Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RIODEJANEIRO234
2006-05-24 16:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Cable title:  

Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas

Tags:  EPET ENRG ECON PGOV PREL BR 
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VZCZCXRO6506
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHRI #0234/01 1441641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241641Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2431
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0282
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0297
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0454
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2428
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4014
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0302
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0309
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0149
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0101
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0127
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0064
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0103
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIO DE JANEIRO 000234 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND WHA/AND
NSC FOR CRONIN
DOE FOR SLADISLAW, GWARD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RGREENBURG, DMORONESE
STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD
AID/W FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas

REFS: A) LA PAZ 1316 and previous

B) BRASILIA 888 and previous
C) SAO PAULO 512

(U) This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified; please protect
accordingly.

-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIO DE JANEIRO 000234

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND WHA/AND
NSC FOR CRONIN
DOE FOR SLADISLAW, GWARD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RGREENBURG, DMORONESE
STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD
AID/W FOR LAC/AA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas

REFS: A) LA PAZ 1316 and previous

B) BRASILIA 888 and previous
C) SAO PAULO 512

(U) This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified; please protect
accordingly.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) In a recent conversation with Consul General,
Petrobras officials indicated that they did not anticipate
that the Bolivia-Brazil crisis will lead to any short or
medium term disruption in gas supply to Brazil. Petrobras,
however, will accelerate the development of gas reserves in
the Santos Basin and may turn to fuel oil as a substitute for
natural gas imports. Our interlocutors noted that although
Petrobras expected Morales to nationalize Bolivia's natural
gas industry, the unfriendly way it was conducted, with
troops occupying the company's facilities, was a big
surprise. Meanwhile, the price of gas imports from Bolivia
remains to be negotiated. Our Petrobras contacts further
stated that the Bolivian nationalization, which was spurring
the Brazilian government to develop its domestic gas supplies
with the goal of gas self-sufficiency, had undermined
Venezuelan President Chavez's planned gas mega-pipeline to
Brazil and Argentina. End Summary.


2. (U) On May 15, Consul General, Political Officer and
Pol/Econ Specialist met with Petrobras officials, Edimilson
Antonio Dato Sant'Anna, Director of Operations and Logistics,
and Heitor Miranda Madeira da Silva, Executive Manager, to
discuss the Petrobras-Bolivia gas situation. In accordance
with the nationalization decree, Bolivian President Evo
Morales sent military troops on May 1 to occupy foreign oil
and gas fields and installations, and gave foreign companies
six months to agree to new contracts or leave Bolivia (ref
A). Petrobras representatives indicated that while the
company was fully aware of Morales' campaign promise to

nationalize the oil and gas industry, it had been expecting a
transition period with negotiations, not the occupation of
their facilities by the Bolivian military.

--------------
The Flow of Gas from Bolivia
--------------


3. (U) Petrobras is the largest foreign investor in Bolivia
with USD 1.5 billion invested there. According to the two
Petrobras officials, the company's activities in Bolivia
generate yearly revenues of USD 1.2 billion, equivalent to
about 15% of Bolivia's GDP. Prior to the nationalization
decree, USD 600 million of this total had been destined for
Bolivian government coffers, although now the decree would
raise the government's take to USD 850 million.


4. (U) Sant'Anna and da Silva stated that Brazil's daily
production of natural gas is 10 million cubic meters and
daily imports from Bolivia are 26 million cubic meters. This
total daily consumption of 36 million cubic meters is divided
as follows: 25.2 for the distributors, 6.3 for the
thermoelectric plants, and 4.5 for the refineries. (Note:
official GoB statistics from the National Petroleum Agency
paint a somewhat different picture, with Bolivian gas

RIO DE JAN 00000234 002 OF 003


accounting for between 43% and 47% of Brazil's daily
consumption.) According to the Rio de Janeiro State
Secretary for Energy, the state is partially protected from

SIPDIS
any shortfall in the supply of natural gas from Bolivia.
Only 20 percent of the natural gas consumed in the state of
Rio comes from Bolivia, while 80 percent comes from the
Campos basin, north of Rio de Janeiro.

--------------
Alternatives for Brazil
--------------


5. (U) Although our interlocutors declared that "there is a
general consensus" that Brazil will not suffer any
disruptions in its gas supply, they also observed that
Petrobras was already studying alternatives to substitute
natural gas imports -- from conversion of industrial
facilities (steel, glass and ceramics in particular) to fuel
oil from gas, acceleration of the production of natural gas
from the Santos basin, and development of alternative sources
of energy (biodiesel, ethanol).


6. (SBU) Sant'Anna stated that Petrobras' strategic plan
already had contemplated accelerating the development of
natural gas from the Santos Basin. Initially, the timetable
predicts daily production for 2008 in the range of 8 to 9
million cubic meters, after completion and installation of
the Mexilhao platform. By the end of 2010, the company
estimates daily production would reach 30 million cubic
meters. On May 18, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council
(CNPE),an advisory body to President Lula that includes the
Ministers of Energy and Agriculture and Petrobras' President,
approved the accelerated Santos Basin development plan. To
reach the target production levels, Petrobras estimates
investments on the order of USD 16 billion, with the majority
of this investment occurring between 2007 and 2011, when the
construction of the ten platforms necessary for the
completion of the project, will take place. (Comment. In
the past, a number of independent analysts have noted that
the notion that Petrobras will be able to get any significant
amount of gas from the Santos Basin prior to 2010 is
extremely optimistic. End Comment.)


7. (U) A second alternative would be to substitute natural
gas imports with fuel oil. Petrobras' total natural gas
imports are equivalent (boe - barrels of oil equivalent) to
100 thousand barrels of oil per day. In an interview with
the press, Petrobras President Jose Sergio Gabrielli said
that the company has the capacity to substitute all the
natural gas imported from Bolivia with domestically produced
oil. Petrobras exported an average of 250 thousand barrels
of oil during the first three months of 2006, and could
easily re-direct part of this volume to domestic consumption.
Separately, on May 18 Petrobras announced that in September
2005 it had begun a pilot project in which it converted a
(relatively small scale) thermal power generation plant to
burn any one of several fuels, including gas, fuel oil,
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or ethanol.

--------------
The Need for Compensation
--------------


8. (SBU) The Petrobras officials believed the company would
be indemnified adequately for any losses in Bolivia, based on

RIO DE JAN 00000234 003 OF 003


the agreements it had previously signed with the Bolivian
government. Petrobras will fight for its rights, Sant'Anna
said, noting that the company has maintained a tough public
stance and will not make further investments in Bolivia due
to the 82 percent tax. Brazil needs to give Bolivia a dose
of reality, our interlocutors declared.

--------------
Alternatives for Bolivia
--------------


9. (SBU) According to Petrobras officials, it would take a
minimum of five years for Bolivia to build up alternatives to
the gas exports to Brazil. Were Bolivia somehow to identify
new export customers, it could construct a new gas pipeline
or a plant to liquefy the gas (LNG) for export. Another
option would be to construct a petrochemical plant.

--------------
Venezuelan (and Brazilian) Pipedreams
--------------


10. (SBU) Sant'Anna also stated that major petroleum projects
in South America are in danger now, especially the project to
construct a ten thousand-kilometer gas pipeline connecting
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. He then turned his fire on
Lula's foreign policy, arguing that President Lula's dream of
promoting greater South American integration, with Brazil as
the continent's leader, was totally impracticable now in view
of the situation in Bolivia.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (SBU) Petrobras is mounting a multi-pronged effort to
persuade the Bolivians that Brazil has alternatives to
Bolivian gas in both the short and long term. Some of the
recent press publicizing these options doubtless is more
negotiating strategy than reality. Brazil's ethanol
supplies, for example, already are strained meeting the
domestic demand for automotive fuel, and would not serve as a
serious alternative for thermal power generation.
Development of the Santos basin, while promising, is likely
to take longer to yield significant quantities of gas than
Petrobras posits. Brazil does, however, have sufficient oil
should industry need to convert from gas to another fuel.
Most importantly, there is little doubt that the GoB and
Petrobras have decided on a gas self-sufficiency strategy and
will move consistently in that direction. This will have
repercussions not only for Bolivia, but for any other
prospective suppliers.


12. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmEmbassy Brasilia.

ATKINS