a, angry at the
state, inspired by the Iranian revolution, and organized by a
young group of leaders, most notably Hassan Al-Saffar, took
to the streets of Qatif in protest. The SAG cracked down,
killing a number of the protesters and arresting many
activists. Hundreds of Shi'a, including Al-Saffar, went into
exile, initially to Iran but later leaving Iran for Syria,
Lebanon, the UK, the U.S., and other western countries.
Al-Saffar and many of his political allies returned to Saudi
Arabia in the mid 1990s after reaching a deal with King Fahd
in 1993-4. The King agreed to allow the exiles to return, to
release Shi'a detained in the Kingdom, and to take steps to
improve the situation of the Shi'a; for their part, the
returning Shi'a agreed to cease their opposition activities
and pursue their goals within the Saudi system.


5. (C) Why did the exiled Shi'a return? According to
Mohammed Al-Mahfooth, one of their number and now
editor-in-chief of a journal on contemporary Islamic issues,
"There were two main reasons. First, we realized that, as a
minority in Saudi Arabia, we could never hope to change the
regime by revolution, as we might have thought in 1979.
Second, we felt we were losing touch with our communities
here, and we were not effective at helping them to develop
from abroad. So we decided to come back and work for our own
rights from within." We have heard similar explanations from
other Shi'a who were part of the exile movement. As a group,
exiled and indigenous leaders made an important tactical
decision in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Realizing that
they could not wrest control over their destiny from the SAG
by opposition and confrontation, they changed their goal to
realizing their civil rights as Saudi citizens and their
tactics to pushing for reform from within. The same tactical
calculus remains relevant today.


6. (C) Shi'a activists have consistently emphasized to us
their continued commitment to pushing for civil rights and
reform within the system; in the words of one of their
leaders, "Any place there is room, we are trying to use it."
We see considerable evidence that the Shi'a are indeed taking
full advantage of every opportunity, especially with the
ascension of King Abdullah, whom the Shi'a view as friendly
to their aspirations. They were active participants in the
petition movement in the last years of King Fahd's reign,
signing petitions calling for reform both as a community and,
as individuals, in conjunction with other (Sunni) reformers.
The Shi'a successfully organized to win all the municipal
council seats in EP areas where they enjoyed demographic
predominance. The Qatif municipal council, with Jafar
Al-Shayeb as its president, will likely prove to be the most
organized and active of any in the EP.


7. (C) The Shi'a are also pushing the boundaries of what the
SAG allows in terms of civil society (ref A),organizing
unregistered but tolerated activities ranging from regular
cultural and political forums to computer and astronomy clubs
to underground film showings. Of the five people appointed
to the Dammam branch of the National Society for Human Rights
(NSHR),at least four are Shi'a activists, including
Al-Shayeb. The Shi'a are pushing for greater religious
freedom and a reduction in discrimination through the NSHR
and via direct appeal to senior SAG leaders, albeit with
limited success. Pointing to these activities and to their
vision of a Saudi Arabia where all citizens enjoy civil
rights, some of our contacts argue that the Shi'a are the
true Saudi nationalists and reformers.


8. (C) Another indication that the Shi'a are, at least for
now, committed to working within the system is that Shi'a
leaders and activists from a variety of backgrounds are
gravitating toward this tactic and that they are actively
building bridges with other reform elements in Saudi society.
The returned exiles are the most politically active Saudi
Shi'a, were the major force in brokering the 1993-4 deal with
King Fahd, and are in the forefront of most of the
initiatives mentioned above. (Note: While they do not form a
single political block, they are sometimes referred to as
"Shirazis" because at the time of their exile many of them
followed the late Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Shirazi, who
advocated that clerics should play a greater political role
in demanding Shi'a rights, although Shirazi opposed the
concept of wilayat al-faqih. End note.) Other Shi'a
activists, both secular and religious, have also adopted the
tactic of pushing for reform from within, although they do
not have the same broad organizational networks of the
Shirazis. These activists include former leftists like Najib
Al-Khunaizi, who hosts one of the regular cultural forums in
Qatif, and purported Saudi Hezbollah leader Hassan Al-Nimr,
who participated in the most recent National Dialogue in
Abha. The Shirazis, Al-Khunaizi, Al-Nimr, and other Shi'a
leaders are also making efforts to reach out to secular and
religious reformers from Sunni society, trading visits to
each other's forums and majlises and seeking other means for
dialogue.

-------------- --------------
Iran: Religious Ties but Few Political Loyalties
-------------- --------------


9. (S) While there are strong religious ties between the
Saudi Shi'a and Iran and the potential for Iranian influence
in the EP is a legitimate concern, especially given the
increasing bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric and policy, our
best assessment is that, under prevailing conditions, the
Shi'a are not looking to Tehran for political guidance.


10. (S) As argued in ref C, given the importance of the EP
to Saudi Arabia's oil industry, Iran has a strategic
rationale for laying the groundwork to exert its influence.
It also has a history of doing so. The Iranian revolution
inspired the Saudi Shi'a to rise up in opposition in 1979,
and the Iranians played a role in organizing Saudi Hezbollah
in the 1980s. Most Saudi Shi'a clerics have studied
extensively in Iran, especially Qom, and many politically
active Shi'a spent time in Iran in the early and mid 1980s.
A militant Saudi Shi'a group, at least inspired if not
directed by Iran, carried out the attack on the Al-Khobar
military barracks in the summer of 1996. More recently, a
few of our Shi'a contacts have claimed that there are active
pro-Iranian networks in the Qatif area and alleged other
signs of Iranian activity, although a much larger number of
others discount these claims. (Note: Recent sensitive
reports from other channels also suggest possible Shi'a links
with militant Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, and/or Lebanon. One
report suggests that Iranian-affliated Iraqi militias may
have begun low-key efforts to establish contacts in the EP,
and another report suggests that one Saudi Shi'a may have
visited a Lebanese Shi'a leader to seek financial support.
End note.)


11. (S) The vast majority of our Shi'a contacts, however,
have told ConOffs that they see no evidence of current
Iranian efforts to exert political influence in the EP. Our
contacts, who include community activists, political leaders,
journalists, businessmen, cultural figures, academics, and
sheikhs, many of whom studied in Iran, are also generally
skeptical of Iranian motives as they pertain to Saudi Arabia.
We heard over and over variants of the following statement:
"We were used by Iran before, and we won't let it happen
again. Their interests are completely different than ours."
Indeed, the exiled Shirazis appear to have left Iran in the
mid 1980s because it became clear they were being used:
several contacts independently told us that the group left
because they refused Iranian pressure to organize or take
credit for sabotage operations against Saudi oil
installations.


12. (C) Time and time again, Shi'a sheikhs have explained
that the Saudi Shi'a prefer to study in Najaf or Karbala
(where Arabic is spoken everywhere, including outside the
religious community),have much stronger historical ties to
religious institutions in Iraq, and studied in Qom only
because Saddam Hussein's regime made it impossible for them
to study in Iraq. They also caution that a Shi'a who has
studied at a hawza in Qom would not necessarily share a
pro-Iranian religious or political perspective and note that
all the important ayatollahs, including those from Najaf,
have hawzas in Qom. All of our contacts concur that among
Saudi Shi'a who emulate a marja' or mujtahid, the large
majority of Saudi Shi'a follow Iranian-born but Iraq-based
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, with the rest divided among a
number of other ayatollahs.


13. (S) The current role and activity of Saudi Hezbollah
remains a question mark about which we have been able to
develop only limited information. Some contacts claims the
group no longer exists, but prevailing evidence suggests that
it encompasses a small group of religious figures who believe
in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, emulate Iran's Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i as their marja', but have few
current followers. Our contacts report that its leaders are
not very active politically, do not take their cue from the
Iranian regime, and do not espouse violence (at least not
currently, in all three cases). While we continue to seek
additional information on Saudi Hezbollah, what limited
knowledge we have supports the views espoused by our
contacts. We do not know of any anti-SAG or anti-American
violence ascribed to any Saudi Shi'a group since the Khobar
Towers bombing in 1996; at least one of Saudi Hezbollah's
purported leaders has participated in the National Dialogue
(suggesting that the SAG does not consider the movement or
the individual as much of a threat and that he supports the
Dialogue's concept); and we have heard that other Shi'a
leaders have, over time, convinced Saudi Hezbollah's leaders
that violence would not help the Shi'a cause. We cannot rule
out the possibility that Iran or its proxies could recruit
and train small Saudi Shi'a cells to carry out disruptive or
terrorist activities. However, we cannot see such cells
developing a broad following given the present Shi'a
leadership and their strategy unless there are major changes
in the regional political landscape.

--------------
The Impact of Iraq
--------------


14. (C) The Saudi Shi'a follow events in Iraq with intense
interest. In stark contrast to non-Shi'a Saudis, most Shi'a
express support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq despite the
current strife and violence. Many Shi'a contacts have
explicitly thanked ConOffs for the U.S. role in freeing their
coreligionists in Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppressive
regime and helping them obtain political power commensurate
with their numbers. Saudi Shi'a feel deep emotional and
religious ties to Iraq and look forward to visiting Shi'a
holy sites and participating in religious festivals there as
soon as the security situation permits. The expanded
political and religious freedoms for Shi'a in Iraq have
empowered Saudi Shi'a to push further than they previously
dared against SAG restrictions on religious freedom and civil
society. For example, contacts have linked expanded Ashura
celebrations in Qatif, as well as more cautious expressions
of Shi'a identity elsewhere in the Kingdom, directly to the
new situation in Iraq.


15. (S) However, although Saudi Shi'a are certainly aware
that Shi'a form a significant part of the population on the
Arab side of the gulf, to date we have seen no indication
that the Saudi Shi'a have any realistic vision of a pan-Arab
Shi'a political block. Any such realization of an Arab
"Shi'a crescent" would have to be led by Iraqi Shi'a, and at
this point, as several contacts have noted to us, domestic
challenges occupy their full attention. Saudi Shi'a are not
currently traveling to Iraq in significant numbers, and
political and religious contacts between Saudi and Iraqi
Shi'a post-Iraqi liberation, while they have occurred, appear
to have been limited to date.

-------------- ---
The Future of the Shi'a Strategy and U.S. Policy
-------------- ---


16. (S) Will the Shi'a strategy of seeking to realize their
rights as Saudi citizens by engaging the SAG hold firm over
the next several years? We believe that it will, as long as
the SAG does not backtrack on reform through a change in
policy or leadership and/or as long as there are not
compelling external pressures or influences that change their
calculus of interests. Although Shi'a leaders have
frequently expressed to us their frustration with the slow
pace of reform and with the continued discrimination against
the Shi'a community, they have invested a great deal in the
strategy of engagement and it is slowly bearing fruit in the
form of some advances in religious freedom (in Qatif at
least) and civil society. If the SAG does backtrack, e.g. by
clamping down harshly on unlicensed civil society
organizations or undoing the limited measure of religious
freedom recently gained by the Shi'a, or if other elements of
the current equilibrium change, the strategic calculations of
the Shi'a leadership could change as well. While we have not
seen any signs of radical young Shi'a leaders who disagree
with the goals or tactics of the current leadership, such
leaders could emerge if sectarian violence initiated by Sunni
extremists spreads uncontained to Saudi Arabia, if the
employment situation for young Shi'a worsens, if Ayatollah
Sistani is succeeded by a more radical cleric as marja' to
most Saudi Shi'a, or if conflict breaks out with Iran.


17. (S) The argument outlined above, that the Saudi Shi'a
remain committed to a strategic choice to push for
realization of their rights as citizens from within the Saudi
system and, under current conditions, do not entertain any
serious external political loyalties, has several important
implications for U.S. policymakers. Most Saudi Shi'a
currently see their interests as directly aligned with U.S.
interests in key respects, particularly with the U.S.
interest in promoting participatory governance and human
rights in the Middle East as an antidote to extremism. They
appreciate any pressure the U.S. puts on the Saudi government
to reform, although they wish the U.S. would increase this
pressure and worry that other interests, such as regional
stability and security of the oil supply, cause the U.S. to
draw back from urging greater steps toward political reform.


18. (S) The most important implication of this argument is
therefore that it is unlikely that the vast majority of Saudi
Shi'a would support Iranian or Iranian-proxy interference in
Saudi Arabia as long as the current equilibrium holds,
particularly the promise for gradual reform. King Abdullah
embodies this promise of reform, particularly for the Shi'a,
and with good cause: no less a figure than Prince Talal bin
Abdulaziz told the Ambassador that King Abdullah has decided
to give Saudi more religious freedom as part of an effort to
better incorporate them into Saudi national life. By
supporting the reform process, the U.S. is also playing a
role, an important one in Shi'a eyes, in maintaining the
current equilibrium. (Comment: As suggested in ref C, the
USG can certainly use SAG concern about potential Iranian
influence as one means of urging the SAG to grant fuller
rights to its Shi'a citizens. End comment.) A secondary,
more tactical implication is that the Saudi Shi'a currently
make natural allies in U.S. efforts to promote political
reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia. Post is already
directing some programmatic resources in this direction and
will explore this potential further in a later cable.

--------------
Sources
--------------


19. (SBU) This cable draws on hundreds of conversations over
the past eight months between CG, PolOff, and PAO and a
diverse group of Saudi Shi'a contacts, as well as on related
observations and on publicly available sources such as Saudi
Shi'a websites and other reports. We have reported many of
these conversations and observations in previous cables
(NOTAL),including RIYADH 964, RIYADH 179, RIYADH 42, 2005
RIYADH 9142 (reform, Iran, Iraq); RIYADH 3306, RIYADH 1741,
RIYADH 1380, 2005 RIYADH 7589, 2003 RIYADH 2698 (reform);
RIYADH 1706, RIYADH 1377, RIYADH 1252 (civil society); RIYADH
1461, RIYADH 280, RIYADH 275 (Shi'a leadership); 2005 RIYADH
9048, 2005 RIYADH 8565 (Iraq, Iran); RIYADH 1053 (Iraq); 2005
RIYADH 8741 (Iran); RIYADH 2840 (reactions to Mubarak); and
2005 RIYADH 8323 (EP governance).

(APPROVED: KINCANNON)
GFOELLER