NLD'S FLEXIBLE OFFER TO THE BURMESE REGIME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000246

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM NLD
SUBJECT: NLD'S FLEXIBLE OFFER TO THE BURMESE REGIME

REF: A. RANGOON 207

B. RANGOON 110

Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: NLD leaders have low expectations that the
Burmese regime will respond favorably to their February 12
proposal to convene the Parliament elected in 1990 in return
for the opposition's recognition of the ruling regime as a
transitional government. The NLD is nonetheless encouraged
by the positive reaction to their proposal among diverse
opposition groups--and they say that they have informed Aung
San Suu Kyi and she supports their effort. The NLD leaders
view their new initiative as a "give and take" offer and are
willing to negotiate further with the SPDC. Some ethnic
leaders have grumbled that the NLD did not consult with them
in advance, but NLD leaders insist that all democratic
opposition parties support the overall reconciliation effort.
We recommend that Washington officials cite the NLD proposal
at appropriate opportunities as a positive gesture and
possible mechanism to begin national reconciliation. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) National League for Democracy (NLD) Chairman U Aung
Shwe and party spokesman U Lwin told us on February 21 that
the ruling military regime has not yet reacted to the party's
recent proposal to convene the Parliament elected in 1990 in
return for the NLD's recognition of the SPDC as a de jure
transitional government (ref A). The party leaders have low
expectations that the SPDC will respond favorably, if at all,
but they are nonetheless encouraged by the positive reaction
to their proposal by leaders of domestic opposition and exile
groups.

EVER-FRAGILE UNITY


3. (C) The NLD unveiled their new proposal for reconciliation
at the democratic opposition's February 12 commemoration of
Union Day (ref A). Despite the outward appearance of close
unity among the NLD and other political parties there,
several ethnic pro-democracy leaders have quietly criticized
the NLD effort. A spokesperson for the United Nationalities
Alliance (UNA),for example, complained to us that the NLD
had not consulted in advance with ethnic politicians,
including the democratic opposition's multi-ethnic Committee
to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP).


4. (C) The top two NLD leaders acknowledged to us that "a
few" ethnic leaders were displeased that the NLD had not
consulted with them in advance of the announcement. They
stressed, however, that while the ethnics had issues with the
process, they stood united on the proposal itself as a means
to initiate a dialogue with the regime. The NLD leaders
convoked a meeting of the CRPP on February 22 in order to
discuss the proposal more fully with ethnic leaders.


5. (C) U Aung Shwe said that NLD leaders kept a very close
hold on the proposal prior to February 12 to avert an advance
crackdown by the SPDC. The regime generals, he said, do not
recognize the legitimacy of the multi-party CRPP and would
"most certainly have taken action if they perceived an
attempt to build a stronger coalition with the ethnics." The
two NLD leaders said they had not even informed the rest of
their own party's executive committee until one week prior to
the announcement.

A VIEW FROM THE NORTH


6. (C) Kachin ethnic leader, and peace negotiator, Rev. Saboi
Jum told the Charge on February 16 that he would like to
follow up on the NLD's proposal by suggesting he could
promote dialogue between regime leaders and the democratic
opposition using the National Convention process. He
welcomed ongoing international pressure on the regime and
agreed with the NLD that ASEAN should play a mediation role.

7. (C) The Charge called the National Convention a sham that
had no credibility. She asked Saboi Jum what problems he had
with the NLD proposal of everyone discussing the way forward.
Saboi Jum described the NLD proposal as "confused," but
offered no specifics. He stressed, however, the importance
of a role for local groups and organizations to bring the NLD
and the military closer together. Comment: Although Saboi
Jum has played a prominent role in previous SPDC negotiations
with ethnic insurgents, the democratic opposition views him
as close to the regime and would not likely seek his
involvement in their initiative. End Comment.


8. (C) Ethnic sources told poloff that the NLD proposal
resembles a similar effort undertaken after the 1990
legislative election. The then-leader of the military regime
(SLORC),General Saw Maung, dismissed the proposal at the
time as "useless" and jailed the MPs-elect who had drafted
it. The SPDC carried out another massive round up of
MPs-elect after the NLD floated a similar proposal in 1998.

A "GIVE AND TAKE" APPROACH


9. (S) The two NLD leaders confided that they had informed
the party's General Secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi, prior to
announcing the proposal, via her personal physician during
his most recent medical visit to her Rangoon compound
(STRICTLY PROTECT; ref B). The two leaders said that they
had not received a direct return message from her, but
intimated that ASSK had endorsed the proposal. They added
that ASSK "is supportive of all NLD efforts to achieve a
peaceful dialogue." U Aung Shwe also affirmed that ASSK
remains under house arrest at her compound, where the NLD
continues to deliver food on a daily basis.


10. (C) U Aung Shwe described the NLD proposal as a "give and
take" effort. "We are not making any demands of the regime,"
he said, "we are simply undertaking every effort to indicate
that we are prepared to have an open dialogue." He noted
that in unveiling the proposal the NLD had cited April 17 as
a date by which the party hoped to hear from the regime.
"This is not a deadline," added U Aung Shwe, "but rather a
polite suggestion that the regime use the Burmese New Year to
accept our offer to negotiate."

U TIN OO REMAINS UNDER HOUSE ARREST


11. (C) U Aung Shwe confirmed international media reports
that the GOB had recently extended NLD Vice Chairman U Tin
Oo's house detention for another twelve months. According to
U Tin Oo's wife, who frequently visits NLD headquarters,
police officials arrived at his home last week with an order
signed by the Minister of Home Affairs. The order cited
provisions of Burmese security law as justification for his
continued house arrest.

COMMENT: AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT UNITING THE OPPOSITION?


12. (C) The challenge of forging unity among the democratic
opposition remains a serious pitfall. The democratic
opposition must contend with a regime intent on thwarting
coalition building among political and ethnic groups. The
NLD and ethnic opposition parties share a common enemy, the
military regime, but little else unifies them. Historic
grievances among them have resulted in constant bickering
over process and details.


13. (C) Nonetheless, the vast majority of the democratic
opposition supports the substance of the new NLD initiative
to preserve the integrity of the 1990 election and to use the
election results as means to effect a transition. Any
agreement among all the opposition forces represents progress
which we will encourage. U Aung Shwe and U Lwin told us that
they would welcome U.S. support for their effort. We
recommend citing the NLD proposal at appropriate
opportunities as a useful gesture and possible mechanism to
advance Burma's national reconciliation process. It
demonstrates NLD's flexibility in the face of regime
stonewalling. Now, if only the democratic opposition could
present a united face to that stone wall. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA