Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT968
2006-05-19 16:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRB #0968/01 1391620 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 191620Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3776 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3988 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1706 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RABAT 000968
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, L, NEA, DS;
FBI FOR ITOS I/CONUS II/TEAM 3
FBI PLEASE PASS NEWARK DIVISION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009
TAGS: MO PHUM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION
REF: RABAT 517
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)
S E C R E T RABAT 000968
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, L, NEA, DS;
FBI FOR ITOS I/CONUS II/TEAM 3
FBI PLEASE PASS NEWARK DIVISION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009
TAGS: MO PHUM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION
REF: RABAT 517
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)
1. (S) Embassy Rabat provides the following background
concerning the possible deportation of Moroccan terrorist
suspect Mourad El Hamyani to Morocco. The Moroccan police
have an arrest warrant for El Hamyani for criminal activity,
including armed robbery with the intent to use the profits to
fund terrorist activity. Having supplied the US with
substantial information concerning El Hamyani's activities
and whereabouts, and as strong partner of the US in the war
on terror, the GOM would not understand a US decision to
allow self-deportation, which would allow El Hamyani to move
to another destination and elude capture. Such actions on
our part could erode our high level of security cooperation
with the Moroccans over the long term. The strong consensus
of the security agencies at post, including ORA, Legatt, and
RSO, is that the US should cooperate with Morocco to the
greatest extent possible to ensure that the Moroccan judicial
system is able to try El Hamdani.
Background
--------------
2. (S) In August 2003, Moroccan authorities provided
information to Legatt indicating that in August-September
2001 Mourad El Hamyani attended a training camp in
Afghanistan identified as Abu Yahya, which is believed to be
run by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The camp is
believed to be located north of Kabul.
3. (S) The Moroccan authorities advised that El Hamyani was
a member of an Al Qaeda cell which committed an armed robbery
in Sale, Rabat's twin city, on Redal Utility Company on
December 24, 2001. The Moroccan authorities have produced an
attested arrest warrant for this crime and have issued an
Interpol diffusion notice. Abdellatif Mourafik (AKA Malek al
Andaloussi, Mourafik),Abdelkrim Chadli (AKA Chadli),Youssef
Fikri (AKA Fikri) Abdelmalek Bouzgarne (AKA Bouzgarne),and
Mohamed Damir (AKA Abou Al Harith, Damir) are five
individuals who are currently being incarcerated by Moroccan
authorities and who have directly alleged that El Hamyani has
acted as an al Qaeda operative. Statements from these
individuals have linked El Hamyani to the Abu Yahya
paramilitary training camp to learn weapons handling in
Afghanistan and to the Redal armed robbery.
4. (S) According to these statements, El Hamyani was a
direct participant in the Redal attack. El Hamyani's
presence in Morocco is corroborated by passport entries
indicating that he arrived in Morocco on September 15, 2001.
The attack was reportedly carried out by a Salafist terrorist
cell led by Youssef Fikri. On July 29, 2002, in Moroccan
interview proceedings, Fikri indicated that El Hamyani served
as the "lookout" during the Redal armed robbery, and El
Hamyani allegedly alerted other members of the terrorist cell
that a Redal vehicle was departing the Redal Company building
in the Rahma quarter in Sale. Fikri also identified El
Hamyani as being someone whom Fikri met in the Abu Yahya camp
and who lived in New Jersey and was married to an American
citizen.
5. (S) Fikri explained further that El Hamyani took part in
the operations of the cell in order to raise funds to take to
Afghanistan. Similarly corroborating witness statements have
been provided by the individuals referenced above. The
statements associate El Hamyani with other terrorist plots as
well. Authenticated copies of these statements have been
provided to Legatt.
Deportation
--------------
6. (S) The US routinely deports Moroccans, escorted and
unescorted, to Morocco for a range of violations of US
criminal statutes. The GOM would likely jail El Hamyani on
arrival and hold him until his trial. Establishing new
conditions for the deportation of terrorist or criminal
suspects to Morocco could have far-reaching consequences for
US law enforcement efforts and cooperation. It could
establish an important new precedent and set Morocco apart
from how similar countries are treated by the US with regard
to deportation.
7. (S) Based on past experience, we do not believe the GOM
will provide assurances about the possible treatment of El
Hamyani upon his return to Morocco. The Mission sought
written assurances from the GOM concerning the return to
Morocco of detainees from Guantanamo, who were returned in
two groups in 2004 and 2005. The GOM provided oral
assurances that the returnees would be treated by the
judicial system in accordance with Moroccan law (one of the
Guantanamo returnees is in prison, while the others are free
on bail pending additional judicial action). The Moroccan
parliament passed a law criminalizing torture in March 2006
(reftel).
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, L, NEA, DS;
FBI FOR ITOS I/CONUS II/TEAM 3
FBI PLEASE PASS NEWARK DIVISION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009
TAGS: MO PHUM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION
REF: RABAT 517
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)
1. (S) Embassy Rabat provides the following background
concerning the possible deportation of Moroccan terrorist
suspect Mourad El Hamyani to Morocco. The Moroccan police
have an arrest warrant for El Hamyani for criminal activity,
including armed robbery with the intent to use the profits to
fund terrorist activity. Having supplied the US with
substantial information concerning El Hamyani's activities
and whereabouts, and as strong partner of the US in the war
on terror, the GOM would not understand a US decision to
allow self-deportation, which would allow El Hamyani to move
to another destination and elude capture. Such actions on
our part could erode our high level of security cooperation
with the Moroccans over the long term. The strong consensus
of the security agencies at post, including ORA, Legatt, and
RSO, is that the US should cooperate with Morocco to the
greatest extent possible to ensure that the Moroccan judicial
system is able to try El Hamdani.
Background
--------------
2. (S) In August 2003, Moroccan authorities provided
information to Legatt indicating that in August-September
2001 Mourad El Hamyani attended a training camp in
Afghanistan identified as Abu Yahya, which is believed to be
run by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The camp is
believed to be located north of Kabul.
3. (S) The Moroccan authorities advised that El Hamyani was
a member of an Al Qaeda cell which committed an armed robbery
in Sale, Rabat's twin city, on Redal Utility Company on
December 24, 2001. The Moroccan authorities have produced an
attested arrest warrant for this crime and have issued an
Interpol diffusion notice. Abdellatif Mourafik (AKA Malek al
Andaloussi, Mourafik),Abdelkrim Chadli (AKA Chadli),Youssef
Fikri (AKA Fikri) Abdelmalek Bouzgarne (AKA Bouzgarne),and
Mohamed Damir (AKA Abou Al Harith, Damir) are five
individuals who are currently being incarcerated by Moroccan
authorities and who have directly alleged that El Hamyani has
acted as an al Qaeda operative. Statements from these
individuals have linked El Hamyani to the Abu Yahya
paramilitary training camp to learn weapons handling in
Afghanistan and to the Redal armed robbery.
4. (S) According to these statements, El Hamyani was a
direct participant in the Redal attack. El Hamyani's
presence in Morocco is corroborated by passport entries
indicating that he arrived in Morocco on September 15, 2001.
The attack was reportedly carried out by a Salafist terrorist
cell led by Youssef Fikri. On July 29, 2002, in Moroccan
interview proceedings, Fikri indicated that El Hamyani served
as the "lookout" during the Redal armed robbery, and El
Hamyani allegedly alerted other members of the terrorist cell
that a Redal vehicle was departing the Redal Company building
in the Rahma quarter in Sale. Fikri also identified El
Hamyani as being someone whom Fikri met in the Abu Yahya camp
and who lived in New Jersey and was married to an American
citizen.
5. (S) Fikri explained further that El Hamyani took part in
the operations of the cell in order to raise funds to take to
Afghanistan. Similarly corroborating witness statements have
been provided by the individuals referenced above. The
statements associate El Hamyani with other terrorist plots as
well. Authenticated copies of these statements have been
provided to Legatt.
Deportation
--------------
6. (S) The US routinely deports Moroccans, escorted and
unescorted, to Morocco for a range of violations of US
criminal statutes. The GOM would likely jail El Hamyani on
arrival and hold him until his trial. Establishing new
conditions for the deportation of terrorist or criminal
suspects to Morocco could have far-reaching consequences for
US law enforcement efforts and cooperation. It could
establish an important new precedent and set Morocco apart
from how similar countries are treated by the US with regard
to deportation.
7. (S) Based on past experience, we do not believe the GOM
will provide assurances about the possible treatment of El
Hamyani upon his return to Morocco. The Mission sought
written assurances from the GOM concerning the return to
Morocco of detainees from Guantanamo, who were returned in
two groups in 2004 and 2005. The GOM provided oral
assurances that the returnees would be treated by the
judicial system in accordance with Moroccan law (one of the
Guantanamo returnees is in prison, while the others are free
on bail pending additional judicial action). The Moroccan
parliament passed a law criminalizing torture in March 2006
(reftel).
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley