Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1776
2006-12-07 02:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

Tags:  EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8507
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #1776/01 3410210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070210Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5491
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1261
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0061
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4407
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3651
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7159
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4748
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0053
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0987
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0991
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0755
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001776 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD,
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID:JMACARTHUR,
APHIS:NCARDENAS, REO:JWALLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

REF: RANGOON 1679

RANGOON 00001776 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001776

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD,
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID:JMACARTHUR,
APHIS:NCARDENAS, REO:JWALLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

REF: RANGOON 1679

RANGOON 00001776 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: Burma has not reported any new cases of AI
since it contained the March - April 2006 poultry outbreak
through extensive culling. The GOB continues to work with
donors to improve its surveillance, reporting, and response
capabilities. David Castellan, a short-term advisor to FAO
Rangoon, praised the GOB's progress in developing a
vaccination strategy and improving its response plan. He
identified political barriers, centralized command and
control, and lack of interagency coordination as the primary
remaining obstacles to effective action. FAO plans to
increase its staff to better handle AI issues in Burma. End
summary.


2. (SBU) David Castellan, a short-term Rangoon FAO
consultant, briefed econoff on developments in the GOB's
ability to identify and respond to another avian influenza
outbreak. He discussed the GOB's vaccination strategy, the
costs of the GOB's response to the March-April 2006 AI
outbreak, World Bank funding, problems of centralized
control, political barriers, poultry sector restructuring,
and increases in FAO staffing.


3. (SBU) Vaccination Strategy: The GOB has decided that it
will use vaccination to respond to AI only after all other
methods, including moving, culling, or disposing of sick
birds fail to work, and only if the outbreak moves out of
control. At that point, officials would use ring vaccination
for all poultry around an affected area. The Livestock
Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) will stockpile two
million vaccines. A short-term consultant will evaluate the
existing regulatory structure and advise on changes necessary
to address any legal constraints on the proposed strategy.
Castellan said he believed the GOB made the right choice not

to vaccinate before an emergency, but noted that the ring
vaccination strategy requires extremely tight surveillance.


4. (SBU) Culling Overkill: While the GOB was successful in
quickly halting the March-April 2006 AI outbreak through
extensive culling, Castellan said the toll in lost revenue
was high, especially for mid-size farmers. GOB officials
estimate that over 540 households were adversely affected by
the culling. Castellan said the "control area" of 10
kilometers from the site of the outbreak was too large, and
should be decreased to 2 kms. This would reduce the farmers'
financial losses and take into account the inability of
breeders and butchers to cull so many birds in a safe and
expeditious manner.


5. (SBU) Coordination Problems and World Bank Funding:
Castellan noted the need for better coordination between GOB
human and animal health departments and the central
government, and between central authorities and lower level
state/division and district officials. Although various
meetings have been held, no true coordination or
follow-through yet exists, he said. Castellan noted that the
World Bank would be more likely to release its projected $2
million funding if government entities cooperate closely. He
confirmed that the World Bank's initial plan was to give $1
million each to FAO and WHO to help develop infrastructure to
handle the AI threat in Burma. Projects would focus on
capacity-building for human and animal health officials to
develop in-country expertise, especially in epidemiology, lab
diagnostics, surveillance, disease control, partnership, and
leadership skills. The WB proposal will also include funding
for more research on the AI vaccination, further analysis of
the structure of Burma's poultry industry, and the creation

RANGOON 00001776 002.2 OF 002


of baseline data on Burma's extensive quail industry, about
which little is now known. The GOB culled almost as many
quail (317,000) as chickens (327,000) in the March and April
outbreak.


6. (SBU) Surveillance, Labs and Political Barriers: According
to Castellan, the top priorities in Burma are better
surveillance and lab capabilities. Castellan noted that
strict surveillance is required for the GOB's ring
vaccination strategy to work, and that regional commanders
must ensure human and animal health officials in their
regions work together. He said that the quality of efforts
around the country varies according to the quality of the
regional commander, and the process of shifting
responsibility from the national level to the state/division
level had not really started. He said that Burma can
eventually have effective surveillance teams at the district
level, but the political process to push responsibility down
must come from the top, through states and divisions, before
reaching the districts. Faced with limited resources,
Castellan said, Burma must choose the most efficient
surveillance method. He recommended that the government
focus on training poultry marketers, veterinarians, and
large-scale producers to create a strong biosecurity system
and early warning mechanisms. On lab capabilities, Castellan
agreed that the National Lab can now confirm AI diagnoses in
animals, and expected new efforts to focus on improvements at
regional labs to enable them to perform initial diagnosis as
well. He said the lab in Mandalay, Burma's second city,
still lacks key basic infrastructure.


7. (SBU) Poultry Sector Restructuring: Castellan said GOB
animal health officials plan a pilot project to set aside
land for poultry farms outside villages (reftel). The
project will begin with 98 acres in Sagaing and Mandalay
Divisions, sites of the prior AI outbreak. FAO will work
with LBVD to develop a comprehensive strategy that looks at
the functional components of the overall AI strategy,
including ministry restructuring, rather than one that
focuses on the efforts of individual donors or implementers.


8. (SBU) FAO Staff Increases: FAO plans to hire a long-term
technical advisor to supervise the efforts of its five new
short-term researchers and six national consultants. The
national consultants will focus on emergency planning,
implementation and management, labs, epidemiology;
communications, and biosecurity. The FAO staff plant to
operate from the LBVD offices to facilitate coordination,
Castellan said.


9. (SBU) Comment: The government is willing to cooperate with
international donors and accept foreign advice on handling
AI, unlike its attitude toward most other offers of
international humanitarian assistance, since the pandemic
also threatens them and their control over Burma.
Technicians and government officials welcome new input on AI,
but they are powerless to compel regional military commanders
to support surveillance teams, enforce biosafety, distribute
information to the public, or report suspected outbreaks in a
timely manner. Effective AI monitoring will require
significant attitude and policy changes. Until regime
leaders push their all-powerful regional commanders to make
AI a priority and cooperate fully with animal and human
health officials, the GOB's capacity to prevent another AI
outbreak will remain erratic and unpredictable. End comment.
VILLAROSA