APRIL 2006 DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS: ICELAND'S RED

C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000140

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSLO FOR DATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR MARR MASS IC
SUBJECT: APRIL 2006 DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS: ICELAND'S RED
LINES

REF: A. (A) REYKJAVIK 118


B. (B) KOSNETT-STATE/DOD E-MAILS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL VAN VOORST, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions with Icelandic Government
personnel and the first three meetings of a bilateral working
group managing base closure issues offer indications of GOI
expectations for the EUCOM briefing 4/26 in Reykjavik.
Although the Icelandic leadership understands the classified
nature of the EUCOM plan to defend Iceland, they are looking
for a briefing that is concrete enough to allow ministers to
explain its basic elements to a skeptical public. With Naval
Air Station Keflavik (NASKEF) preparing for closure, it is
also urgent that we come to a swift understanding with the
Icelanders on transition issues to include status of the
Agreed Area, IADS, environment, real estate, and airport
operations. End summary.


2. (C) Since the last round of bilateral defense talks March
31 (reftel),Ambassador, DCM, and poloff have canvassed
senior Icelandic diplomats for their reactions and hopes for
the next round, now scheduled for April 26. In addition, a
working group of Icelandic and Embassy, NASKEF, and Iceland
Defense Force officials has met three times to discuss
nuts-and-bolts aspects of the U.S. military's departure.
Post's findings and recommendations:

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The Plan
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3. (C) The plan to defend Iceland after the withdrawal of the
combat aircraft that EUCOM presents will need to meet the
following criteria if it is to respond to Icelandic concerns
about the optics of the bilateral defense relationship as
well as about security:

-- Intelligibility: Briefers should keep in mind that
Icelanders have limited competence in military matters, and
no one at their side of the table this week will have
military experience. We must take care to facilitate
Icelandic engagement through plain speaking in layman's terms.

-- Specificity: Foreign Minister Geir Haarde and other
government ministers must be able to reassure the public that
there is a blueprint for Iceland's defense. GOI officials
understand that part of the blueprint will necessarily be
classified, but must also to be able to express confidence
that our defense plan for Iceland is reasonably concrete --
and to disclose enough details to make it credible to a
public accustomed to the very "visible defense" offered by
the departing aircraft and base personnel.

-- Input: The GOI wants and needs to be seen to have had
input into the plan. Icelandic chief negotiator Albert
Jonsson and FM Haarde have made it clear that the Icelandic
government expects to comment on and perhaps contribute ideas
to any U.S. plan before it is finalized.

-- Air cover: The Icelanders still want force posture that
is "visible and robust," i.e. planes here at least some of
the time and, ideally, some facilities left here to service
them. In addition, they want a schedule of exercises.

-- Radars: The GOI insists on continued operation of the
NATO-controlled Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).

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Transition Issues
--------------

4. (C) The bilateral Transition Work Group that has been
meeting to handle the practicalities of base drawdown (ref B)
has identified several areas of U.S.-Icelandic disagreement
that we need to address promptly, before the Icelandic
position hardens to a point where negotiation will become
impossible. The main issues are:

-- Agreed Area: The GOI believes the USG is responsible for
continued utility costs, maintenance of, and security for the
Agreed Area even if we withdraw our forces and that there is
no point to the Defense Agreement if we do not accept this
view. They have suggested that any U.S. actions must be
approved by the NATO Infrastructure Committee.

-- Environment/real estate: The Icelanders want to move
quickly on land return and need to be told whether the U.S.
will ask for residual value payments (note: which they have
said they do not wish to pay; end note) and who should be
responsible for environmental and UXO cleanup (note: they
argue it should be us; end note).

-- Airport operations: The Icelanders want us to hand over
equipment needed to maintain the airfield; we have thus far
said that the U.S. is open to providing the equipment but
that the question of whether and how much we would expect in
payment is an open one. The MFA has promised a formal letter
of request for specific equipment.

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Comment/Action Requested
--------------

5. (C) The bilateral talks scheduled for April 26 are a key
event for the Icelandic government. The EUCOM team must
deliver the briefing on "the plan" that they promised the
Icelanders March 31, at the risk of damaging our credibility
and undercutting our well-wishers in the Icelandic
government. The EUCOM team must come to Iceland with the
object not just of briefing the government but of soliciting
Reykjavik's input. We need to tell the government enough
about how we would defend this NATO ally so that FM Haarde
and his colleagues can say they have confidence that the U.S.
has considered possible threats and knows how we would deal
with them. On another track, we also need to reach
interagency agreement on transition issues very soon and get
to work on implementing our decisions.


6. (C) On base transition issues, we recommend that an
interagency team empowered formally to negotiate -- not just
to brief on U.S. views -- be dispatched as early in May as
feasible.
van Voorst