4/26-27 DEFENSE TALKS: ICELAND LOOKS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000150

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSLO FOR DATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS NATO IC
SUBJECT: 4/26-27 DEFENSE TALKS: ICELAND LOOKS FOR
POLITICAL HELP

REF: A. (A) REYKJAVIK 107

B. (B) REYKJAVIK 140

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL VAN VOORST, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: EUCOM briefed Iceland Chief Defense
Negotiator Albert Jonsson 4/26 on the Draft Concept Plan (the
Conplan) for the Defense of Iceland. Jonsson responded 4/27
that the Conplan was fundamentally acceptable as a plan but
did not go far enough toward meeting Iceland's political
needs. He set out a list of references Reykjavik proposes to
include in a U.S.-Icelandic agreement that could be used by
the GOI to underpin their assurance to Icelanders that the
U.S. commitment continues even without a base. This
agreement would include references that Jonsson believes are
necessary to help the government make the case to the public
that the U.S. commitment to defend Iceland remains credible.
While the U.S. studies the Icelandic defense proposals,
working-level talks will continue on transition issues in
preparation for 9/06 closure of Naval Air Station Keflavik
(NASKEF). End summary.

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Conplan 4287-06 and its Discontents
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2. (C) In its briefing to the Icelanders April 26, the U.S.
European Command team led by RADM Richard Gallagher stressed
that the EUCOM plan is not fully developed, that we welcome
Icelandic comment, and explained the approval system as the
plan moves up to SecDef. At several points in the discussion
the U.S. side urged the Icelanders to take advantage of the
intelligence sharing and other proposals that we offered in
the March meeting (ref A).


3. (C) Ambassador Albert Jonsson, the Icelandic delegation
head, commented on the Conplan in a follow-up session April

27. He said that his side was disappointed with the plan as
measured against Icelandic expectations of a U.S. commitment
to a "robust" and "visible" replacement for the four F-15
fighters. While noting that the Conplan "has an internal
logic and is consistent," Jonsson said the defense plan as it
now stands is insufficient politically to reassure the
Icelandic public, parliament, and ministers that Iceland is
adequately defended.


4. (C) He proposed that the defense plan be supplemented with
a "conclusion" signed at the SecDef level and issued in
conjunction with the completion of the plan. The conclusion
would contain references to:

1) 1951 Defense Agreement.

2) Conplan 4287-06.

3) The resources and capabilities that stand behind the
Conplan. Wording would not need to be specific as to what
units might be deployed to Iceland but should cite the range
of capabilities that the U.S. has available and where they
are sourced.

4) How the U.S. would provide for Iceland's air defense.
This would not need to specify what units might be deployed
if the U.S. were to continue operation of the radar stations.

5) What personnel and facilities would be maintained at
Keflavik to assist forces redeploying to Iceland.

6) Visible manifestations of the bilateral defense
relationship, whether exercises or deployments or other ways
of 'showing the flag.'

7) The option for Iceland to call on U.S. forces to defend
against terrorist threats and attacks. In this regard
Jonsson noted that the 1951 Defense Agreement is not specific
in saying that it applies only to state threats (as the
Conplan does); and cited NATO's Article 5 invocation after
September 11 as evidence that military forces can properly
respond to terrorist attacks.

8) What is envisaged with respect to law
enforcement/non-military security cooperation. (Note:
Ministry of Justice Deputy Permanent Secretary Stefan
Eiriksson added that Reykjavik wishes to prioritize
intelligence cooperation as described by the U.S. side in

March and hopes to enhance cooperation between the U.S. and
Icelandic Coast Guards. He announced that the National
Commissioner of Police and the Icelandic Coast Guard would
contact the Embassy in early May to initiate collaboration in
these areas as well as on training and non-proliferation
activities. End note.)


5. (C) As to the Conplan itself, Jonsson asked for some
specific changes and raised some questions:

-- pp. 1 and 2: Refer to "1951 Defense Agreement" or
"bilateral 1951 Defense Agreement" rather than "Defense of
Iceland."
-- p. 9: Delete "US mission will not include enforcing
peacetime air sovereignty."
-- p. 10: To "GOI will continue to provide access to its
territory," add "in accordance with the 1951 Defense
Agreement."
-- p. 10: Why is "GOI will maintain Keflavik as an operating
international airport" not a redundant assumption if the GOI
is providing access to its territory? (Jonsson said we could
leave this assumption in if we believed it did in fact add
something.)
-- p. 21: Could the U.S. and Iceland undertake to defend
Iceland bilaterally without NATO having to invoke collective
defense? (Reassured that it could, Jonsson accepted the text
as drafted.)

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Follow-up
--------------

6. (C) Jonsson stated that the GOI would like to come to the
next bilateral meeting with a draft text for this
"conclusory" document. He hoped this meeting could take
place very soon; Ambassador van Voorst said the U.S. would
take this Icelandic proposal under consideration. In the
meantime, both sides agreed, the governments should continue
cooperation on the technical and practical aspects of
disposing of NASKEF assets and ensuring smooth functioning of
Keflavik International Airport after September 30, 2006.
Jonsson reiterated five areas of Icelandic concern in this
regard:

1) U.S. military footprint: What will remain after 9/30?

2) What is the timetable for transition?

3) In the event that few or no military forces remain, how
will the U.S. maintain and monitor its installations in the
Agreed Areas?

4) How will the U.S. carry out its host nation duties for
NATO?

5) How does the U.S. wish to dispose of the special
communications installation at Grindavik?

The U.S. side assured the GOI that we are working on these
issues and will answer the Icelandic questions as soon as
possible.


7. (C) Comment: Jonsson and his government want our help in
reassuring the Icelandic public as concretely and believably
as possible that the U.S. commitment to defend Iceland
remains intact despite the pullout of the planes. Iceland's
success in negotiating two agreed minutes with us during the
1990's is probably at the bottom of this new proposal for
greater definition in our military and security relationship.
We may at some later point choose to seriously consider this
option -- but before reaching for this device, we should
explore all options of helping the GOI get the political
cover it needs without the cost of the time, effort, and
legal complexities of a signed understanding. End comment.
van Voorst