Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT722
2006-04-20 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES FOR CREDIBLE

Tags:  MO PBTS PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0722/01 1101122
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201122Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3462
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3930
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0467
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2904
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5465
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0360
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3132
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4160
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8812
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1598
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0500
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000722 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; USUN FOR AMBASSADOR BOLTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010
TAGS: MO PBTS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES FOR CREDIBLE
AUTONOMY PLAN AND BROADER DEBATE

REF: A. STATE 60280

B. RABAT 714

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000722

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; USUN FOR AMBASSADOR BOLTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010
TAGS: MO PBTS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR PRESSES FOR CREDIBLE
AUTONOMY PLAN AND BROADER DEBATE

REF: A. STATE 60280

B. RABAT 714

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Deputy FM Taieb Fassi
Fihri for two hours the afternoon of April 17 to deliver
points on the possible visit of Hamas SecGen Mishal (Refs A
and B). Most of the meeting was consumed by a discussion on
the Western Sahara, however, as Fassi Fihri recapped his
recent meetings in Washington and subsequent visits to Moscow
and Beijing to lobby for support for Morocco's position on
the Sahara. In typical fashion he accused the Algerians of
moving the goalposts for improved relations with Morocco,
highlighting a series of statements by Algerian officials
indicating that improved relations and the opening of the
border depend on Morocco's implementation of the Baker Plan.
The Ambassador said the US was disappointed the GOM had come
to Washington empty-handed, after indicating it was prepared
to share specific ideas on autonomy. The Ambassador also
challenged Fassi Fihri on the consultation process underway
in Morocco on autonomy, saying it was unconvincing, and he
pressed Morocco to stimulate genuine debate on the issue.
Fassi Fihri appeared to delay even further the possible
submission of an autonomy plan, saying the consultation
process could take a year or more, and even hinting nothing
would be ready prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections.
End Summary.

Algerians Being Provocative
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Polcouns, met with Deputy
FM Fassi Fihri late afternoon April 17 to deliver Ref A
points on the possible visit of Hamas SecGen Khalid Mishal
(Ref B). Fassi Fihri was accompanied by MFA Bilateral
Affairs Director Youssef Amrani and Chef du Cabinet
Abdelmounaim el Farouq. Most of the two-hour discussion
focused on the Western Sahara issue. Ambassador asked for
Fassi Fihri's views on his March meetings in Washington and
his travels to other Security Council capitals. Fassi Fihri
said he had visited Paris, London, Moscow, and Beijing.

Before elaborating on what he encountered there, however,
Fassi Fihri opened a folder of documents -- recent statements
made by Algerian officials -- and proceeded to read directly
from them. He opened by noting that in Washington -- on
advice of the US embassy -- he had not spent a lot of time in
his discussions with USG complaining about Algeria. "We were
not very aggressive about Algeria," he said. He and PermRep
Sahel went to Washington to be constructive. It was in that
vein that the King had written recently to President Bush.
But he wanted the Ambassador to be clear about the statements
and position adopted by the Algerians toward Morocco since UN
Envoy Van Walsum's January 18 briefing of the Security
Council -- as evidenced by Algerian President Bouteflika's
letter to UNSYG Annan and statements made by the Algerian
cabinet.


3. (C) Algeria's insistence that it is not a party to the
conflict, but can play a helpful role, "provokes people in
Morocco," Fassi Fihri said. All Moroccans believe the key to
the conflict is in Algiers. Especially galling, Fassi Fihri
said, were PM Ouyahia's comments to the effect that the
re-opening of the border is tied with a resolution of the
Western Sahara conflict (which in turn hinges on
implementation of the Baker Plan, he added). So the Algerian
position was first Morocco's need to respect international
legality, then the two countries can talk about
normalization. Fassi Fihri said the Algerian Press Service
did not cover all of the PM's comments, but he had a
transcript of what was actually said. Former FM Belkhadem
had said recently the opening of the borders is not possible
in the absence of a resolution of the Western Sahara. In
Washington, FM Bedjaoui said (according to Fassi Fihri) that
the Americans know very well there are parties to the
conflict: Morocco and the Polisario; Algeria can help, along
with Spain, Mauritania, and the US, as "a friend of the two
parties." And Algerian Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Saleh was
in Washington this week; during a recent visit to Moscow, he

had said, "We want to fight and win, just like the Russians."


Recapping Washington Visit
--------------


4. (C) In Washington, Fassi Fihri continued, we heard "new
things" in meetings with USG officials. Opening another
folder and leafing through hand-written notes drafted by
Sahel, Mekouar, and himself following their meetings, notes
he joked that he had not even shared with his secretary, he
asked Polcouns to set aside his pen, as this was just
personal. Fassi Fihri said A/S Welch had welcomed Sahel and
him in a very warm manner, emphasizing the strength and
strategic nature of the US-Morocco relationship and the
important leadership of the King; conveying that the US
agreed that autonomy was the way forward for the Western
Sahara and self-determination could be accommodated in
several different ways; and suggesting that Morocco's
position on the issue was stronger than Algeria's (sic).
Deputy Secretary Zoellick, whom Fassi Fihri knew well from
the FTA negotiations, was very congenial, Fassi Fihri said,
and stressed that autonomy had to be real, and there had to
be a serious negotiation. NSC Deputy Abrams, Fassi Fihri
said, had focused on a Moroccan diplomatic timeline, and had
relayed that Russia and China, along with others in the Arab
world, were eager to play a role.


5. (C) What was new from the USG, Fassi Fihri said,
"something I have not heard in 12 years," was the idea that a
serious dialogue with the Polisario had to get underway
before the US could extend full support to Morocco. This was
conveyed to the Moroccans as an American suggestion, not a
condition, Fassi Fihri said, adding that A/S Welch and others
were "tough diplomats." He was also struck by the use of the
term "mystical" by USG officials to describe Morocco's
thinking on autonomy.

Russian, Chinese Views on Western Sahara
--------------


6. (C) Continuing his global tour, Fassi Fihri said the US
and P-4 had urged Morocco to "do its homework" in terms of
broad consultations on autonomy, and it was in that spirit
that Fassi Fihri had traveled to P-5 capitals. He believed
the P-5 understood that what Morocco was considering on
autonomy was different from the past. Morocco was going to
disseminate another autonomy plan. Fassi Fihri had traveled
to Moscow and Beijing in late 2003 to share the first
autonomy plan. Because the next plan would be widely
publicized, it needed the support of the Moroccan people as
well as the Security Council. The P-5 all have embassies in
Rabat and are to a varying extent in touch with the political
parties in Morocco.


7. (C) In Moscow, Fassi Fihri said, the Russians expressed
support for a political solution to the Western Sahara and
never mentioned the Polisario. In the past the GOR had
offered to the UN to mediate between Morocco and Algeria,
something the Algerians refused. The Chinese view the
conflict as pitting against each other two countries friendly
to China; the Chinese also favor a negotiated solution
acceptable to all parties. (Note: Chinese President Hu
Jintao will visit Morocco April 24-26).

Path to Autonomy is Irreversible
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador asked Fassi Fihri about the possibility of
an international conference on the Western Sahara. Depending
on the circumstances, would Morocco attend? Fassi Fihri said
the Algerians want a conference that brings together Morocco
and the Polisario and that allows Algeria to stay on the
sidelines and portray itself as a "good guy with no
historical responsibility." Fassi Fihri asserted that
Morocco was not against dialogue with the Polisario. There
had been dialogue in the past, and a Moroccan weekly magazine
had even carried a front-page story on the dialogue. The
King's call to political parties and the Moroccan people to

work together on an autonomy plan creates an irreversibility.
It is not a tactic. Morocco would present something to
negotiate with the Polisario. But the US and the
international community could not provide comfort to Algeria
that it was not a party to the dispute. The international
community makes a mistake if it allows Algeria to distance
itself from the conflict.


9. (C) As to timing, Fassi Fihri said the consultation
process with the political parties, now well underway, would
take a minimum of six months. The consultation with "the
people" could take twelve months, maybe more.

Morocco's About Face: Why?
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador said the US expected that Fassi Fihri
would present in Washington some elements of an autonomy
proposal, based on previous discussions with the Ambassador.
The US expected something concrete, based on what the GOM had
said. Fassi Fihri said Morocco was taking a page from
America's own book -- like the Millennium Challenge
Corporation -- and promoting a genuine discussion on
autonomy. That takes time, he insisted. The Ambassador said
he had spent much of the last week meeting with Morocco's
leading political parties; none had any real details to share
about their thinking on autonomy. The US was disappointed
that no plan, or no outline of one, was shared with the US in
Washington.

CORCAS
--------------


11. (C) Turning to the Royal Advisory Council for Sahrawi
Affairs (CORCAS),the Ambassador relayed that the head of the
RNI party, Ahmed Osman, had met with a delegation of Sahrawis
upset at having been excluded from CORCAS. Osman had
reportedly tried to arrange a meeting for the delegation with
the King, per their request, to no avail. Should CORCAS not
cast its net wide to encompass a variety of points of view,
the Ambassador asked. The impression we had was that CORCAS
was limited; it included former members of the Polisario and
others, but did anyone who does not support autonomy have a
voice in CORCAS? The Ambassador also questioned the decision
to hold the first meeting of CORCAS in Rabat; that was a a
"bad symbol," he said. For the US to support Morocco on
autonomy, Morocco needed a real consultation mechanism;
Morocco needed to stimulate real debate, not just produce a
council that would rubber stamp decisions made elsewhere.


12. (C) Fassi Fihri said he heard the Ambassador was not
impressed with CORCAS. He insisted that there would be
genuine debate. The US needed to understand how far CORCAS
had come from its earlier incarnation. The council was first
created in 1981 and was composed solely of tribal leaders.
When King Mohammed took the throne, he asked then-PM
Youssoufi to reinvigorate the council. He asked for wide
representation. There are people in the Sahara who argue
they cannot participate in such a mechanism if their father
is not represented. There are tribal customs, Fassi Fihri
said, even if they are evolving. Just as he had done with
the family code and the Equity and Reconciliation Commission,
the King had made an enormous effort to push CORCAS forward.
Former MOI Driss Basri froze the council in Hassan II's time.
King Mohammed endowed the council with an economic purpose
as well -- to advise on the development of the region. The
Sahara, after all, is poor. In spite of the King's call, no
one succeeded in dynamizing the Sahrawi council. He had to
step in directly. There were three women in the previous
council; now the council was representative and had special
inclusion of women and youth. Many Sahrawis are complaining
they are left out, but the council cannot include everyone
directly. Fassi Fihri said he did not think the US
appreciated the effort behind CORCAS. CORCAS could not
accept people who wave the Polisario flag. No individual who
supports the Polisario represents people in the Sahara.
Apart from that, the door is still open to membership.


13. (C) Fassi Fihri said the council met in Rabat because it

is a royal council, and it reports to the King, like other
royal councils. To hold the first meeting in Laayoune would
be destabilizing. Morocco does not do that with other royal
councils. The Rif area in the northern Morocco would make a
similar demand if CORCAS opened in the Sahara. All members
of CORCAS are advisors to the King. That is their role.
CORCAS represents all tendencies, from revolutionary to
conservative. CORCAS was not only charged to deal with
autonomy; it had a social and cultural role to play as well.
If in the end the political parties proposed and accepted
ideas on autonomy, it was not an accident, not something
automatic. There was an evolution underway, and the US
should welcome it.


14. (C) The Ambassador said he did not need to be convinced
of the objectives of CORCAS or indeed the GOM overall. The
more the US could see a real debate, the more supportive the
US could be on the outcome. Could anyone attend a CORCAS
meeting? Was there a way for CORCAS to interact with the
Polisario or with the UN? There was a real window of
opportunity here, the Ambassador stressed, a great chance to
push forward with autonomy. But one does not get the feeling
of open debate. Even the names of the CORCAS members ran
together as one long list, with individuals
indistinguishable. The US needs something tangible to
support. The more the debate and process were real, the less
they appeared artificial, the stronger Morocco's case was.
Fassi Fihri said the King had imposed no limits on CORCAS.
The Ambassador stressed the US expected a credible autonomy
plan from Morocco. Everyone does, he added. Fassi Fihri
insisted CORCAS and the way forward could not be more
transparent or credible. King Mohammed had been courageous
to get things this far. The debate in the coming months will
be intensive, Fassi Fihri promised. The King has not
proposed any particular plan for autonomy.


15. (C) At the door on the way out, Fassi Fihri noted that
Sahel had told him (Sahel called three times during the
meeting; Fassi Fihri took the third call and left the room
for several minutes to converse) that the UNSYG's report
would call on the parties to negotiate. Fassi Fihri
reiterated his earlier point about Moroccan willingness to
negotiate with the Polisario but advised that Algeria could
remain a by-stander. He also said that with the 2007
parliamentary elections coming up, Morocco had to be careful
that its autonomy plan could not be exploited by certain
political parties, implying that the timing of an autonomy
plan could be affected by the lead-up to the elections.
******************************************
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Riley