NLD IN CENTRAL BURMA: TREADING WATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000946

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD IN CENTRAL BURMA: TREADING WATER

REF: RANGOON 287

Classified By: P/E: Mark B. Taylor; for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Facing repressive measures by regional
authorities, the NLD struggles to maintain minimal activities
in the key central divisions of Mandalay and Magwe. Elder
party leaders shrugged off the effects of the SPDC's public
campaign to coerce NLD resignations, but hope for "outside
help" to rekindle Burma's dispirited opposition. The GOB
closely watches NLD youth and students and prevents them from
organizing or communicating and coordinating with the NLD's
leadership. NLD leaders in central Burma highlighted growing
involvement of USDA in intimidation efforts. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) During a June 22-23 visit to Mandalay, Emboffs met
with five members of the NLD's Mandalay Division Committee.
The Mandalay Committee members voiced their intention to
maintain limited party activities, but expressed concern over
moves by the SPDC to tighten control through the state-made
mass mobilization organization, Union Solidarity Development
Association (USDA). Chairman Bo Zan recounted personal
attacks on him and other NLD members by suspected USDA
members on motorcycle. (reftel).

3.(C) The NLD members expressed keen interest in the UN
Security Council resolution proposed by the USG. In
particular, they asked how the resolution would fare with
Chinese and Russian opposition. Emboff acknowledged that PRC
and Russian resistance presents a challenge to the UNSC
initiative and noted that discussions on the resolution were
ongoing in New York and other countries. The NLD members
noted the regime's alarm over the prospective resolution and
expressed hope that the initiative would succeed. According
to the NLD officials, Burmese people, too afraid to speak out
themselves, put the burden of political dissent on the NLD,
which sees "outside help" as essential to break the political
stalemate. Chairman U Bo Zan cited many examples in history
when Burmese rulers sought outside assistance in the fight
for self-determination.

4.(C). The NLD elders then discussed the government's public
campaign touting the resignations of key NLD members in
Mandalay Division. Chairman U Bo Zan declared that most of
the resigning NLD members were unknown to the party leaders
in the Division. In a recent group of 40 resignations in the
Mandalay area, only two of the "members" were known to be
active, added Daw Win Mya Mya. "They are lying," concluded
the NLD officials, who expressed confidence that this public
campaign would not have a serious effect on the NLD. Later,
however, the NLD leaders spoke about the deleterious effects
of the government's efforts, often through the USDA, to lure
NLD members away from the party by offering bribes and perks,
such as permission to engage in illegal businesses. The
regime promises "hundreds of lakhs" of kyat (equivalent to
thousands of dollars) to some NLD officials, they complained.
The elder politicians also inquired about the future of the
former U.S. Consulate in Mandalay, which they hoped would be
reopened to represent America and indirectly help the NLD.

5.(C) The five elder officials noted that they continue to
hold monthly party meetings in private residences and issue
statements to the international media and external
supporters. The NLD office in Mandalay remains closed,
although its sign remains. Party Secretary U Kan Htun
described how party members repainted the fading and
paint-chipped sign over the office at night without taking
the sign down. Removal and replacement of the sign, claimed
the Secretary, would have broken a regulation against
erecting new political party signs.

TAKING THE DEBAYIN ATTACK TO THE HAGUE?
--------------

6.(C) Daw Win Mya Mya revisited the violent USDA attack on
Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi and her entourage in Debayin on May 30,
2003, showing Emboff the scars remaining from wounds she
suffered in that attack. Not only has the SPDC failed to
investigate the attack, noted the Party's Mandalay Secretary,
but its security personnel arrested her and others who
survived the attack, releasing them with a warning that "you
have not been interviewed." NLD members infer from this
warning that it could be used by authorities a pretext to
re-arrest and "investigate" them at any time. Win Mya Mya
then revealed a proposal developed by the Mandalay Committee,
to bring the Debayin incident before the International Court
of Justice in The Hague. She noted that the drivers of the
vehicles ferrying USDA members to the site, who she intimated
are sympathetic to the NLD, are available as eye witnesses to
the violence and killings.

7.(C) If the international media revisits the Debayin
massacre in the international media, and holds the SPDC
accountable, the NLD Mandalay office hopes to rekindle a
national uprising, Win Mya Mya disclosed. The Mandalay NLD
office is in a "pre-assessment" phase, according to Win Mya
May, and seeks guidance on how to present the case to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the highest
prospects of success. She acknowledged that the Mandalay
Committee had not yet raised this proposal with the NLD's
National Committee in Rangoon, but will do so soon. She also
opined that the proposal, which would undoubtedly raise the
SPDC's ire, might not yield the National Committee's approval
since the "uncles" in Rangoon seek to encourage contacts with
the regime.


LIKE THIEVES THEY CHASE US
--------------


8. (C) Daw Win Mya Mya noted that the Mandalay Committee's
members are watched more closely now. She predicted that
there would be security personnel waiting for the five NLD
officials after the meeting and she was proven correct. She
described the recently increased monitoring of NLD officials'
movements by security personnel, who she claimed are assisted
by USDA members trained in surveillance, by saying "they act
like thieves, chasing us everywhere."


TIGHT CONTROL ON NLD IN MAGWE
--------------

9.(C) Magwe Division, one of the country's largest sources of
agricultural output and recruits for the Army, is not known
for tolerating political dissent. The Division capital was
one of Burma's few cities that saw no significant public
protests in the summer of 1988. Magwe NLD Committee
officers, contacted in Rangoon during the commemoration of
Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday, claimed to be "rebuilding" and
focused on strengthening the Party's role in Magwe, but they
asked that Emboffs not contact them while visiting Magwe, as
such a visit would provoke additional suppression of the
Party's activities in the state. Emboffs found that other
local figures, such as a politically active monk with no
direct ties to the NLD, were also reluctant to meet them
during their visit.

MAGWE NLD YOUTH DISPIRITED, REALISTIC
--------------

10.(C) On June 27 Emboffs met in Magwe town with five
representatives of the NLD Youth in the residence of one of
the "Youth" who had been imprisoned for several years
following the 1988 uprising. Three are now in their late
thirties or early forties; two were in their twenties. As a
group, they disparaged the new generation of students,
describing them as politically inert, "with eyes and ears
shut." They admitted, however, that some younger students
still "see the light" and get involved despite the greater
risks. The older students credited international support for
the opposition in Burma but stated that the onus for pushing
the regime was on those inside the country. They expressed
appreciation for meeting with a USG official, and stressed
that they are under unprecedented control now. Parents are
afraid that their children's' political behavior could result
in a student being barred from matriculation exams or
entering university. One of the younger students noted that
parents now get nervous when students listen to RFA or DVB at
home.

11.(C) They described a new, lower threshold of dissent that
now provokes a harsh response from the regime. For example,
the NLD youth cited a modest 2006 action by current Magwe
University students. The students protested a hike in the
cost of bus transport from the center of Magwe to the new
campus on the far outskirts of town. Police broke up the
protest and expelled ten students identified as leaders.

12.(C) Illustrating the bleak prospects for Burma's youth
today, one student said that, of his two daughters in their
twenties, one has graduated university but can only find work
selling snacks from a roadside store. The other daughter for
the past year attended one of the SPDC's "computer colleges"
where all the computers are inoperable. She has never
operated a functioning computer. "What future do my
daughters face?" he asked in despair.

13.(C) The Magwe youth claimed the forced NLD resignation
campaign has yet to hit Magwe Division, but they acknowledged
significant official pressure, particularly on students, to
join the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA),the
regime's mass member organization. Some high-performing
students who refused to join the USDA, have found themselves
inexplicably locked out of matriculation exams and unable to
get into universities, claimed one of the youth. In
addition, the USDA has developed a security function, claimed
the youth. These USDA informers, who assist the regular and
Special Branch police in keeping tabs on and suppressing
potential political activities, are part of an informal
organization known as the "people's militia" which receives
some training in fighting, claimed the youth.

14.(C) Comment: Continued repression by the regime against
NLD in the Burmese heartland will likely continue. Regime
intimidation tactics in these areas get less international
press coverage, giving local authorities more latitude. In a
tightly closed society, the NLD can do little to put the
spotlight on the ongoing repression, which is why they
welcome visits by Embassy officers, even though they expect
even greater harassment. The most troubling trend we see
appearing nationwide is the increasing use of USDA cadres as
another element of intimidation, in addition to the police
and military. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA